

# Ancient Commentators on Aristotle

GENERAL EDITORS: RICHARD SORABJI  
AND MICHAEL GRIFFIN

## ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS: On Aristotle Topics 3

Translated by  
Laura M. Castelli

BLOOMSBURY



# Alexander of Aphrodisias

*On Aristotle Topics 3*

*Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*

GENERAL EDITORS: Richard Sorabji, Honorary Fellow, Wolfson College, University of Oxford, and Emeritus Professor, King's College London, UK; and Michael Griffin, Associate Professor, Departments of Philosophy and Classics, University of British Columbia, Canada.

This prestigious series translates the extant ancient Greek philosophical commentaries on Aristotle. Written mostly between 200 and 600 AD, the works represent the classroom teaching of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic schools in a crucial period during which pagan and Christian thought were reacting to each other. The translation in each volume is accompanied by an introduction, comprehensive commentary notes, bibliography, glossary of translated terms and a subject index. Making these key philosophical works accessible to the modern scholar, this series fills an important gap in the history of European thought.

A webpage for the Ancient Commentators Project is maintained at [ancientcommentators.org.uk](http://ancientcommentators.org.uk) and readers are encouraged to consult the site for details about the series as well as for addenda and corrigenda to published volumes.

# Alexander of Aphrodisias

*On Aristotle Topics 3*

Translated by  
Laura M. Castelli

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC  
LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC  
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc  
50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK  
1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA  
29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland

BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of  
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published in Great Britain 2022

Copyright © Laura M. Castelli, 2022

Laura M. Castelli has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988,  
to be identified as Author of this work.

For legal purposes the Acknowledgements below and on p.37 constitute an extension  
of this copyright page.

Cover design: Terry Woodley

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or  
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information  
storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites  
referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going  
to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or  
sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Names: Alexander, of Aphrodisias, author. | Castelli, Laura Maria, translator, editor.

Title: On Aristotle Topics 3 / Alexander of Aphrodisias ; translated by Laura M. Castelli.

Other titles: Commentaria in Topica Aristotelis. English | Ancient commentators on Aristotle.

Description: New York : Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. | Series: Ancient commentators on Aristotle |  
Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021018836 (print) | LCCN 2021018837 (ebook) | ISBN 9781350214668 (hardback) |  
ISBN 9781350214682 (ebook) | ISBN 9781350214699 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Aristotle. Topics—Commentaries. | Philosophy, Ancient—Early works to 1800.

Classification: LCC PA3893.T7 A5413 2021 (print) | LCC PA3893.T7 (ebook) | DDC 185—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2021018836>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2021018837>

ISBN: HB: 978-1-3502-1466-8

ePDF: 978-1-3502-1468-2

eBook: 978-1-3502-1469-9

Series: Ancient Commentators on Aristotle

Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk

To find out more about our authors and books visit [www.bloomsbury.com](http://www.bloomsbury.com)  
and sign up for our newsletters.

## Acknowledgements

The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham College; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NOW/GW); the Ashdown Trust; the Lorne Thyssen Research Fund for Ancient World Topics at Wolfson College, Oxford; Dr Victoria Solomonides, the Cultural Attaché of the Greek Embassy in London; and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The editors wish to thank Jakob Fink, David Merry, Katerina Ierodiakonou, and Mirjam Kotwick for their comments; Marilù Papandreou for preparing the volume for press; and Alice Wright, Publisher for Classics and Archaeology with Bloomsbury Academic, for her diligence in seeing this volume of the series to press.

# Contents

Conventions	vi
Abbreviations	vii
Introduction: Alexander's commentary on Aristotle, <i>Topics</i> 3	1
Preliminary remarks	1
1. Aristotle, <i>Top.</i> 3 and its challenges	2
2. Alexander and the logical aspects of <i>Top.</i> 3	6
3. Alexander and the ethical contents of <i>Top.</i> 3.1–4	24
4. Note on the translation	33
5. Note on the Greek text	36
Acknowledgements	37
List of Departures from Wallies' Text	47
Translation	49
Notes	129
Select Bibliography	167
English–Greek Glossary	177
Greek–English Index	181
Index of Passages	187
Subject Index	193

## Conventions

- [...] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation for purposes of clarity.
- <...> Angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Greek text, i.e. additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompanying notes provide further details.
- (...) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words.

# Abbreviations

<i>Adv. Eth.</i>	<i>Adversus Ethicos</i>
<i>An. Post.</i>	<i>Analytica Posteriora</i>
<i>An. Pr.</i>	<i>Analytica Priora</i>
CAG	Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 23 vols (Berlin: Reimer, 1882–1909)
<i>Cat.</i>	<i>Categoriae</i>
<i>D.L.</i>	Diogenes Laertius, <i>Vitae philosophorum</i>
<i>Div. Arist.</i>	<i>Divisiones Aristoteleae</i>
<i>El.</i>	<i>Elementa</i>
EN	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>
<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium</i>
<i>Eth. Probl.</i>	<i>Ethica Problemata</i>
<i>Fin.</i>	<i>de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum</i>
<i>Gorg.</i>	<i>Gorgias</i>
<i>Hist.</i>	<i>Historiae</i>
<i>Hrdt.</i>	<i>Ad Herodotum</i>
<i>Iphig. Aul.</i>	<i>Iphigenia in Aulis</i>
<i>Il.</i>	<i>Iliad</i>
<i>Inst. Log.</i>	<i>Institutio Logica</i>
<i>Leg.</i>	<i>Leges</i>
LSJ	H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. Jones, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
<i>Mant.</i>	<i>De Anima Libri Mantissa</i>
<i>Metaph.</i>	<i>Metaphysica</i>
<i>Meteor.</i>	<i>Meteorologica</i>
<i>Mixt.</i>	<i>De Mixtione</i>
<i>Off.</i>	<i>De officiis</i>
<i>Op.</i>	<i>Opera et Dies</i>
<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Philebus</i>
<i>Phys.</i>	<i>Physica</i>
PN	<i>Parva Naturalia</i>
<i>Polit.</i>	<i>Politicus</i>

<i>Pol.</i>	<i>Politica</i>
<i>PH</i>	<i>Pyrrhonei Hypotyposes</i>
<i>Probl.</i>	<i>Problemata</i>
<i>Quaest.</i>	<i>Quaestiones</i>
<i>Resp.</i>	<i>Res Publica</i>
<i>Rhet.</i>	<i>Rhetorica</i>
SVF	von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i> , 4 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–24)
<i>Top.</i>	<i>Topica</i>

# Introduction

## Alexander's Commentary on Aristotle, *Topics* 3: A Glimpse into Peripatetic Logic and Peripatetic Ethics in the Second–Third Century CE

### Preliminary remarks

The third book of Aristotle's *Topics* is a relatively short and yet rather challenging text. Alexander's commentary on *Top.* 3 includes hints about Alexander's take on most of the challenges of this text and is, in this sense, a valuable piece of exegesis which will be of interest for those working on Aristotle's *Top.* 3. The commentary, however, also gives us information about Alexander's views on this text as a piece of Aristotelian philosophy. In this respect, Alexander's agenda often includes worries and considerations distinct from those of the contemporary reader (or of the contemporary commentator).

In the introduction to the translation of Alexander's commentary on *Top.* 2<sup>1</sup> the reader can find a more general introduction to the commentary on the *Topics* as a whole and to its value as a piece of evidence for Alexander's views about the *Organon* and (what he takes to be) Peripatetic logic more generally. Those general considerations extend to the commentary on *Top.* 3. In this introduction I shall rather focus on the specific features of the commentary on *Top.* 3. Some specific features concern the logical aspects of Aristotle's *Top.* 3: the focus on comparative problems, in which a conclusion in comparative form is established or demolished; the analysis of the relations obtaining between different *topoi*;<sup>2</sup> the account of how to tackle particular problems in 3.6. In addition to the logical aspects, however, the commentary on *Top.* 3 has a peculiarity (based on a corresponding peculiarity of Aristotle's *Top.* 3.1–4). One general feature of the method presented in the *Topics* is that, as Aristotle acknowledges, the method is in principle topic-neutral. In other words, although the claims which will be attacked and defended in any actual dialectical debate will have some specific content, the argumentative strategies and the argumentative patterns provided in the *Topics* can be used independently of the specific contents of the claim

addressed. *Top.* 3.1–4, however, differ from the rest of the *Topics* in that they resort systematically to one single example: all *topoi* in *Top.* 3.1–4 are formulated and illustrated with reference to what is choiceworthy (*haireton*) and to what is to be avoided (*pheukton*). Alexander is sensitive to the ethical contents of these chapters and this might have some historical relevance in addition to some philosophical implications for his interpretation of *Top.* 3.

After an overview of Aristotle's *Top.* 3 (section 1), in the next sections I will highlight what I take to be the most interesting overarching features of the commentary both with reference to the logical aspects of *Top.* 3 (section 2) and with reference to its ethical contents (section 3). As for the logical aspects, I shall mainly focus on three points: Alexander's views on comparative predication, comparative *topoi* and comparative problems (2.1); the way in which Alexander deals with *topoi* of different generality (2.2); Alexander's account of particular problems in 3.6 (2.3). As for the ethical contents, I shall provide an overview of Alexander's take on ethical problems within Aristotle's theory of dialectical practice (3.1) and a brief reconstruction of the main systematic points in ethical theory Alexander alludes to throughout the commentary (3.2). I shall also make a suggestion about the different ways in which Alexander might have found the *topoi* about the choiceworthy worth investigating: in alignment with some more general cultural trends of his time, he may have thought that these *topoi*, in addition to being tools for philosophical debates, could also be used as general rules or principles for deliberation (3.3). Finally, I shall comment on my main translation choices (section 4) and add a few general comments on the Greek text on which the translation is based (section 5).

## 1. Aristotle, *Top.* 3 and its challenges

### 1.1 *Top.* 3 within the *Topics*

Aristotle's *Topics* is a treatise about dialectical argumentation. It is introduced by Aristotle as providing a method supposed to enable those who master it to argue for or defend any claim without falling into contradiction.<sup>3</sup> While the extent to which the *Topics* are a unified and systematic treatise is a controversial matter,<sup>4</sup> it is fairly clear that one guiding idea is behind the structure of the treatise at least as we (and Alexander) read it. The claims one can attack or defend are typically in predicative form: something (a predicate, expressed by a general term or description: e.g. 'pale', 'capable of laughing', 'biped rational animal') is ascribed to

something else (a subject, expressed by a general term or description: e.g. 'human being', 'soul', 'the just man'). Depending on the way in which the predicate is ascribed to the subject, in *Top.* 1.4–5 Aristotle distinguishes four basic types of predicate: accident (*sumbebêkos*), specific property (*idion*, often referred to in the literature with the Latin translation: *proprium*), genus (*genos*, to which the difference, *diaphora*, is associated), and definition (*horos*). In his systematic account of the distinction in *Top.* 1.8, Aristotle resorts to the combination of two general criteria in order to show that the distinction is exhaustive: a predicate can either be predicated instead of (i.e. be co-extensive with) the subject, or not; and a predicate can either express or contribute to expressing the essence of the subject, or not. The result of the application of these two criteria is that there are four possible types of predicate: a predicate which is not predicated instead of the subject and does not express the essence of a subject (i.e., an accident); a predicate which is not predicated instead of the subject but does contribute to expressing the essence of the subject (i.e., a genus or a difference); a predicate which is predicated instead of the subject and does not express its essence (i.e., a *proprium*); a predicate which is predicated instead of the subject and expresses its essence (i.e., a definition). The distinction of these four types of predicate provides the basic structure for the central books (2–7) of the treatise, where the *topoi* for establishing or demolishing claims expressing the corresponding type of predication are given: books 2 and 3 present (with some qualification to which I shall return presently) *topoi* about the accident; book 4 about genus and difference; book 5 about the *proprium*; and books 6 and 7 about the definition.

Within this picture, the analysis of the precise relation between books 2 and 3 presents some challenges. *Top.* 3, as Aristotle emphasizes, deals with 'comparative' problems. In *Top.* 1.5, 102a14–20 Aristotle says explicitly that comparisons 'from the accident' belong together with the accident.<sup>5</sup> Aristotle is not particularly explicit on this point, but what this seems to mean is that problems in which an accident F is predicated in a comparative way ('... is more F than...' '... is less F than...' '... is as F as...') belong together with problems about the accident despite their peculiarity, i.e. being about a comparison. Aristotle does not say whether the comparative predication is supposed to appear in the premises or in the conclusion (or both). As we will see,<sup>6</sup> Alexander will distinguish between problems in which comparative propositions are used as premises to establish (or demolish) a non-comparative conclusion and problems in which a comparative conclusion is established (or demolished).

Both the comparative form of the problems discussed in *Top.* 3 and the type of predication they express, however, raise some issues in their own right and

with respect to the general picture sketched above. As for the comparative form of the problems in *Top.* 3, nowhere does Aristotle discuss explicitly how the logic of comparative predication relates to the logic of non-comparative predication which he seems to regard as basic (not only in the *Topics* but, more generally, throughout his logical writings). Nor does he suggest that the logic of comparative predication might be independent of the logic of non-comparative predication. At the beginning of his commentary on *Top.* 3 Alexander may suggest that, since all comparisons fall under the category of the relatives, arguments based on comparative predication are (in a sense to be qualified) all about one type of accident, i.e. relatives.<sup>7</sup> There are texts suggesting that Alexander does not see any problem in taking propositions with a relative predicate, such as 'A is equal to B', as conclusions of a syllogism.<sup>8</sup> All this suggests that Alexander did not find the predicative structure of propositions expressing a comparison (or, more generally, a relation) particularly problematic.

As for the idea that comparative problems belong together with those about the accident because what is expressed in comparative terms is accidental predication, it is important to stress that in *Top.* 2 Aristotle switches back and forth between two conceptions of the accident. On a more specific conception, a determinate modality is associated to the accident: the accident is a predicate which can belong or not belong to a subject while the subject remains the sort of thing it is.<sup>9</sup> On the broader conception, no determinate modality is associated to the accident and accidental predication turns out to be, quite in general, predication in which it is not specified how the predicate belongs to the subject.<sup>10</sup> On the broader conception, Aristotle can claim that the topic of the accident is part of or contributes to the topic of the definition:<sup>11</sup> a definition is a predicate which belongs to a subject, is co-extensive with it and expresses what the subject is. In order to establish or demolish a proposed definition, then, one must check (among other things) whether the proposed definition does or does not belong to the given subject. And this task can be accomplished through the *topoi* of the accident.<sup>12</sup> On the more specific conception of the accident, establishing that a predicate belongs to a subject as an accident amounts to excluding that it belongs to the subject as any other type of predicate.<sup>13</sup> For this reason, the broader conception is referred to as 'inclusive', while the more specific conception is rather 'exclusive'. Whether *Top.* 3 rests on either of these conceptions of the accident or (like *Top.* 2) switches back and forth is no trivial issue and Alexander's commentary is ambiguous. The introductory remarks in the prologue to the commentary on *Top.* 3 suggest that comparative problems only refer to accidents

on the exclusive understanding of accidents, while other remarks and some *topoi* rather seem to require the inclusive reading.<sup>14</sup>

## 1.2 The structure of *Top.* 3

As for its structure, *Top.* 3 can be divided into three blocks.

(i) In 3.1–3 Aristotle provides a list of *topoi* for establishing and demolishing claims stating that something is more or less (or equally) choiceworthy (*haireton*) or to be avoided (*pheukton*) than (or as) something else. In 3.4 he claims that the same *topoi* can be used to establish or demolish claims stating that something is choiceworthy or to be avoided without qualification. This raises a question as to the relation between comparative claims (e.g. ‘health is more choiceworthy than wealth’) and corresponding non-comparative claims in which the predicate is ascribed to the same subject without qualification (‘health is choiceworthy’).

(ii) 3.5 builds a block on its own: in this chapter, Aristotle explains how the *topoi* about what is more or less or similarly choiceworthy can be generalized into *topoi* about what is more or less or similarly ‘such and such’, thereby suggesting that the *topoi* in 3.1–3 can be used as a starting point for a more general topic of comparative problems. One of the main issues with respect to this move concerns the relations obtaining between *topoi* of different generality (e.g. those specifically about what is more choiceworthy in 3.1–3 and those more generally about what is more ‘such and such’ in 3.5), how one can identify or distinguish different *topoi*, and how relations between *topoi* can be described. On this point Alexander is much more explicit than Aristotle, also because he takes into account the work done on *topoi* by Aristotle’s followers (especially Theophrastus), which provides Alexander with additional conceptual tools.<sup>15</sup>

(iii) Finally, in 3.6 Aristotle returns to the distinction between universal and particular problems he had already introduced in 2.1, 108b34–109a10, and spells out how one should tackle particular problems. In 3.6 (119b6 ff.) Aristotle gives indications about how to proceed if the problem is ‘indeterminate’ (*adioriston*). The examples he gives to illustrate this case, however, raise some questions about Aristotle’s understanding of quantification in the *Topics* and about the relation of 3.6 with the explicit partition of propositions into universal, particular, and indeterminate in *An. Pr.* 1.1, 24a17–22. With respect to 3.6, Alexander endorses a rather specific reading of the chapter. On his reading 3.6 presents three strategies to tackle particular problems, where particular problems may differ with respect to the amount of determination they include.<sup>16</sup>

## 2. Alexander and the logical aspects of *Top.* 3

From the logical point of view, the most interesting aspects of Alexander's commentary on *Top.* 3 are three. (1) Firstly, the commentary provides some information about Alexander's take on comparative predication and comparative problems. (2) Secondly, it discusses the relations obtaining between *topoi*, often in terms of potentiality, containment and determination, which is reminiscent of Theophrastus' account of *topos*. (3) Thirdly, it contains an account of the determination of particular propositions which, again, shares some features with Theophrastus's account of *topos* and gives us some information about Alexander's take on quantification in this commentary. I shall deal with each of (1)–(3) separately, but the reader should be aware that some of the issues in (1)–(3) relate to each other even when they do not fully overlap.

### 2.1 Alexander on comparative predication, comparative *topoi* and comparative problems

As mentioned above, in the course of *Top.* 3.1–3 Aristotle discusses a number of *topoi* to establish or demolish claims that something is more (or less or equally) choiceworthy (or to be avoided) than (or as) something else. He then claims that the same *topoi* can be used to establish or demolish non-comparative claims stating that something is choiceworthy (or to be avoided) (3.4). And, finally, he says that the *topoi* about what is more (or less or equally) choiceworthy can be generalized into *topoi* to establish or demolish that something is more or less or equally 'such and such' (*toiouton*) (3.5).

At the beginning of the commentary on *Top.* 3 Alexander provides a fairly exhaustive overview of the structure of comparison, their categorial framework and the 'matter' for comparisons. Alexander distinguishes clearly the objects that are compared (i.e. the *relata*) and the respect in which they are compared. Expanding on a distinction Aristotle draws in *Top.* 2.10, 114b6–14, Alexander distinguishes the cases in which: (a) the comparison is between two (or more) objects with respect to one single property; (b) the comparison is between the degrees in which two (or more) properties belong to the same object; (c) the comparison is between two (or more) objects with respect to two properties. Alexander also distinguishes the case in which the objects figuring in the comparison are simple (e.g. justice) or complex (e.g. justice taken together with health); this distinction cuts across (a)–(c).<sup>17</sup>

As for the property or properties with respect to which things are compared, Alexander specifies (217,13–19) that these can only be accidents, since these are the only predicates which can belong to different degrees to the different subjects they belong to. The basic intuition here seems to be that if a predicate expresses a genus or a *proprium* or a definition of several subjects, the predicate will belong in the same way (or: to the same “degree”) to all of them.<sup>18</sup> The implication of this remark seems to be that comparative problems are about accidents on the exclusive understanding of the accident.<sup>19</sup> This point seems to be confirmed by Alexander’s considerations about the categorial framework of comparative problems (218,13–219,1): comparisons can only be with respect to nine categories out of ten, since comparisons are with respect to accidents. There are other passages, however, which may suggest that the inclusive understanding of the accident is required to make sense of at least some comparative problems.

First, in spelling out the categorial framework of comparisons, Alexander seems to partially revise his claim that comparisons can only be with respect to accidents of the subject(s) by saying that it might seem that comparison with respect to substance is possible, since one can ask whether primary substances are substances more than secondary substances are (219,1–3).<sup>20</sup> More importantly, Aristotle presents *topoi* (e.g. 116a23–8; 116a31–5) requiring that the same predicate (in the examples: ‘good’ and ‘choiceworthy’) belong to one thing as a genus or in its own right and to something else not as a genus or incidentally. This implies that the predicate with respect to which two or several objects are compared need not belong to all compared objects in the same way, i.e. as an accident: it could be that it belongs to some as an accident and to some other in another way. This seems to require that the exclusive reading of the accidents in comparative problems be at least qualified: for a difference in degree and a comparison seem to be possible also in those cases in which the predicate belongs to some objects as an accident (on the exclusive reading) and to some other objects non-incidentally. But in this case the comparison can only be with respect to the predicate understood as an accident in the inclusive sense. For example, if a predicate (e.g. ‘good’) belongs to a subject (e.g. ‘happiness’) as a genus or per se and to another (e.g. ‘surgery’) only incidentally, the comparison cannot be about the predicate as an exclusive accident, since as an exclusive accident it is predicated only of one of the two objects and not of both. In other words, the possibility of a comparison with respect to a property which can belong to different subjects in different ways must be accommodated, and this is only possible under the inclusive reading of the accident.

This intuition is perhaps captured by Alexander in his discussion about problems about the accident. In a passage I shall return to later for other reasons,<sup>21</sup> Alexander discusses whether problems such as whether one ought to get married belong together with problems about the accident. The answer, according to Alexander, is that they do since what such problems ask is either whether getting married is more choiceworthy than something else or whether getting married is choiceworthy. Either way, the question is whether the predicate belongs as an accident to the subject (52,21–7). In spelling out this view, Alexander comments on someone else's view about such problems:

[T1] *Alex., in Top. 52,27–53,9*

But there are those who say that such problems are from the genus: for the enquiry in them is whether the choiceworthy is the genus [of the subject]. However, the enquiry is not whether the choiceworthy is predicated in their what-it-is, but rather only whether it belongs to them. And those who demolish [such claims] do not show that it is not the genus – say, for instance, [they do not show] that the good [is not the genus] of pleasure, but that it does not belong to it. [...] [53,2] There is an enquiry also about such problems, under what [type of predicate] they must be ordered: whether the gods are, whether the soul is. And some say that all such [problems] are genus-related: for the enquiry in them is whether the submitted [subject] is in the genus: being. Alternatively, these might fall under the accident, too: for even those to whom being does not seem to be a genus – those who enquire into such things enquire nonetheless whether being belongs incidentally to [those subjects, i.e. the gods and the soul] or whether they belong among things that are. For also in these cases the enquiry is about the simple belonging (*peri haplôs huparxeôs*), not about the way of belonging (*ou peri tropou huparxeôs*).

The remarks about the simple belonging can be taken as (more or less self-aware) allusions to the inclusive understanding of the accident, which, at least in this text, apply also to the predicate ('choiceworthy') chosen as an example in *Top.* 3.1–4. Whether these remarks, according to Alexander, apply across the board to all comparative problems we cannot tell with certainty, but in any case it seems clear that Alexander (like Aristotle) switches back and forth between the inclusive and the exclusive understanding of the accident.

We can now take a closer look at the propositions which Aristotle considers with reference to comparisons in the *Topics*. Aristotle considers three cases:

- (a) S1 is P more than / less than / as much as S2.
- (b) S is P1 more than / less than / as much as P2.
- (c) S1 is P1 more than / less than / as much as S2 is P2.<sup>22</sup>

There are two ways in which one can analyse these propositions. On one reading, the comparative 'more than' / 'less than' / 'as much as' is taken as a propositional connective.<sup>23</sup> On this interpretation, what is compared are propositions with respect (e.g.) to their degree of truth. (a)-(c) could then be rephrased in the following way:

- (a') 'S1 is P' is more true than / less true than / as true as 'S2 is P'.
- (b') 'S is P1' is more true than / less true than / as true as 'S is P2'.
- (c') 'S1 is P1' is more true than / less true than / as true as 'S2 is P2'.

Although this is an interesting and promising approach to comparative logic, it does not seem to be the way in which Alexander goes. Alexander takes seriously all of Aristotle's indications about the way in which comparative problems relate to the general classification of problems based on the type of predication they express. As mentioned above, comparative problems belong together with problems about the accident. Compared to non-comparative problems about the accident, comparative problems require not only that a predicate belong to a subject, but also that it belong to some subject to a greater extent (than to another subject or than another predicate or than another predicate belongs to another subject). Alexander phrases this point by saying that in comparative problems not only the *huparxis* (the 'belonging' of a predicate to a subject), but also the *hyperokhê*, the 'excess' is at stake (*in Top.* 221,27–33). In a similar way Aristotle (3.4, 119a3–4) distinguishes the claim that a predicate belongs to a subject from the *hyperokhê*, which can be detached from the predication. This all strongly suggests that both for Aristotle and for Alexander the comparative modifies the predicate.

As already mentioned, Alexander says explicitly that the comparison can be carried out with respect to any accidental predication. The comparison (*sunkrisis*) as such, however, falls under the relative (*hupo to pros ti*: 218,16).<sup>24</sup> Alexander does not spell out this point any further, but one thing that he might be trying to say is that, although the (monadic) predicate taking on the comparative form can belong to any category, the comparative formulation turns any standard predicative proposition into a proposition in which the predicate is a relative. In order to fully understand the implications of this picture, we would need to know more about Alexander's views on the category of the relatives. It is a well-known fact that Aristotle's account of the relatives in *Cat.* 7 is far from being simple or uncontroversial. Among other things, interpreters discuss whether Aristotle sees any clear distinction between properties (corresponding, in modern logic, to monadic predicates) and relations (corresponding, in modern logic, to two-place

predicates). For example, Aristotle will say that, in the two sentences ‘Socrates is larger’ and ‘Socrates is red’, the predicates indicate a relative and a quality respectively. However, due to some difficulties in Aristotle’s account of the category of relatives, it is not clear whether Aristotle thinks that the linguistic incompleteness is a distinctive mark of some predicates in need of any special logical treatment.<sup>25</sup> It is hard to tell how much Alexander adheres to Aristotle’s texts (including unclear points) on the relatives in his own understanding of the relatives.

Bearing this difficulty in mind, we can now take a closer look at the *topoi* in *Top.* 3. More specific things can be said about each single *topos*, but in order to get an idea of the sort of formulations that Aristotle regards as *topoi* in this book, a sample of the general *topoi* in 3.5 is a good place to start:

- (i) What is F by nature is more F than what is F not by nature.
- (ii) If *a*, when added to *b*, makes *b* F, while *c*, when added to *b*, does not make *b* F, then *a* is more F than *c*.
- (iii) If both *a* and *b* make *c* F, but *a* makes *c* more F than *b* does, then *a* is more F than *b*.
- (iv) If *a* is more F than *c* and *b* is less F than *c*, then *a* is more F than *b*.
- (v) If *a* is more F than *b*, which is F, and *c* is more F than *d*, which is not F, then *a* is more F than *c*.
- (vi) If *a* and *b* are such that, when added to *c*, *a*+*c* is more F than *b*+*c*, then *a* is more F than *c*.

Such a sample makes it possible to highlight some peculiarity of the lists in *Top.* 3 without focusing on the specific contents of the *topoi* about what is choiceworthy. We can distinguish between two basic types of *topoi*. In *topoi* such as (iv)–(vi) the only features of the compared terms figuring in the *topos* are those with respect to which the comparative claims are made. They exclusively describe the behaviour of ‘quantitative’ relations. There are other *topoi*, however, in which the comparative claim is established as a consequence of some further claim involving properties other than that (or those) with respect to which the comparison is made. (i)–(iii) (as most *topoi* in 3.1–4) are of this type in that they spell out a dependence of a difference in degree (expressed in a comparative sentence) on some further properties of the compared object. For example, they rely on whether the compared objects have the property with respect to which the comparison is made by nature or not by nature, in their own right or incidentally; how the compared things behave in causal interactions in which the property with respect to which the comparison is made is what is brought

about in something else. The list can be extended, and the reader will find many more such examples going through *Top.* 3.1–4.

These *topoi* bring to expression the general idea that in order to establish or demolish a comparative claim one can look at further features of the compared objects. The features one can resort to in order to back up a difference in degree in the way a property belongs to different subjects are of different types: they may have to do with the nature of such objects, with their behaviour in causal interactions, with their behaviour over time, etc. It is noteworthy that Aristotle resorts to these features in 3.4 to back up his claim that the same *topoi* used to establish that something is more choiceworthy or more to be avoided than something else can be used to establish that the same thing is choiceworthy or to be avoided. The idea here is not so much that any comparative predication implies the corresponding non-comparative predication (if *a* is more F than *b*, then *a* is F),<sup>26</sup> but rather that one can resort to the same grounds one can use to establish that something is more F than something else also to establish that the same thing is F without qualification. In other words, the point in 3.4 does not seem to be that, whenever one has established that *a* is more (or less or equally) F than (or as) *b*, one can directly derive from this that *a* is F. The point is rather that, if one can argue that *a* is more F than *b* because *a* is G (or more G than *b*), then one can also argue that *a* is F because *a* is G (where G may have to do with causal efficacy, ontological stability, being essentially or naturally F, etc.).

It is not clear whether Aristotle (or Alexander) thought that a useful distinction can or should be drawn between *topoi* such as (i)–(iii) and those such as (iv)–(vi). Alexander introduces his commentary on 3.5 (i.e. the chapter where Aristotle provides the generalized version of some of the *topoi* about the more choiceworthy in 3.1–3) by saying that comparisons can be made ‘most of all’ or ‘especially’ (*malista*: 275,28) with reference to magnitudes and numbers. It is hard to tell from this remark whether Alexander thought that some *topoi* might be more apt than others for developing a systematic logic of comparative relations. Did Aristotle ever think of such a possibility? Evidence in Aristotle is very sparse and certainly not enough to ascribe to him a clear theory. Such evidence, however, is worth presenting because Alexander certainly was aware of it. The most extensive passage in which Aristotle refers to arguments including comparative propositions is *An. Pr.* 2.22, 68a25–b7.

**[T2] Arist., *An. Pr.* 2.22, 68a25–b7:**

When, of two things that are opposite, A is more choiceworthy than B, and in the same way, D [is more choiceworthy] than C, then if A and C [taken together] are more choiceworthy than B and D [taken together], A is more choiceworthy

than D. For A is as much to be pursued as B is to be avoided (for they are opposites), and C [is similarly related] to D (for they are opposites too). If, then, A is as choiceworthy as D, B is as much to be avoided as C: for each of the two stands in a similar relation to the other [in each pair, i.e.], the one which is to be avoided to the one which is to be pursued. Therefore, A and C together will be [as much to be pursued or avoided] as B and D together. But since [A and C together are] more [choiceworthy than B and D together], it cannot be [that A is] as [choiceworthy as D]: for then B and D together would be as [choiceworthy as A and C together]. But if D is more choiceworthy than A, then B must be less to be avoided than C; for the less is opposed to the less. But the greater good together with the lesser evil is more choiceworthy than the lesser good together with the greater evil: the whole BD, then, [would be] more choiceworthy than AC. But in the present case this is not so. A, then, is more choiceworthy than D, and therefore C is less to be avoided than B.

In this passage Aristotle illustrates one rule about what is more choiceworthy, which he then applies to show that affection is more choiceworthy than sexual intercourse (2.22, 68a39–68b7). Attention to the logic of choice, so to speak, is obviously reminiscent of *Top.* 3.1–4 and, although we do not have Alexander's commentary on *An. Pr.* 2, it is certainly possible that he thought that this passage somehow relates to the *Topics*. As it stands, however, the passage is rather isolated, and it is hard to tell whether it was supposed to be part of a larger picture about comparisons. The use of schematic letters, at least superficially in the fashion of the *Analytics*, departs from the fashion of the *Topics*, where Aristotle uses pronouns ('this', 'that') to indicate the objects of the comparison. The letters in this passage, however, do not stand for subject and predicate, but rather stand for the *relata* of the relation 'more choiceworthy than', while the latter figures in the text as a constant. Nothing suggests that Aristotle would be interested in figuring out what happens if 'more choiceworthy' were dropped in favour of 'more P' (or 'more such and such', as in *Top.* 3.5).

The idea, in *Top.* 3.5, that the *topoi* of the more choiceworthy can be generalized into *topoi* about what is 'more such and such' and the corresponding interest in developing a more general account of deductions based on comparisons may be found in some allusions in the course of *An. Pr.* Whether Aristotle himself ever worked out such a general account we do not know, but it is clear that Alexander is familiar with some account of such deductions which may have been developed by Theophrastus and, perhaps, by Eudemus.<sup>27</sup>

In *An. Pr.* 1.28, 45b17 Aristotle mentions (without saying much about it) a type of *sullogismos* from a hypothesis (*ex hupotheseôs*) 'based on quality' or 'with

respect to quality' (*kata poiôtêta*), and in his commentary (*in An. Pr.* 324,19–325,24) Alexander clearly links this label to some types of arguments which we find in the *Topics*. In the course of the commentary to this passage, Alexander provides examples and a brief discussion of the structure of all three types of argument (from the more, from the less, from the similar), but for the sake of our assessment of the relation of this passage with the commentary on the *Topics* the initial lines and the first example will suffice:

[T3] Alex., *in An. Pr.* 324,19–33:

'Based on quality' (*kata poiôtêta*) are called those which show [their conclusion] from the more and the less and the similar (*apo tou mallon kai hêtton kai homoiou*), since these, i.e. the similar and the more and the less, follow upon quality (*tôi poiôi parakolouthei*). These [*sullogismoi*] themselves,<sup>28</sup> too, come about based on replacement (*kata metalêpsin*):<sup>29</sup> for in the [deductions] showing [their conclusion] in this way one thing is set as a hypothesis (*hupotithetai*), while the argument (*deixis*) and the deduction (*sullogismos*) are of another thing, which is itself also said to be replaced (*metalambanomenon*). For the one who shows that being happy does not consist in being wealthy through the [claim] that [it does] not [consist] in being healthy either, sets as a hypothesis: 'if the thing which would seem to be sufficient for happiness to a higher degree is not sufficient, neither will the thing [which seems to be so] to a lesser degree be sufficient'; but health, which seems to be sufficient for happiness to a higher degree than wealth, is not sufficient; therefore, wealth is not [sufficient] either. That wealth is not sufficient for happiness, if indeed health is not so, is set as a hypothesis. That health is not sufficient for happiness, instead, is shown through a deduction in this way: some people are healthy with a vice; nobody who has a vice is happy; therefore, those who are healthy are not happy; therefore, health is not sufficient for happiness.

Several points in this text are worth emphasizing. First, Alexander is talking about a class of fairly complex deductive arguments. The example Alexander discusses is this:

- (0) If the thing which would seem to be sufficient for happiness to a higher degree is not sufficient for happiness, neither will the thing which seems to be sufficient to a lower degree be sufficient. [Set as a hypothesis.]
- (1) If health, which seems to be sufficient for happiness to a higher degree than wealth, is not sufficient for happiness, wealth is not sufficient either. [Set as a hypothesis.]
- (2) Some people have health together with a vice. [Premise, to establish (4).]

- (3) Nobody who has a vice is happy. [Premise, to establish (4).]
- (4) Therefore, some people who are healthy are not happy. (= Health is not sufficient for happiness.) [Deduced through a categorical syllogism from (2) and (3).]
- (5) Therefore, wealth is not sufficient for happiness. [From (1) and (4) through the hypothesis: (1), (0) or both?]

One difficult part about this argument is that it is not fully clear what logical function Alexander ascribes to (0) and (1) respectively. Alexander's account of this type of argument is in keeping (both on clear and on less clear points) with what he says, in an earlier passage, about arguments from the more, the similar and the less:

[T4] *Alex., in An. Pr. 265,30–266,5:*

And those from the more, the similar and the less would fall under those from a hypothesis, too: for in these, too, one thing is set as a hypothesis, while another thing is replaced – and it is with respect to the latter that a categorical syllogism is used; for all [deductions],<sup>30</sup> in which something is replaced, are from a hypothesis. And in these, too, there occurs a replacement: for example, if what is a greater good than something else is not productive of happiness, neither will the lesser good be productive of it; but health, being a greater good than wealth, is not productive of happiness; for this is what is replaced and is in need of a categorical argument. And, similarly, for 'if the lesser good is choiceworthy because of itself, also the greater good is; but wealth, being a lesser good than health, is choiceworthy because of itself'; for in this case again this is what is replaced and is in need of a categorical argument. And those from the similar are of this sort, too. And Aristotle calls 'based on quality' (*kata poiôtêta*) specifically those from the more, the less and the similar, while he calls 'based on replacement' (*kata metalêpsin*) specifically those so-called based on taking something in addition (*kata proslêpsin*) (which are the mixed ones), as we will learn as the discussion proceeds.

Arguments from the more, the less, and the similar are a special class of arguments from a hypothesis. Like 'mixed' arguments, they combine a complex premise (a conditional) which is set as a hypothesis (in the example above, both (0) and (1) are set as a hypothesis)<sup>31</sup> and a predicative one; the latter ((4) in the example) is the conclusion of a categorical syllogism. The conclusion (5) is established through the hypothesis from the conditional premise and the predicative premise, which was in turn established through the categorical syllogism. I take it that (4) is 'replaced' in the sense that it is the result of a

replacement: (4) is the conclusion established through a categorical syllogism, but the desired conclusion is (5). (4) is what is actually ‘shown’ instead of (5). In the *Topics* Aristotle often uses the language of ‘replacement’ to indicate a procedure in which one produces an argument for a claim which is shown instead of the desired conclusion (in the example: (4) instead of (5)), while the desired conclusion will be established in virtue of some special relation to the claim that has been shown. In the example above, the idea is that (5) is not really ‘shown’: it is simply assumed (in (1)) that (5) follows from (4); but what is ‘shown’ is (4). The desired conclusion is obtained ‘from’ or ‘through’ the hypothesis (*ex hupotheseôs* [...] *kai dia tēn hupothesein*: 325,14–15), i.e. it follows from the two premises through the consequence expressed in the first premise, and not ‘through’ a categorical syllogism.

There are several puzzling aspects in this general account, but I would like to pick out only one. In T3 Alexander spells out what is set as a hypothesis in two different ways: as (0) and as (1). (0) is a more general formulation of (1), and, conversely, (1) can be taken as a specification of (0). In T4 the conditional is given in the general formulation (‘if what is a greater good than something else is not productive of happiness, neither will the lesser good be productive of it’), while the predicative premise is specific, but it embeds the information that health follows under the general description of the antecedent of the conditional (‘health, being a greater good than wealth, is not productive of happiness’).

It is hard to tell whether Alexander thought that in the formulation in T4 one premise (corresponding to (1)) is missing or whether he thinks that (1) is unnecessary because already potentially included in (0). That Alexander thought of (1) as potentially included in (0) is not just mere speculation; rather, this might be suggested by the account of the relation between general *topoi* and specific premises which he links to Theophrastus’ account of *topos* in the commentary on the *Topics*:

[T5] *Alex., in Top. 5,21–7*:

A *topos* is, as Theophrastus says, a certain principle or an element, from which we take the principles about each subject, fixing our mind [on it]. It is determinate in its outline (*tēi perigraphēi hōrismenos*) (for either it circumscribes (*perilambanetai*) the common and universal things which preside over the arguments, or it is possible to make clear and take such things from them), but it is indeterminate with respect to the particulars (*tois kath’hekasta aoristos*). For starting from these it is possible to supply a reputable premise for what is submitted: for this is the principle.

[T6] Alex., in *Top.* 126,11–31:

A *topos* is a principle and a starting point for an attack (they call ‘attack’ the dialectical deduction). For this reason, Theophrastus also defines the *topos*, as we have already said in the first book, in this way: a *topos* is a certain principle or an element, from which we take the principles about each subject; it is determined in its outline (*têi perigraphêi hōrismenos*), but is indeterminate with respect to the particulars (*tois kath’hekasta aoristos*). For example, a *topos* is: ‘if the contrary belongs to the contrary, then also the contrary belongs to the contrary.’ For this formula, i.e. this proposition is determined with respect to the universal (it makes clear that it is in general about contraries), but it is not further determined in it whether it is about these or these particular contraries.

However, starting from it, it is possible to lead an attack about any contraries: for if the enquiry is about the good, whether it benefits, we would take, starting from the given *topos*, a premise appropriate to the submitted problem, i.e. ‘if the bad harms, the good benefits.’ Both its being and its credibility will come to the premise from the given *topos*. If the object of the enquiry is whether the colour white pierces sight, we will again take a premise pertinent and appropriate (*oikeian kai prosekhê*) to this problem from the given *topos*, i.e. ‘if the colour black contracts sight, then the colour white pierces sight.’ But, if one enquires about pleasure whether it is good, from the given *topos* the premise will be taken that says ‘if pain is bad, pleasure is good.’ For all these and similar things are potentially and indeterminately included in the given *topos* (*dunamei te kai aoristôs en tōi prokeimenōi periekhetai topōi*).

It seems at least possible that Alexander thought of the relation between (0) and (1) in T3 as one of ‘potential and indeterminate inclusion’. I shall return to this point in section 2.2. Before doing that, however, I would like to raise the question of whether, according to Alexander, the account of arguments ‘based on quality’ in T3 and T4 applies to the arguments that Aristotle discusses in *Top.* 3.1–3 and 5. Two points, one more superficial and one more substantial, seem relevant for an answer to this question. The first, more superficial, is Alexander’s account of the label ‘based on quality’ in T3 (324,19–22): the similar, the more and the less ‘follow upon’ qualitative determinations (*tōi poiōi parakolouthei*). The second, more substantial, is that in the arguments considered both in T3 and in T4 both the second premise (i.e. ‘what is replaced’ and is shown syllogistically) and the desired conclusion are (or, in any case, are regarded by Alexander as) predicative propositions which do not express any comparison.

Let us start with the label. The issue here is whether Alexander takes ‘quality’ to refer strictly speaking to the category of quality, or whether he takes this more

loosely, to indicate what something is like (as opposed e.g. to what something is).<sup>32</sup> One thing Alexander may have in mind when he spells out the label in T3 is that in *Cat.* 8, 10b26 ff. Aristotle claims that most qualities (unlike substances and quantities) admit the more (*to mallon*) and the less (*to hêttōn*), and, at 11a15–19, that things are said to be similar (*homoia*) or dissimilar only with respect to quality. So, he might think, it is only natural for Aristotle to say that arguments from the more, the less and the similar degree are based on comparisons in quality. As I mentioned earlier, Alexander pays explicit attention to the categorial framework of the *topoi* in *Top.* 3. In the prologue to the book, he spells out that comparisons can be about predicates falling under any accidental category (218,13–219,3),<sup>33</sup> but the comparison (*sunkrisis*) as such falls under the relative (*hupo to pros ti*: 218,16). These remarks taken on their own are certainly not enough to rule out the possibility that Alexander would regard these arguments as falling under the class of those ‘based on quality’, at least in the broader understanding of quality. One could also imagine that, while comparisons are in principle possible with respect to any category, Alexander thought that in most cases or in the most typical cases they are with respect to qualities. Be this as it may, we can at least raise the question of why, if Alexander thought that the comparative arguments in *Top.* 3 belonged in that class, he did not use the label which he could find in the *Analytics*, especially given his keenness in emphasizing the connections between *Topics* and *Analytics* elsewhere.<sup>34</sup>

The second point might be more instructive. One passage in Alexander’s prologue to *Top.* 3 is particularly relevant. At 219,20–220,2 Alexander raises the issue of why Aristotle presents some comparative *topoi* (from the more, the less, and the similar, from addition) in *Top.* 2 and has not rather collected all comparative *topoi* in ‘this’ book, i.e. *Top.* 3. Alexander’s answer to this question is an interesting one: he suggests that in *Top.* 3 Aristotle is not so much interested in collecting all comparative *topoi* but rather in giving *topoi* for comparative problems. The comparative *topoi* in *Top.* 2.10 are used to establish (or demolish) a standard predicative conclusion, saying that something belongs (or does not belong) to something else. But comparative problems are about establishing (or demolishing) a comparative claim. Alexander then recalls Aristotle’s distinction of comparative claims depending on the number of subjects (i.e. the number of *relata*) and the number of predicates that feature in the comparison (219,3–17). This is an important point, for the arguments that Alexander seems to have in mind in T3 and T4 are rather those that he finds in *Top.* 2. This raises a question as to whether he thinks that the same analysis applies to the arguments he finds in *Top.* 3, i.e. arguments with a comparative conclusion, and whether he thinks

that arguments based on *topoi* like (i)–(iii) on p. 10 work in the same way as arguments based on *topoi* like (iv)–(vi).

As is well known, Alexander struggles with arguments based on relations. We have texts in which Alexander clearly and rather unfortunately tries to show that arguments based on relations such as the one below can be reformulated as categorical syllogisms:

A is greater than B;  
B is greater than C;  
Therefore, A is greater than C.

One of these texts belongs to the commentary on the *Topics*:

[T7] Alex., *in Top.* 14,20–7:

And also the arguments (*logoi*) which are said by the Stoics to reach their conclusion unmethodically are of this sort. For it is not the case that, if A is equal to B and similarly B is equal to C, it is shown syllogistically that A is equal to C on this ground. For the necessity is not in virtue of the things posited. For this [conclusion] follows the things posited in virtue of the fact that the universal is true: ‘things equal to the same thing are also equal to each other’ (*dia to alêthes einai to katholou to ta tōi autōi isa kai allêlois einai isa*). For this reason, if that is laid down (*keimenou*) and what was divided there is composed and brought together into one premise, namely ‘A and C are equal to the same thing B’, one also concludes syllogistically that A is equal to C.

Just to be clear, what Alexander is saying in this text is that arguments like [1] should be rephrased as in [2] in order for the conclusion to follow syllogistically from the premises.

[1]

A is equal to B.  
B is equal to C.  
Therefore, A is equal to C.

[2]

- (1) Things equal to the same thing are also equal to each other.
- (2) A and C are equal to the same thing (i.e.: B).
- (3) A and C are equal to each other.

Alexander’s account of this type of argument has been discussed in the literature and I shall not linger on the (important) details.<sup>35</sup> I only want to emphasize two

points. First, Alexander's texts on arguments based on relations imply that he thought that at least some of the arguments in *Top.* 3 had a different logical structure from that of those in *Top.* 2.10. Second, in both cases it turns out that a universal proposition ((0) in T3; (1) in [2]) enters the reconstruction of the logic of the argument. In T7 Alexander seems to say that (1) in [2] is the universal premise of a syllogistic deduction on whose truth the validity of the deduction rests. In T3 (0) is apparently set as a hypothesis, but its relation to the more specific (1) is left unclear.

As is well known, Galen (*Inst. Log.* XVI 1) discusses at length what he regards as a third species of *sullogismo*i (i.e. third next to categorical and hypothetical ones). He says that he calls such *sullogismo*i 'based on what is relative' or 'with respect to what is relative' (*kata to pros ti*). These – Galen says – are used, among other people, by those who deal with numbers and calculations. These arguments according to Galen build a separate class, but Aristotle's followers "forced them" to be reckoned among categorical syllogisms. Alexander's remark about comparisons as falling under the category of the relative and about comparative problems as being raised primarily about magnitudes and quantities may resonate after Galen's remark, but the commentary on *Top.* 3 on its own does not take us much further.

We have seen, however, that it might be instructive to bring together Alexander's remarks on Theophrastus' account of *topoi* and his remarks about the introduction of universal premises in different types of argument from the more, the less, and the similar degree with a standard predicative conclusion. Galen refers to a debate about the role that general propositions such as 'things equal to the same thing are also equal to each another.' He objects to the Peripatetic view, according to which such general propositions should count as universal premises of categorical syllogism, by saying that these are rather universal propositions on the truth of which the validity of the corresponding deduction rests. We have seen in T3 and T4 that there might be cases in which the universal proposition plays a different and not fully clarified function: in T3 and T4 the universal proposition is rather a conditional (which may or may not be true) through which or from which (as a hypothesis) the desired conclusion is inferred. This may suggest that, even for the Peripatetic and within the Peripatetic tradition, there was some tension or, at least, unclarity on the role that such universal propositions were supposed to play in different types of argument involving comparatives. If there was indeed some overlap between the discussion on *topoi* and their logical function and the debate Galen refers to, it might be relevant that often in the commentary on *Top.* 3 Alexander comments on the 'truth'<sup>36</sup> (and not only on the reputability or 'endoxality')<sup>37</sup> of the *topoi*.

## 2.2 *Topoi* of different generality and relations between *topoi*

The texts and issues introduced in section 2.1 have already pointed in the direction of a question concerning the relation between general *topoi* and their more specific instantiations. The commentary on *Top.* 3 is quite interesting in this respect and, more generally, with respect to the analysis of the relations obtaining between different *topoi*. For the commentary certainly testifies to an activity of analysis (possibly going back to Aristotle himself)<sup>38</sup> on the *topoi* in which both the ‘vertical’ relations obtaining between *topoi* of different generality and the ‘horizontal’ relations obtaining between *topoi* of the same degree of generality were subject to investigation.

Hints about the relation between *topoi* of different generality can be found in the commentary on *Top.* 3.5 and 3.6. Readers interested in this aspect can find more detailed comments in the notes, but a few overarching features of these chapters are worth emphasizing. If we read these texts with Alexander’s discussion of Theophrastus’ account of *topos* (T5 and T6) in mind, we can notice a few things. First, differences in generality are described in terms of difference in (semantic) determination or specification. In the commentary on 3.5, the change in the linguistic formulation, from ‘more choiceworthy’ to ‘more such and such’, turns a *topos* which was about something determinate (*epi hōrismenou tinos*) into a universal (*katholou*) one,<sup>39</sup> and what is ‘more specific’ (or: ‘more species-like’: *eidikōteron*) is turned into something ‘more common’ (*koinoteron*)<sup>40</sup> or ‘more general’ (or: more genus-like: *genikōteron*).<sup>41</sup> In the commentary on 3.6, the second strategy to tackle particular problems, which consists in “adjusting” universal *topoi*: to fit the particular problems,<sup>42</sup> is spelled out in terms of a switch in quantification (from universal to particular). For example, the universal *topos*: ‘if every pleasure is good, every pain is bad’ is adjusted to a particular problem by changing the quantification: ‘if some pleasure is good, some pain is bad.’<sup>43</sup> The particular formulation is then illustrated: ‘the pleasure about fine activities is good’; ‘the pain about fine activities is bad.’ This shows that in Alexander’s commentary both semantic and syntactic considerations are used to describe the relations obtaining between *topoi* of different generality. I expand on this point in section 2.3, about the way in which Alexander deals with particulars in 3.6.

Two further and possibly interesting features of the conceptual framework used by Alexander to describe the relations between *topoi* are: (1) his (occasional) resort to relations of containment or inclusion to indicate the relation between different *topoi* (237,2: *emperiekhetai*: ‘is included’); (2) his resort to the vocabulary

of potentiality (233,1: ‘this *topos* is potentially the same as the one before it’; cf. 238,7–8; 272,16–17). We have seen earlier that a similar conceptual framework appears in T5 and, especially, T6. There is one further relatively well-known text in which potential inclusion figures prominently, i.e. one of the accounts of a true conditional given by Sextus:

[T8] Sextus, *PH* 2.112:

And those who judge by implication (*têi emphasei*) say that a conditional whose consequent is potentially included (*periekhetai dunamei*) in the antecedent is true.

It does not seem impossible that this account of a true conditional originated in the same milieu in which an analysis of the relations obtaining between different *topoi* was carried out. This hypothesis should be checked against further evidence, especially in the other books of the commentary of the *Topics*, where the idea of describing relations between propositions in terms of potential inclusion, possibly based on the idea that relations between propositions eventually rest on relations between their (more or less general) terms, might have been at home.

### 2.3 Alexander on particular problems

Aristotle opens his account of the *topoi* about the accident in *Top.* 2.1, 108b34–5 with a distinction: ‘Of problems, some are universal (*katholou*), some are particular (*epi merous*).’ As interpreters have noticed,<sup>44</sup> this division ignores the third type of proposition which Aristotle explicitly distinguishes in *An. Pr.* 1.1, 24a17–22, i.e. indefinite (*adioristos*) propositions. The latter are propositions with no universal or particular quantification. So, for example, ‘pleasure is not good’ is an indeterminate negative proposition; ‘no pleasure is good’ is a universal negative proposition; ‘some pleasure is not good’ is a particular negative proposition.

The distinction between universal and particular problems provides the outer framework of the presentation of the *topoi* in *Top.* 2–3. Aristotle says explicitly (2.1, 109a1–6) that universally constructive and universally destructive ‘things’ (presumably: *topoi*) are useful for both particular and universal problems. This is so because of the relation obtaining between a universal and the corresponding particular: in Aristotle’s account of the relations of implications obtaining between propositions of different quantity (i.e. universal or particular) and same quality (negative or affirmative), each universal entails the particular of the same quality. For the purposes of dialectical practice, one consequence of this is that,

if one manages to establish a universal affirmative (e.g. ‘every pleasure is good’), the corresponding particular affirmative (‘some pleasure is good’) will have been established too; if one manages to establish the universal negative (‘no pleasure is good’) the corresponding particular will have been established too (‘some pleasure is not good’).

Alexander comments extensively on these first remarks in *Top.* 2,<sup>45</sup> and he notices that the distinction between universal and particular problems is strictly speaking pertinent only to problems about the accident since it is only in the case of accidents that a particular proposition can be true on its own, i.e. without the corresponding universal’s being true too. What Alexander means is that, by definition, *proprium*, genus and definition are types of predicate which belong universally to their subjects. For example, the *proprium* ‘capable of learning grammar’, the genus ‘animal’ and the definition ‘biped rational animal’ belong to all human beings and, in this sense, if the predicate of the problem is a *proprium*, a genus or a definition, the predicate will be predicated universally of the subject:

- (i) Every human being is capable of learning grammar.
- (ii) Every human being is an animal.
- (iii) Every human being is a biped rational animal.

Based on the rule of subalternation, since the universal implies the corresponding particular, the corresponding particulars will be true too:

- (i\*) Some human being is capable of learning grammar.
- (ii\*) Some human being is an animal.
- (iii\*) Some human being is a biped rational animal.

However, Alexander says, if the predicate is a *proprium*, a genus or a definition, the particulars such as (i\*)–(iii\*), will not be true on their own, i.e. it cannot be the case that the particular whose predicate is a *proprium* or a genus or a definition of the subject is true and the corresponding universal is false. The only case in which particulars can be true without the corresponding universals being true is the case in which the predicate is an accident. For example, it can be the case that (iv) is false and (iv\*) is true:

- (iv) Every human being is musical.
- (iv\*) Some human being is musical.

In *Top.* 3.6, after the chapters on comparative problems, Aristotle returns to the distinction in 2.1 and says that he is now going to say how one has to tackle particular problems. In the course of the discussion, however, at 119b6 ff.,

Aristotle refers to indeterminate (*adioristos*) problems: ‘If, then, the problem is indeterminate, it is possible to demolish it in one way only [...]’ The immediately following text (119b7) gives an example of what counts as an indeterminate problem. As Brunschwig makes clear in his notes,<sup>46</sup> the entire manuscript tradition of the *Topics* at this point gives as example *hêdonên agathon einai ê mê agathon*. This text yields the translation: ‘e.g. is one said that pleasure is good or not good and did not add any further determination.’ The first hand of C, then rubbed off, has a different text: *tina [...] hêdonên agathon einai ê mê agathon*. This is the text that Brunschwig prints and the translation of the whole passage is: ‘e.g. if one said that *some* pleasure is good or not good and did not add any further determination.’

The difference between the two options is quite crucial: the text without *tina* gives an example of an indeterminate problem as indeterminate problems or propositions are characterized in *An. Pr.* 1.1. The text which Brunschwig prints with *tina* takes Aristotle’s remark to be about one particular type of *particular* problems, i.e. those in which any further determination is left aside. It should be stressed that all examples in the following lines are examples of particular propositions and Brunschwig’s operation mainly consists in making the first example coherent with everything else that Aristotle is saying.

Alexander’s commentary on 120a6 is interesting on this point. Alexander thinks that in 3.6 Aristotle distinguishes three strategies to tackle *particular* problems. Within this framework, he clearly takes the passage at 120a6 ff. to introduce a distinction between different types of particular propositions. What Aristotle labels ‘indeterminate’ (*adioriston*) here are “indeterminate particulars” and Alexander explains why these particulars are called indeterminate in opposition to ‘determined’ propositions (*diôrismenai*). One reason<sup>47</sup> is that these particular propositions are equivalent (*ison dunatai*: 288,24) to the propositions which are called ‘indeterminate’ strictly speaking (*kuriôs adioriston*: 288,25), i.e. the indeterminate propositions of the *Analytics*. In this respect Alexander proposes a reading of the passage analogous in spirit to that of Brunschwig. However, the text of the commentary clearly suggests that Alexander read (in agreement with the manuscript tradition) a text without *tina* at 119b7, for he paraphrases the text at 119b7 in the following way (289,2–3): ‘he takes “some pleasure is good” to be the same as “pleasure is good”, and “some pleasure is not good” as “pleasure is not good”’. The remark seems an attempt at making sense of a text without *tina*.<sup>48</sup>

For more details, the reader can turn to the translation and the notes. It might be worth emphasizing, however, that in the whole passage Alexander seems to

understand determination or indetermination not just as a matter of quantification, but also as a matter of (semantic) specification. For example, ‘some pleasure is good, some is not,’ ‘only one pleasure is good,’ ‘only contemplative pleasure is good’ are given as examples (289,7–8) of progressively more determined particulars. In this, Alexander does not radically depart from Aristotle’s own attitude in this text, but at the end of the discussion of the determinations of particulars (290,28–9), he refers to Theophrastus’ *On affirmation*, which may have also included an account of particulars of increasing determination and how to deal with them in dialectical exchanges. It might be relevant that the same language of determination and indetermination to indicate degrees of specification can be found in Alexander’s reports of Theophrastus’ account of *topos* (T5 and T6 quoted above). In both texts the most universal formulation of the *topos* is said to be ‘determined in its outline’ and ‘indeterminate with respect to the particulars.’ In Alexander’s discussion of Theophrastus’ account, it becomes clear that the determination which is necessary to apply the universal *topos* in order to establish the desired conclusion consists in finding a premise which is an appropriate specification of the universal *topos*. For example, if one wants to establish that pleasure is good, one can do so by resorting to the universal *topos*: ‘If the contrary belongs to the contrary, then also the contrary belongs to the contrary.’ The determined premise, the premise ‘appropriate’ to the conclusion, will rather look like this: ‘If pain is bad, then pleasure is good.’ As we have seen, similar pairs of propositions can be found repeatedly in the texts discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2. Further research on all of these issues might deliver a richer and more systematic picture of how the discussion on the *Topics* and *topoi* interacted with the debates on the further points mentioned in sections 2.1–2.3.

### 3. Alexander and the ethical contents of *Top.* 3.1–4

Although Alexander states explicitly that comparative problems can take any ‘matter’ and concern any branch of knowledge,<sup>49</sup> and Aristotle’s own generalization in *Top.* 3.5 certainly suggests that the *topoi* about the choiceworthy can be generalized,<sup>50</sup> Alexander is also certainly sensitive to the fact that the illustration of the *topoi* in 3.1–4 is carried out through ethical problems. More specifically, *Top.* 3.1–4 present *topoi* to establish what is more (or less or equally) choiceworthy than (or as) something else. In what follows I shall highlight three points that seem particularly relevant to appreciate Alexander’s perspective in dealing with the ethical contents of *Top.* 3.1–4: (1) the nature and place of ethical problems

within Aristotle's theory of dialectical argumentation; (2) a few systematic points about Aristotle's ethics which seem to be in the background of the commentary; (3) possible reasons for Alexander's interest in the ethical contents of these chapters.

### 3.1 Ethical problems and dialectic

Alexander's take on the ethical nature of the problems in *Top.* 3.1–4 must be read against the backdrop of Alexander's more general views about ethical problems in dialectic. One reason the analysis of *Top.* 3.1–4 in Alexander's commentary is interesting from the point of view of the history of philosophy is that evidence about Peripatetic ethics in this period is rather sparse.<sup>51</sup> These chapters of the commentary, including Alexander's assessment of the *topoi* about the choiceworthy and his discussion of examples about what should or should not be pursued to what extent, could be a valuable source of information which has not been fully explored.<sup>52</sup> In this section of the introduction I would like to sketch the philosophical and historical background against which the discussion of the *topoi* and of the examples in the commentary could be read.

To start with, two passages in Aristotle's *Top.* 1 play a pivotal role in Alexander's identification of ethical problems. First, in *Top.* 1.11, 104b1–12, Aristotle distinguishes three classes of problems: a problem is a dialectical object of investigation (*dialektikon theôrêma*) which either contributes 'to choice and avoidance' (*pros hairestin kai phugên*) or contributes to 'truth and knowledge', either in its own right or as 'helping' (*sunergon*) towards a problem of either of the two former kinds. The second passage is *Top.* 1.14, 105b19–29, where Aristotle distinguishes three classes of 'premises and problems': problems can be 'ethical' (*êthikai*), 'natural' (*phusikai*), or 'logical' (*logikai*). The example of an ethical problem is whether one ought to obey one's parents or the laws if they (i.e. parents and laws) disagree (105b21–3).<sup>53</sup>

Alexander takes the two three-fold partitions in *Top.* 1.11 and 1.14 to be equivalent (74,11–75,3; 93,22–95,16): ethical problems are those which contribute to choice and avoidance; natural problems are those which contribute to truth and knowledge; logical problems are those that are instrumental to the other two types of problems. With respect to this partition, it is clear for Alexander that the problems mentioned in *Top.* 3.1–4, about what is more / less / equally choiceworthy or to be avoided, are ethical.

One passage, from Alexander's commentary on *Top.* 1.5, 102b14, is worth quoting in full to get a better understanding of Alexander's take on ethical

problems. In this passage, Alexander is commenting on Aristotle's claim that the mutual comparisons of things (*hai pros allêla sunkriseis*) should belong together with problems about the accident,<sup>54</sup> 'in whatever way [the comparisons] are said from the accident (*hopôsoun apo tou sumbebêkotos legomenai*)'. Alexander discusses (52,2 ff.) different interpretations of this statement, one of which is the following:

[T9] Alex., in *Top.* 52,19–27

It is possible that 'in whatever way' is added also with reference to this, namely to the fact that the problems which pertain to deliberation (*ta sumboulês ekhomena problêmata*) are somehow themselves comparative too (*kai auta sunkritika pôs esti*) – for which reason they, too, would be brought under those from the accident. For example: 'Should one get married or not?', and 'Should one have children or not?' are themselves comparative too: for in them it is enquired which of the [alternatives] in the problem is more choiceworthy.

In the immediately following text,<sup>55</sup> Alexander spells out why comparative problems and, more specifically, comparative problems about deliberation, should be brought under the umbrella of problems about the accident. The gist of the arguments seems to be that when we enquire into whether something is choiceworthy, we are asking whether the feature of being choiceworthy belongs to it *at all*, and not whether it belongs to it in any specific way. The point here seems to be that problems in which 'choiceworthy' is the predicate are problems about the accident since in asking whether something is choiceworthy or not one is not asking whether something is essentially or incidentally choiceworthy but is simply asking whether something is worth choosing at all. Alexander does not take this point to be uncontroversial: apparently, other people claimed that an enquiry into whether a certain object is choiceworthy is an enquiry into whether the choiceworthy is the genus of that object. Note that even if Alexander does not spell out this point explicitly, his reading of questions about whether something is choiceworthy as questions about whether something is choiceworthy at all seems to require taking accidental predication in the inclusive rather than in the exclusive sense.<sup>56</sup>

These remarks by Alexander are important for various reasons. Firstly, they show that Alexander is interested in figuring out the logical structure of problems related to deliberation and that comparative problems, in their specific formulation about what is more choiceworthy (or about what is better), might enjoy a special status. For, as T9 suggests, it may turn out that all problems about making a choice about a course of action are comparative problems about what

is more choiceworthy; Alexander's point here seems to be that such problems are comparative also when the alternative is between doing or not doing something (rather than between doing *x* and doing *y*). Secondly, the insistence on the nature of the predication of choiceworthiness as accidental makes room (a) for the possibility that some things are choiceworthy in their own right while others are not, and (b) for the possibility of a meaningful debate, which does not beg the question, between interlocutors endorsing different views on the way in which being choiceworthy belongs to different objects.

As for (a), some of the *topoi* in *Top.* 3 do in fact rely on the possibility of distinguishing between things that are choiceworthy (or good) in different ways: essentially (because 'choiceworthy' is their genus) or not essentially (116a3); because of themselves or because of something else (116a29); in their own right or incidentally (116a31); by nature or not by nature (116b10).<sup>57</sup> In his commentary Alexander spends quite some time spelling out the relations between these distinctions.<sup>58</sup>

As for (b), there is little doubt that Alexander thought that *Top.* 3 (as, I believe, the *Topics* more generally) could be used in debates with other schools. For example, Alexander is clearly interested in using the *topoi* in 3.1–4 in the context of the debate, presumably with the Stoics, about the assessment of so-called 'indifferents' or 'intermediates' and in showing how their inclusion in a calculus of what is more or less choiceworthy may or may not impact on their classification as something in itself choiceworthy, to be avoided, or genuinely indifferent (see e.g. 247,19–27; 256,30–1). In order to better appreciate Alexander's perspective, it might be helpful to sketch the background against which the commentary can be read.

### 3.2 Alexander's background

Alexander's understanding of ethical problems about choice and avoidance reflects the idea, which was circulating around Alexander's time, that ethical investigation is (if not exclusively, at least to a large extent) about finding out how one can choose good things and avoid bad ones in order to live a good life. Interestingly enough, in Sextus's depiction the whole of dogmatist ethics consists in providing different (in Sextus's view: unwarranted) criteria of choice. The issue whether something is more choiceworthy than something else, however, rests for the dogmatists on a basic distinction between good things, bad things, and things that are indifferent or intermediate.<sup>59</sup> In the course of the commentary, Alexander addresses the relation between being choiceworthy

(or more choiceworthy) and being good (or better) on several occasions. His background is (not very surprisingly) Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.

In *EN* 1.1, Aristotle sets up a framework for the analysis of what is good and choiceworthy which is certainly present to Alexander's mind<sup>60</sup> in his commentary on *Top.* 3 and provides the Peripatetic starting point for debates about what is good and choiceworthy with other philosophical traditions. The main ideas are that any human activity (theoretical or practical) aims at some good as an end and that ends can be ordered in a hierarchical structure culminating in the end we desire for its own sake (*ho di'hauto boulometha*) and because of which we choose other things (*dia touto* [...] *hairoumetha*).<sup>61</sup> The hierarchy is illustrated, for example, by the consideration that the ends of 'master-arts' (e.g. ship-building) for the sake of which subordinate arts (e.g. carpentry) pursue their own ends, are 'more choiceworthy' (*hairetôtera*) than the ends of the subordinate arts. The end which is found on top of this structure will be "the" good, i.e. the best or the highest good (*to ariston*). Although Aristotle's terminology varies in the course of the passage, there is little doubt that the highest good, which is identified with happiness, will be what is choiceworthy for its own sake (literally: 'because of itself').<sup>62</sup>

The precise way in which being good and being choiceworthy interact in this picture is not specified by Aristotle, but in his commentary Alexander seems to have a fairly articulated picture in mind. The bits and pieces of this picture have to be extrapolated from the commentary, but the result is relatively clear and coherent. The occasion to clarify the relation between being good and being choiceworthy (and the corresponding comparatives) is given to Alexander by the very beginning of *Top.* 3.1, where the first words in Aristotle's text are: 'Which one of two or several things is more choiceworthy (*hairetôteron*) or better (*beltion*) [...]'. Alexander's first reaction is to clarify that 'more choiceworthy' and 'better' are not equivalent: 'better' is said of more things, i.e. has a greater extension, than 'more choiceworthy'. More specifically, while 'more choiceworthy' only ranges over the domain of human action and of things that can be chosen, 'better' also ranges over the objects of theoretical investigations (both natural and logical) (220,14–20). In the course of the commentary, Alexander points at further divergences. For example, it can be the case that what is better is not also more choiceworthy for someone (233,26–235,2). There can be different cases: immortality is better than longevity; but since immortality is not an option for human beings, longevity is more choiceworthy than immortality for human beings. The tool of a master-art is better than the tool of a subordinate art; and yet the tool of the subordinate art is more choiceworthy than the tool of the

master-art for the craftsman of the subordinate art who wants to do his job. In other words, the assessment of what is choiceworthy and more choiceworthy is carried out with reference to the subject that has to make the choice (see 234,3–4 and 10–11), whereas the assessment of what is good and better can be carried out on different grounds.

In the course of the commentary, Alexander also alludes to two distinct divisions, i.e. a division of the ways in which things are choiceworthy and a division of the ways in which things are good. The division of the choiceworthy can be found directly in Aristotle's text (*Top.* 3.3, 118b27 ff.) and Alexander simply takes it over (271,3–272,24): the choiceworthy can be divided into what is fine (*to kalon*), what is pleasant (*to hêdu*), and what is advantageous (*to sumpheron*) or useful (*to khrêsimon*). As for the division of the goods, Alexander relies on a *Division of the goods* (242,4–8) which is lost for us.<sup>63</sup> According to this division, four types of goods are distinguished:

- (1) the 'honourable things' (*timia*), i.e. things that are principles or are similar to principles (e.g. gods, happiness, parents);
- (2) the 'fine and praiseworthy' things (*kala kai epaineta*), e.g. the virtues and virtuous actions;
- (3) capacities (*dunameis*), which can be used well or badly;
- (4) 'useful' things (*ôphelima*), which bring about or contribute to acquiring some of the other types of goods.

This division is in the background throughout the whole commentary on *Top.* 3.1–4 (cf. e.g. 234,4–8; 236,21–6; 242,3–243,11; 273,8–274,8). The same partition of goods into things that are honourable, praiseworthy, capacities, and useful can be found elsewhere in texts attributed to Alexander (e.g. at the beginning of *Quaest.* 4.17, 137,22–3). Various parts or aspects of the two divisions are discussed in the collections of *Quaestiones*. For example, *Quaest.* 1.14 provides an argument that it cannot be the case that only what is fine (*to kalon*) is good; *Quaest.* 4.20 argues that it cannot be the case that only what is useful (*to khrêsimon*) is choiceworthy;<sup>64</sup> *Quaest.* 4.1 argues, among other things, that it is not the case that capacities (*dunameis*), being of the opposites, are indifferent and intermediate: rather, they are good and choiceworthy since they are defined with reference to an end, which is the better opposite of the two opposite outcomes they can achieve or be used for (118,25 ff.).<sup>65</sup> For example, medicine is a capacity to bring about health and disease, but its proper end is health.

One further aspect worth emphasizing in order to appreciate Alexander's agenda about the *Topics* and, specifically, about *Top.* 3 is that he is clearly

interested in stressing the usefulness of Aristotle's chapters. He takes very seriously Aristotle's hints to the effect that a dialectical problem must be an issue about which we are genuinely in doubt (see e.g. Arist., *Top.* 1.11, 104b3–5; b12–17). A problem is for Alexander an 'enquiry about an object of investigation' (*zêtêsis peri theôrêmatos*) which (as we saw) either contributes to choice and avoidance or to our discovery of truth and knowledge (*in Top.* 74,2–11). A problem is an enquiry about alternative options to neither of which we are in a position to give an assent (*sunkatathesis*: e.g. 75,28; 77,24). Dialectical problems must be 'worth the enquiry' to start with (77,27–78,4).

Alexander's programmatic remarks about *Top.* 3 are particularly resonant after these general views about dialectical problems. In particular, Alexander emphasizes that comparative problems and the *topoi* given in *Top.* 3 must be used with reference to what is 'worth the enquiry' (*en tois axiois zêtêseôs*: see e.g. 221,5–10 and 17–27). The outcome of the application of *topoi* and of the resulting arguments should be that the mind stops wandering and gives its assent (*sunkatatithetai hê dianoia*) to one of two opposite sides (*in Top.* 221,13–17; cf Arist., *Top.* 3.1, 116a10–12). Although the description of the outcome applies to all comparative problems, it is not difficult to see its specific relevance for ethical problems about what is choiceworthy. Although Alexander is paraphrasing Aristotle here, it seems at least possible that, to his ears, Aristotle's words sounded like an anti-sceptical point.<sup>66</sup> According to Sextus, the ethical investigation of the dogmatists mainly consists in assessing and distinguishing good things from bad things.<sup>67</sup> The main source of perturbation, which has to be removed by the sceptical way, is the belief that good things should be pursued and bad things should be avoided.<sup>68</sup> The dogmatists simply keep enhancing perturbation by coming up with more or less complicated and diverging theories about what should be chosen and what should be avoided.<sup>69</sup> While the dogmatists seem to think that tranquillity is achieved once one has found a solid and fixed standard of judgement,<sup>70</sup> for the sceptic tranquillity happens upon suspension of judgement.<sup>71</sup> Certainly, the *Topics* are not a text of ethical theory, but Alexander goes out of his way in the commentary on *Top.* 3 to spell out the theoretical underpinning of the *topoi* about what is choiceworthy, he spends time assessing the contents and the truth of the *topoi*.<sup>72</sup> He may well have thought that, in addition to being tools to meet philosophical opponents,<sup>73</sup> they are also a tool to reach that assent which puts an end to the perturbing wandering of the mind.

One point Alexander is particularly keen to emphasize when commenting on Aristotle's logic is that Aristotle's work (and, therefore, the Peripatetic school) does not waste time on idle and pointless controversies. Of all areas of philosophy,

logic was (at least in antiquity) the one which mostly required some sort of legitimation, also and especially for the traditions (i.e. the Peripatetic one and the Stoic one) in which the study of logic had its own relatively independent place, with a corpus of writings entirely devoted to logical matters. Alexander's and, perhaps more generally, the Peripatetic strategy of legitimation resorts to pragmatic considerations: logic is a tool to train the mind in the discovery and identification of truth and falsity. As a tool, logic must be studied and pursued to the extent to which it is useful (as suggested in the passages in *Top.* 1.11 and 1.14 mentioned above) for enquiries about choice and avoidance and about what is worth knowing in its own right (where worth knowing in their own right are nature and divine beings).<sup>74</sup> What better way to show that some part of Aristotle's logical writings responds to this general praiseworthy attitude than to emphasize its relevance for deliberation and choice?<sup>75</sup>

### 3.3 *Topoi*, ethical principles and precepts

One last aspect I would like to mention concerns some peculiar features of the *topoi* in 3.1–4. Here are a few examples:

- (i) What lasts longer and is more stable is more choiceworthy than what is such to a lesser extent.
- (ii) What is choiceworthy in its own right is more choiceworthy than what is choiceworthy incidentally.
- (iii) What is choiceworthy by nature is more choiceworthy than what is choiceworthy not by nature.
- (iv) The thing which is followed by the greater good is more choiceworthy than what is followed by the lesser good.
- (v) What the wise person would choose is more choiceworthy than what the others would choose.
- (vi) If two things are added to the same, what makes the whole more choiceworthy is more choiceworthy.
- (vii) If  $c$  minus  $a$  is less choiceworthy than  $c$  minus  $b$ , then  $a$  is more choiceworthy than  $b$ .

(i)–(vii) are just a small sample from 3.1–3. If we look at them out of the context of the *Topics*, they may look like very general rules or principles one can apply in trying to assess what, between two apparently similar things or courses of action, one ought to choose. Alexander's examples in spelling out each of them give us a glimpse into the way in which such general "principles" can be used and

applied to very specific matters. For sure, the primary goal in the commentary is certainly an exegetical one: Alexander is certainly trying to explain Aristotle's text. One might speculate, however, whether, somewhere in the back of his mind, Alexander thought that, in addition to being patterns of argument to establish or demolish a given claim in a debate with an opponent, the *topoi* in 3.1–4 also were or could be taken as guidelines for deliberation and, eventually, for conduct.

As a contribution to this speculation, one example is peculiar. At 257,10–19 Alexander comments on the *topos* that the things that we want to do for a friend are more choiceworthy than those we rather do for a random person:

[T10] Alex., in *Top.* 257,15–19:

One would show in this way that it is more choiceworthy to give than to lend: for giving is for friends, lending for random people. And teaching [is more choiceworthy] than showing off: for we choose to teach friends, but to show off to random people.

It seems noteworthy that the attitude of 'explaining', i.e. engaging in genuine critical enquiry, for the sake of progress in knowledge, rather than in a sterile criticism of other people's views for the sake of showing off, is precisely the attitude that Alexander ascribes to himself in both treatises *De Mixtione* and *De fato* (Alex., *Mixt.*, 215,29–32; *De fato*, 175,5–8). Whether Alexander is relying on a *topos* because he finds it rhetorically effective or he is applying a general rule of conduct, which is in fact also captured by one of the *topoi* in *Top.* 3, we cannot tell. But the question is not so abstract and far-fetched as it may look at first sight. For we know that preceptistic literature met with quite some fortune before and at the time of Alexander. We also know that there was a debate as to whether philosophers should confine themselves to providing general principles or they should provide more specific indications, resting on general principles, in order to help people act appropriately.<sup>76</sup> Some of these texts are very well known: Seneca, for example, clearly distinguishes between the more or less specific precepts (*praecepta*: see, in particular, *Ep.* 94) for the particular cases and circumstances of life and the more general doctrines (*decreta* or *dogmata*, *scita*, *placita*, discussed in *Ep.* 95) which provide the philosophical underpinning of the precepts (e.g. *Ep.* 95, sections 9–12). Apart from Seneca's remarks, examples of preceptistic literature from different times and philosophical orientations can be found, for example, in Cicero's *De officiis*, and in (Arrian's) Epictetus's *Enchiridion* (a 'little handbook' for life). The importance of precepts in the Stoic tradition is linked to the idea that the only good for the Stoics is virtue (correspondingly: the only bad is vice), but for those (i.e. the vastest majority of

human beings) who have not quite reached the status of the sage, who simply knows what to do, life is about making choices between things which are in themselves indifferent (i.e. neither good nor bad) and yet are such that, depending on the circumstances, some of them are to be preferred or to be avoided. Precepts are supposed to help people in this choice.

It seems at least possible that for Alexander, clearly interested in defending the viability and the usefulness of Aristotle's philosophy, the appeal of general principles and precepts meant to help people in making their choices could have been attractive. Aristotle's ethical theory, with its emphasis on the particularity of action, does not include any rules or principles and consists in identifying the criterion for the right action in the wise person – which leaves the question open of how the non-wise are supposed to find out what to do.<sup>77</sup> In this perspective, the fact that the *topoi* about what is choiceworthy are (like any proposition admitted as a premise in a dialectical argument) supposed to be endoxastic might have been saluted as a welcome feature in opposition to the often paradoxical contents and implications of Stoic ethics. In absence of further evidence, this all remains highly speculative, but it might be useful for placing Alexander's commentary on *Top.* 3 on the map of the possible sources of information on Peripatetic ethical investigation in this period.

#### 4. Note on the translation

As a general rule, in order to make the translation more transparent, especially for the readers who do not have access to the Greek text, I have sacrificed elegance to consistency. For the most part, the translation choices for this volume correspond to those I made for the volume on the second book of the commentary.<sup>78</sup> Different types of brackets are used as indicated in the Conventions. More specifically, < > in the translation indicate problematic points in the Greek. [ ] indicate words in the translation that do not correspond to any word in Greek and have been added for the sake of clarity or legibility. For the most part, additions in [ ] are not particularly noteworthy – nor is the absence of a corresponding word in Greek worth stressing since this is usually to be explained with reference to common features of Greek syntax and prose. Cases in which the additions in [ ] could be controversial are signalled in the notes.

I have left *topos* (literally: 'place') untranslated throughout. This is a technical term which is very hard to translate without more or less implicitly importing assumptions or connotations which may not reflect Alexander's (or Aristotle's)

understanding. In fact, the term is used by Aristotle both in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Topics* to indicate many different things, including prescriptions, general propositions about more or less specific subjects, suggestions to practice in a certain way, etc.<sup>79</sup> The disadvantage of leaving a term untranslated is that the reader cannot immediately associate a concept or a function to it, but this in fact reflects some objective difficulties in spelling out what a *topos* is.<sup>80</sup> As for the terms indicating argumentative activities, I have used (the rather generic) ‘to show’ as a translation of (the rather generic) *deiknumi*, ‘to establish’ for *kataskeuazein*, ‘to demolish’ for *anaskeuazein*, ‘to remove’ for *anhairein*. I have not been able to come up with a translation preserving the morphological kinship between the two verbs and the corresponding expressions *kataskeuastikos* / *pros kataskeuên* and *anaskeuastikos* / *pros anaskeuên*, but I have tried to preserve at least the semantic relation by translating ‘constructive’ / ‘for constructive purposes’ and ‘destructive’ / ‘for destructive purposes’ respectively. Alexander uses systematically *epikheirêma* or *epikheirêsis* to indicate the dialectical argument. I have translated both terms literally and systematically with ‘attack’ and the corresponding verb, *epikheirein*, with ‘to attack’.

There are a few specific points about the translation of the commentary on *Top.* 3 which might be worth emphasizing. The most common technical expressions specific to *Top.* 3 are *sunkrisis*, ‘comparison’; *sunkritikon*, ‘comparative’; the adverbs *mallon*, ‘more’, *hêttôn*, ‘less’, *homoiôs*, ‘similarly’. Depending on the context, I have taken the liberty of translating the last three expressions with ‘to a greater extent’ or ‘to a higher degree’, ‘to a lesser extent’ or ‘to a lower degree’, ‘to a similar extent’ or ‘to a similar degree’ whenever these formulations seemed more suitable or made the translation smoother. These adverbs are often used in nominal phrases to label a specific *topos* or a class of *topoi*. In these cases I have emphasized the structure of the label: so, ‘from the more’, ‘from the less’, ‘from the similar degree’ translate *ek tou mallon*, *ek tou hêttôn*, *ek tou homoiôs* respectively. Further recurrent expressions concern the description of procedures to modify an already given *topos* either to fit a different type of problem (e.g. a *topos* for comparative problems can be modified into one for non-comparative problems; a *topos* for universal problems can be modified into one for particular problems) or to obtain a *topos* of different generality (e.g. a *topos* about what is more choiceworthy can be modified into a *topos* about what is ‘such and such’). The language Alexander uses to describe these situations varies a little through the commentary, but the most common expression is *metapherein*, ‘to transfer’ (or ‘to modify’) from one problem or *topos* to another. Correspondingly, *topoi* can ‘be suitable’ (*harmozein*) for different types of problems or one can ‘adapt’ (*epharmozein*) them to different problems.

One possibly controversial choice is that of translating *haireton* with ‘choiceworthy’ and the comparative *hairetôteron* with ‘more choiceworthy’. Some alternative translations can be found in the translations of Aristotle’s *Top.* 3. Brunschwig translates *haireton* with *souhitabile* (‘worth pursuing’) and the comparative *hairetôteron* with *préférable* (‘preferable’).<sup>81</sup> Pickard-Cambridge translates *haireton* with ‘desirable’ and the comparative with ‘more desirable’.<sup>82</sup> The disadvantage of ‘preferable’ is that, while the adjective is comparative at the semantic level, morphologically it is not a comparative; furthermore, this choice makes it impossible to mirror the distinction and the relation between *haireton* and *hairetôteron* in Greek. It seems to me that it is important to keep the comparative formulation in the translation (both of Aristotle’s text and of Alexander’s commentary) because the comparative formulation is precisely what is characteristic of the problems discussed in *Top.* 3 and raises a few fairly specific issues about the logic of comparative propositions and of deductions based on comparative relations. It is also important to translate in such a way that the translation of *hairetôteron* is the comparative of the translation of *haireton*, because in 3.4 Aristotle makes some points about using the same *topoi* which one can use to establish that something is *hairetôteron* to establish that something is *haireton*, and important issues might be missed if the translation does not reflect the Greek. ‘Desirable’ and ‘more desirable’ are, in all these respects, a good pair. My worry with this choice is that it loses the direct semantic link to choice and choosing (*hairein*) which, at least for Alexander’s text, is quite important.<sup>83</sup> There are disadvantages with my translation too. Having translated *haireton* with ‘choiceworthy’, the corresponding and literal translation for the opposite verbal adjective, *pheukton*, would be ‘avoidance-worthy’, which, however, sounds (to me) significantly clumsier than ‘choice-worthy’. For this reason, for the (very few) occurrences of *pheukton* I have opted for a periphrastic translation: ‘to be avoided’. In the same semantic area, I have translated *hairein* with ‘to choose’, *diôkein* with ‘to pursue’, *pheugein* with ‘to avoid’. *Krisis* and *epikrisis*, are, as far as I can tell, used interchangeably. Depending on the context, I have translated ‘discernment’, ‘judgement’, or ‘assessment’.

As for the objects of choice and avoidance, ‘good’ translates (rather unspectacularly) *agathon* and ‘bad’ translates *kakon*. As a comparative for ‘good’, Alexander follows Aristotle in using *beltion*, ‘better’, most of the time. On a few occasions, Alexander uses *ameinon*, as far as I can tell without significant distinctions;<sup>84</sup> I have therefore used the same translation, ‘better’, in these cases too. I use ‘indifferent’ as a translation of *adiaphoron* and ‘intermediate’ as a translation of *metaxu*. Translations for more specific objects of choice or

avoidance, including virtues and vices, good and bad conditions of the body and external good and bad things, are mostly uncontroversial. An overview of the translation choices for most recurring terms can be found in the English-Greek glossary. Two possibly controversial choices concern the translations of *phronêsis* and *kalon*. For *phronêsis* I have systematically used ‘prudence’; ‘practical wisdom’ would be an alternative. The main reason for using ‘prudence’ is that on some occasions *phronêsis* and *sophia*, which I translate with ‘wisdom’, occur in the same sentence (or very close to each other) and it seemed to me that at least in those contexts ‘prudence’ and ‘wisdom’ (as opposed to ‘practical wisdom’ and ‘wisdom’) make the translation more transparent. As for *kalon*, this often indicates one type of choiceworthy thing,<sup>85</sup> i.e. what is morally fine. On these occasions, I have translated ‘fine’. There are, however, a few occasions in which the adjective (and the corresponding noun, *kallos*, ‘beauty’) are used to indicate a good property of the body; in these cases I have translated ‘beautiful’.

## 5. Note on the Greek text

The translation is based on the critical edition of Alexander’s commentary: *Alexandri Aphrodisiensi in Aristotelis Topicorum libros octos commentaria*, ed. M.A. Wallies, CAG II.2, (Reimer: Berlin 1981). A recent and detailed discussion of the tradition of the text of the commentary on the *Topics* can be found in Gonzáles Calderón (2014). Important, even if less recent, discussions of the text of the commentary are Brandis (1835) and Wallies (1891). Despite its shortcomings, Wallies’ edition is still the only one available and, although I have departed from Wallies’ text on a few occasions, I have mainly adopted a conservative attitude, especially where no main difference for the translation would follow from reading a different text. Problematic points where I have not departed from Wallies’ text are discussed in the notes to the translation.

< > in the translation always indicate problematic points in the Greek text established by Wallies. In particular, several of Wallies’ interventions on the Greek text of the manuscripts seem to serve the purpose of clarity: he supplies words or even whole sentences that must be understood even if they were not explicitly stated. It is, however, not always evident that such interventions on the Greek text are necessary, since the Greek text of the manuscripts is often intelligible without the additions proposed by Wallies. A list of departure from Wallies’ text is appended.

One feature of Alexander's commentary is that he often provides very close paraphrases of Aristotle's texts and it is not always clear whether he is quoting or paraphrasing. Wallies double-spaces all words and portions of text that are close enough to Aristotle's text to be either a close paraphrase or a quotation. I have marked as quotations (enclosed in '...') only the portions of text where Alexander is unmistakably quoting from Aristotle. I have signalled close paraphrases and dubious cases in the notes. One further feature of Alexander's Greek is that he often uses very long and relatively convoluted periods. In order to make the translation more readable and the text more intelligible, I have occasionally broken down a long Greek period into shorter English sentences. It does not seem to me that these interventions yield an alteration in meaning, but the reader should be aware of this operation.

## Acknowledgements

This book, together with its predecessor on *Top.* 2, is one of the results of a project of research on Aristotle's *Topics* and its reception I started to work on back in 2012. The initial stages of the project were funded by the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, whereas in more recent years (from 2015 to 2019) I have been supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). To both institutions goes my deepest gratitude. I am particularly grateful to the DFG for their helpfulness and flexibility in allowing me to combine research with all privileges and duties of motherhood. To Michael Griffin and Richard Sorabji I am grateful for their early interest in the two volumes for this prestigious series and for keeping the interest alive over the years. Richard kindly went through the penultimate version of the Introduction and made a number of specific comments. Michael was my main interlocutor for this project: I would like to thank him for all his feedback, his help, and his friendship. It has been an honour and a privilege to contribute to the shared endeavour of making the philosophy of the commentators accessible to a broader public. Warm thanks to Alice Wright at Bloomsbury for putting up with a series of delays in the submission of the final draft; to Lily Mac Mahon and, especially, Merv Honeywood for their kind and patient assistance. Jakob Fink, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Mirjam Kotwick and David Merry were asked by Bloomsbury to vet an earlier version of the translation; I am very grateful for each and every comment. It goes without saying that the responsibility of any remaining mistake or incongruence is exclusively mine. Marilù Papandreou kindly and competently assisted me in preparing the final

typescript for the press and compiled the Index of Passages. Her help and support have been invaluable.

The project on the *Topics* brought me to Munich as a Humboldt postdoctoral fellow. After quite a few years I am still privileged enough to be at the same University (LMU) and at the same institution (MUSAPh: Munich School of Ancient Philosophy). To Oliver Primavesi, Peter Adamson and, especially, Christof Rapp goes my gratitude for their support over the years and for their generous feedback at various stages of this and other projects. To my friends and colleagues at MUSAPh I owe the possibility of working in a friendly, open and stimulating environment. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude especially to Mareike Hauer, with whom I co-taught a class on philosophy and moral education (first century BC–third century CE) which gave me a much deeper understanding of the background and of the issues relevant to Alexander's commentary on *Top.* 3; and to Andreas Anagnostopoulos, for all the great coffee and for sharing an office and the way to becoming a better scholar, a better philosopher and a better teacher.

Finally, I would like to remember two of my teachers at the Scuola Normale of Pisa whom I have often thought of in writing this book: Ettore Casari, who, among other uncountable things, introduced me to comparative logics; and Francesco Del Punta, who introduced me to the philosophy of the commentators and taught me that a scholar's duty is that of making tools for other people.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family: my mum, for taking care of my children (and me) in the final stages of preparation of this volume – it would have taken much longer without her help; my sister, Francesca, for sharing laughter with worries and challenges; Marcus, my main ally over the last fourteen years; and my children, Francesca and Alessandro, for showing me everyday the sweet and cheeky face of joy.

## Notes

- 1 Castelli (2020: 1–45). An English translation of Alexander's commentary on *Top.* 1 is available in this series: Van Ophuijsen (2001). On the first book see also Abbamonte (1996) and La Croce (1978–1979). On the commentary on *Top.* 4 see Militello (2017). About Alexander's exegetical method in general, see Donini (1995); especially on the commentary on the *Topics*, see Abbamonte (1995) and (2013), Gonzáles Calderón (2018). On the more general methodological relevance of the *Topics* and dialectic for Alexander, see Adamson (2018), Castelli (2014), Guyomarc'h (2017), Karatzaki-Perdiki (1992).

- 2 A *topos* (literally: ‘place’) is that ‘from which’ one can find the appropriate premises for a desired conclusion (typically: in a dialectical exchange or in a rhetorical speech). For the reasons I spell out in the note on the translation (p. 33), I leave this word untranslated throughout. A more detailed account of the different attempts at specifying the exact nature and function of *topoi* with reference to Alexander’s commentary can be found in Castelli (2020: 28–30, 33).
- 3 Arist., *Top.* 1.1, 100a18–24.
- 4 In addition to the question of the unity of the whole treatise, each book of the *Topics* in a way presents its own internal question(s) of unity. For an overview of the issues concerning the structure of the *Topics* see Brunschwig (1967: LVI–LXXXIII). A detailed discussion of the issues concerning specifically *Top.* 5 can be found in Reinhardt (2000). The structure and unity of the *Topics* were a matter for debate, if not for Aristotle himself, certainly already for Theophrastus (as Alexander himself reports: in *Top.* 45,11–13; 55,24–7). For an overview and some discussion of the evidence about the debate and various commentators’ take on the structure of the *Topics* see Castelli (2013) and Hasnawi (2007).
- 5 Different types of problems are distributed among the problems about the four types of predicate. For example, problems of sameness belong together with problems about the definition (for that the subject and the predicate indicate the same thing is a necessary, even if not a sufficient, condition of the predicate’s being the definition of the subject: *Top.* 1.5, 102a5–17). Problems about the difference (1.4, 101b18–19) and problems about sameness in genus (1.5, 102a36–b3) belong together with problems about the genus. Problems about relative or contextual specific properties belong together with problems about the specific property (102a24–30; cf. 102b20–6). On the procedure of assigning the different types of problems to rubrics ultimately referring to the four types of predicate see *Top.* 1.6, 103a1–5.
- 6 See pp. 17–19.
- 7 On this point see pp. 6–10.
- 8 See p. 18
- 9 Arist., *Top.* 1.5, 102b6–8.
- 10 On the distinction between the two conceptions of the accident and its broader consequences for the structure of the *Topics* see Brunschwig (1967, especially pp. XLV–LV and LXXXVI–LXXXIII).
- 11 Arist., *Top.* 1.6, 102b27–103a5.
- 12 *Top.* 1.6, 102b31–5.
- 13 See e.g. the *topos* in *Top.* 2.2, 109a34–b12.
- 14 See pp. 7–8.
- 15 On this point see pp. 15–16, 20–1.
- 16 See pp. 21–4.

- 17 Alex., in *Top.* 219,3–17; see the notes on the translation for more details on the distinction.
- 18 Alexander adds a puzzling comment about the genus, which, however, does not affect the meaning of the general point he is making here: see n. 20 below.
- 19 For the distinction between exclusive and inclusive understanding of accidental predication see pp. 4–5.
- 20 Also Alexander's remarks at 217,16, about the way in which the genus belongs to the things to which it belongs 'appropriately' or 'proximately', may suggest that Alexander leaves room for the possibility that a genus is predicated of its higher and lower species with a difference of degree: see n. 6 to the translation.
- 21 See pp. 26–7.
- 22 Sn are place-holders for the *relata*, Pn for the predicate picking out the property with respect to which the comparison is carried out. In the *Topics* both Sn and Pn are replaced by general terms.
- 23 The propositional approach is developed (based on Aristotle's intuition, but not as an interpretation of Aristotle's text) by Casari (1987; 1989). Paoli (1999) provides an account of comparative logic with reference to comparison in natural languages. Recent studies on Aristotle's comparative logic are Gambra Gutiérrez (2012) and Gili and Pezzini (2015). The relation between Aristotle's logic of comparison and his theory of truth is explored in Cosci (2014). Sorbi (1999; 2002) analyzes the role of comparison in Aristotle's metaphysics and some medieval interpretations of the same.
- 24 See also p. 19 on the possible relevance of this remark. Berrettoni (2000a; 2000b) makes a few interesting hypotheses about the origin of the grammatical category of comparatives with reference to the account in the grammatical treatise of Dionysius Thrax (second century BC). Berrettoni compares Dionysius' account of the 'comparative noun' (*onoma sunkritikon*, in Berrettoni's translation: 'The comparative is the noun introducing the comparison of one object with another one of the same kind, as "Achilles is braver than Ajax", or of one objects to more objects of a different kind, as "Achilles is braver than the Trojans";' Uhlig 1883: 27) with Euclides' account of ratio (*logos*: 'A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between two magnitudes of the same kind', Eucl., *El.* 5, def. 3). Both Galen and Alexander emphasize the role of comparatives for those who deal with mathematics (see p. 19) and Berrettoni makes a number of plausible points, which might well be supported by this evidence. However, in his emphasis on the first part of Dionysius' definition, about two objects of the same kind, Berrettoni does not say much about the second part of the definition (one thing compared to many of a different kind): certainly the choice of the examples, the attention to the number of objects on the two sides of the comparisons, the emphasis on whether the compared objects are similar or not, all point in the direction of aspects explicitly addressed by Aristotle (and, much later, by Alexander) in the account of comparative problems. There might be more to dig out

- about the ‘prehistory’ of the comparatives as a grammatical category. I would like to thank Leonardo Chiochetti for bringing Berrettoni’s articles to my attention.
- 25 In the examples, ‘is larger’ is linguistically incomplete: linguistic usage requires that the predicate be followed by a complement introduced by ‘than’. However, not all types of relatives discussed by Aristotle share this feature: for example, ‘slave’ and ‘large’ are not linguistically incomplete, but still signify relatives. Conditions and states, according to Aristotle, belong in the category of the relatives, too. For some discussion on this point see e.g. Mignucci (1986); Sedley (2002); Harari (2011); Duncombe (2015).
- 26 In fact, it does not seem to be true that any proposition in comparative form implies the corresponding non-comparative proposition. In discussing the ways in which comparative *topoi* can be used, it turns out that two of them (from the greater and from the equal degree) make room for the possibility that (a) *a* is A more than *b* is A (or: *a* is A as much as *b* is A); (b) *a* is not A; therefore (c) *b* is not A either. This seems to suggest that for Aristotle it is not trivially true that, if *a* is A more than / less than / as much as *b* is A, then *a* (or *b*) is A.
- 27 We do not know much about Eudemus, but we know that he contributed to the development of Aristotle’s logic and that he had an interest in mathematics, which apparently also showed in his work on the history of exact sciences, which mainly focused on the mathematical aspects of sciences. On Eudemus see the essays collected in Bodnár and Fortenbaugh (2002), especially Huby (2002) on Eudemus’s logic, and Zhmud (2002) on Eudemus’s mathematical interests.
- 28 I take it that in Alexander’s commentary the masculine pronoun picks up the *sullogismoi* from a hypothesis in Aristotle’s text (45b15).
- 29 About the language of replacement, see Castelli (2020: 5, 22, 32, 93–8).
- 30 I take the masculine in the Greek to refer to *sullogismoi* (cf. 265,20). An alternative would be ‘arguments’ (*logoi*: cf. 265,17).
- 31 I return to this point and to the relation between (0) and (1) presently.
- 32 This distinction, between what something is like and what something is, can be found in Aristotle e.g. in *Top.* 4.2, 122b16–17.
- 33 For more details on this point, see nn. 13–19 to the translation.
- 34 For an overview of Alexander’s take on the structure of the *Organon*, the relations between *Topics* and *Analytics*, and, more generally, on the scope of Peripatetic logic see the introduction to the translation of Alexander’s commentary on *Top.* 2 in this series, Castelli (2020: 1–45).
- 35 See especially Barnes (1983; 1985).
- 36 See e.g. Alex., in *Top.* 226,5–6; 234,4; 246,21–2; 262,3–4; 267,2 and 10–25.
- 37 Aristotle stresses that the distinctive feature of dialectical arguments is that their premises are *endoxa* (*Top.* 1.1, 100a20, a29–30; 1.10, 104a8–37). These are claims that can be used without further discussion or further justification as premises in a

dialectical debate because they are endorsed by more or less distinguished and authoritative groups of people (e.g. by all wise people or by most wise people or by the most distinguished among them). Alexander's view on *endoxa* is quite clear: whether a claim is *endoxon* is assessed with reference to what people think, whereas whether a claim is true is assessed with reference to things in reality (*in Top.* 19,22–7; 21,31–22,6). On *endoxa* see also nn. 68 and 251 to the translation.

38 See e.g. Arist., *Top.* 3.1, 116a35–9.

39 Alex., *in Top.* 275,15–23.

40 *ibid.* 276,7.

41 *ibid.* 277,3.

42 *ibid.* 280,1–286,31.

43 *ibid.* 280,16–20.

44 See e.g. Brunschwig (1967: 138 n.1).

45 Alex., *in Top.* 129,16–131,19.

46 Brunschwig (1967: 163 n. 2).

47 It is not completely clear whether Alexander gives one or two reasons for calling these particulars 'indeterminate'. The text printed by Wallies suggests that the reason is only one, the texts of the manuscripts may suggest that the reasons are two. See n. 000.

48 Brunschwig reports in the apparatus that Alexander reads *tis* in the commentary, presumably referring to *tis* at 289,1. I agree with Brunschwig that Alexander's text on that point may look like a quotation, but it is not unusual for Alexander to offer extremely close paraphrases of Aristotle's text, by adding one or two words which makes Aristotle's text clearer. I find it hard to tell whether the text referred to by Brunschwig is a direct quotation or a very close paraphrase. Cf. n. 413 to the translation.

49 Alex., *in Top.* 217,19–218,13.

50 cf. Alexander's comments *ibid.* 275,14–276,8.

51 A collection of sources (in English translation) about Peripatetic philosophy between 200 BC and 200 CE can be found in Sharples (2010). In addition to the classical works by Moraux (1973; 1984) and Moraux and Wiesner (ed.) (2001), recent overviews of the evidence on Peripatetic philosophy after Aristotle's death can be found in Baltussen (2016) and Falcon (2017). More specific essays on the reception of Aristotle in antiquity and late antiquity are collected in Falcon (2016). On Peripatetic ethics in the first century BC see especially Fortenbaugh (2017), Tsouni (2016; 2019). An English translation of what is left of Aspasius' commentary on Aristotle's *EN* is available in this series in Konstan (2001; 2006). Critical essays on various aspects of Aspasius' commentary are collected in Sharples and Alberti (1999). A critical discussion of some of the main issues in the development of Peripatetic ethics after Aristotle can be found in Inwood (2014). Further

- sources on the reception of Aristotle's philosophy in late antiquity can be found e.g. in Blumenthal and Robinson (1991), Blumenthal (1996), Gottschalk (1987), Sorabji (1990),
- 52 English translations of Alexander's better known texts dealing with ethical contents are available: a translation, with introduction and notes, of the *Ethica Problemata* can be found in Sharples (1990); of *Mantissa* in Sharples (2004); of *De fato* in Sharples (1983). These texts have received attention in the literature: among the most recent book-length publications, see e.g. the collections of essays on Alexander's *Ethica Problemata* in Bonelli (2014); the new commented edition of *Mantissa* in Sharples (2008); Natali and Tetamo (2009) and Koch (2019) on *De fato*. On Alexander's treatise *On providence*, which is preserved in Arabic, see Adamson (2018) and Fazzo and Zonta (1999).
- 53 On the programmatic relevance of these partitions for Alexander and for the collections of problems that have come down to us, see Castelli (2014).
- 54 cf. p. 3.
- 55 Quoted on p. 8.
- 56 For the distinction and Alexander's argument see pp. 4–5, 7–8.
- 57 The formulation 'by nature' / 'not by nature' is in Aristotle, but it seems at least possible that to Alexander's ears this resonated after a debate about whether anything good by nature exists and, if so, what that is. According to Sextus, the debate lies at the bottom of the ethical theories of the dogmatists (cf. Sextus, *Adv. Eth.* 42–109; *PH* 3.179–187).
- 58 See translation and notes for more details.
- 59 See e.g. Sextus, *Adv. Eth.* 3–41.
- 60 See in particular Alex., in *Top.* 237,1–241,28. The more general relevance of *EN* 1.1 for Alexander's understanding of Aristotle's philosophy as a whole can be gathered for example by his commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Alex., in *Metaph.* 14,3–15,19), where *EN* 1.1 is used to argue in support of the primacy of the science or philosophy that aims at knowledge of the final end.
- 61 *EN* 1.1, 1094a1–22.
- 62 It seems possible that the claim that 'good is what is choiceworthy because of itself' reported by Sextus in *PH* 3.172 and *Adv. Eth.* 30 was regarded as a Peripatetic thesis.
- 63 Fr. 113 in Rose (1886); Ross (1963: 101), *Dihaireseis* 1. Cf. *Div. Arist.* 23 (30col1–31col9).
- 64 This is an interesting text. Although its origin (as for most of the other *Quaestiones*) is not clear, it seems possible to me that it started as a discussion of the perspective championed by Isocrates in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*: Hutchinson and Johnson (2017: 17–19).
- 65 On capacities cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 9.2, 1046a36–b28; Alex., *Eth. Probl.* 1 (Bruns, 118,23–120,2); Aspasius, in *EN*, Heylbut 5, 23–34.

- 66 About Alexander's reaction to the sceptical stance, cf. Mansfeld (1988).
- 67 Sextus, *Adv. Eth.* 2.
- 68 *ibid.* e.g. sections 110–3; 133–4.
- 69 *ibid.* 133–4; 139–140.
- 70 cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 95.57.
- 71 Sextus, *PH* 1.25–8.
- 72 cf. n. 36
- 73 Note that Aristotle phrases ethical debates in ways that are very much reminiscent of the *topoi* in *Top.* 3: see, e.g. the introduction of Eudoxus's arguments for the claim that pleasure is the good and of his opponents in *EN* 10.2, 1172b9 ff. Certainly for Alexander the *Topics* were not just about abstract or uncommitted dialectical exercise, but they were a tool for philosophical debates.
- 74 See for example the arguments in Alex., *in An. Pr.* 2,33–4,29; 8,3–9,2. About logic as a tool rather than as a part of philosophy, see Hadot (1990) and Ierodiakonou (1998).
- 75 About the relevance of ethical matters and ethical enquiries within the Peripatetic tradition, cf. Aspasius' remarks on ethics as the most necessary part of philosophy at the beginning of his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Heylbut 1,3–2,7). For some discussion of the role of ethics in Aristotle's philosophy, see Karamanolis (2011).
- 76 Both Cicero (*Fin.* 4.23) and Seneca (*Ep.* 116.5–6) praise the Stoic Panaetius of Rhodes (185–110 BC) for his efforts in providing practical advice for those who would like to do the right thing and are not a sage (and, in most cases, will never be). Panaetius was the author of an unaccomplished treatise *peri tou kathêkontos*, usually translated 'on duty' (literally: 'on what is appropriate'). Cicero's *De officiis* (*officium* is the Latin translation of *kathêkon*) is directly inspired by Panaetius's work. An 'appropriate' action (lat. *officium medium*, 'mean duty') is an action for which 'a plausible reason can be given of why it has been done' (*quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit*: Cic., *Off.* 1.8). For the Stoics, only the sage can do the appropriate thing in the right way and with full knowledge of why a certain action is appropriate (the action of the sage is a *katorthôma*, 'what is correctly done'). The possibility of doing what is appropriate, however, is there also for those who are not sage (on the distinction between the sage and the others, imperfect people, see e.g. Cic., *Off.* 3.13–19). There was a debate about whether general philosophical principles or more specific precepts should be given by philosophers (see e.g. Sen., *Ep.* 94 and 95). There was, however, no debate as to whether philosophers should give indications (no matter how general) about how to live one's life: that this is one task (if not the main task) of philosophy was an undisputed claim in antiquity and late antiquity.
- 77 That this might have been a problem for the Peripatetic tradition is suggested by independent evidence: in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aspasius

(Heylbut 19,14–23,29; translation in Konstan 2006: 20–4) comments extensively on the explicitly sketchy nature of Aristotle’s account of *eudaimonia* as activity in accord with complete virtue. Aspasius seems interested in addressing (among other things) the worry that no clear indication is given or can be derived about the activity or activities one should engage with in order to be happy (20,3–8). Furthermore, Baltussen (2016: 86) mentions that Peripatetics after Chamaeleon (a student of Theophrastus) ‘seem to have limited themselves to individual problems and practical applications. This is at least what the evidence suggests. Titles of their works indicate engagement with questions on education and moral principles.’ It seems possible that similar interests were still prominent at Alexander’s time.

78 See Castelli (2020: 31–4).

79 For an overview of the different types of *topoi* in Aristotle’s *Topics* and *Rhetoric*, see Rapp (2002: 270–300, vol. 1).

80 A fuller discussion of the issues involved in specifying the nature and function of *topoi* can be found in Castelli (2020: 2–3, 24–30).

81 See Brunschwig (1967: 154 n.1).

82 See e.g. Pickard-Cambridge (1984), who translates consistently ‘desirable’ and ‘more desirable’.

83 cf. pp. 25–7 about the ethical contents of *Top.* 3 in Alexander’s commentary.

84 *ameinôn* is often used to indicate what is better with respect to strength (cf. SLJ s.v. I).

85 cf. p. 29 on the division of the choiceworthy.



## List of Departures from Wallies' Text

The reader can find here a list of my (minor and major) departures from Wallies' text. A discussion of my choices can be found in the notes. About the Greek text, see also Introduction, pp. 36–7.

- 220,17: I depart from Wallies' punctuation (see n. 33): *en theôrêtikois, kai phusikois kai logikois* [...].
- 220,24: the insertion of *hoion* in Wallies' text does not seem necessary.
- 222,25: Wallies prints *toiouton d' he euexia: oute gar khôris* [...]; the text of the manuscripts reads: *toiouton gar he euexia oute khôris* [...]. Wallies' departure from the text of the manuscripts does not seem necessary and I translate the text of the manuscripts.
- 225,17: I translate *autos hou*, which is Wallies' conjecture in the apparatus, instead of *autou*.
- 228,29: Wallies adds *ê* and deletes *eiê de kai ta* of the manuscripts. I translate the text of the manuscripts.
- 232,14–15: I translate the text of the manuscripts, since Wallies' additions (*ha* at 232,14 and *pasin* at 232,15) do not seem necessary.
- 234,21: Wallies' addition of *ei ge* does not seem necessary.
- 235,11: I translate *dio* of the manuscripts and depart from Wallies, who prints *ei* at 235,11.
- 235,13: Possibly linked to his change at 235,11, Wallies deletes *kai* at 235,13, which I translate.
- 243,23: Wallies signals a lacuna. I translate the words supplied by Wallies in the apparatus.
- 243,24: Wallies signals a lacuna. I translate the words supplied by Wallies in the apparatus.
- 248,23–4: Wallies deletes *tês iskhuos*, which I rather keep and translate: cf. 248,19 and 248,27.
- 250,21: Wallies deletes *kai*, but this does not seem to be necessary.
- 251,26: I translate *opheilon* of the manuscripts instead of Wallies' *kai opheilontôs*.

- 251,29–30: I do not translate Wallies' addition: *tou khairein hêtton tôi eidenai ê tôi phainesthai*.
- 252,2–3: I *de facto* translate Wallies' text with the addition *kai dikaiosunê hugeias hairêtôteron*, which has to be understood, but I am not sure Wallies' intervention on the Greek is justified.
- 252,27: I read *duo* with the manuscripts instead of Wallies' *dokei*.
- 254,26: Wallies signals a lacuna. I translate the text he supplies in the apparatus.
- 259,4: I translate the *kai* of the manuscripts.
- 262,19: Wallies signals a lacuna. I translate the text supplied by Wallies in the apparatus.
- 264,19: Wallies signals a lacuna. I translate the text supplied by Wallies in the apparatus.
- 265,1: Wallies adds *ti*, which must be understood and supplied in the translation, but does not seem to be necessary in Greek.
- 269,21–3: Wallies deletes the whole period at ll. 21–3. I agree that the words at l. 22, from *oimai* to *paralêphthê* very much look like a gloss (they are added in margin by the second hand in P). I am not sure about the rest of the text, which I keep and translate.
- 276,15–16: Wallies supplies the whole text of the *topos* Alexander refers to, but this does not seem to be necessary. I therefore do not translate Wallies' addition.
- 276,27: Wallies signals a lacuna. I translate the text he supplies in the apparatus.
- 277,17: I depart from Wallies, who reads *mê toiouton* with AD, whereas I read *mê toioutou* with P.
- 277,25–6: Wallies supplies the whole text of the *topos* Alexander refers to, but this does not seem to be necessary.
- 282,15: I *de facto* translate Wallies' text, which must be understood in any case, but it is not clear to me that the intervention on the Greek text is necessary.
- 284,3: Wallies adds *oun*, which I do not translate.
- 287,25: Wallies signals a lacuna; I translate the text supplied in the apparatus.
- 288,27: I omit *hai*, which is Wallies' addition.
- 289,5: I translate the text of the manuscripts, with *kai*.

# Alexander of Aphrodisias

*On Aristotle Topics 3*

Translation



[Commentary] of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the  
third book of Aristotle's topical investigation.<sup>1</sup>

217,1

In the second book he set out the *topoi* concerning the accident, through which we will be able to establish something as an accident of something else without qualification<sup>2</sup> or to demolish it and show that what is said to belong as an accident [to the subject] does not belong as an accident [to it]. In the third book he sets out the *topoi* through which we will be able to attack<sup>3</sup> when dealing with comparative problems and to show that something belongs to something else more or less.<sup>4</sup> And these *topoi*, too, would be from the accident, as he himself in fact said in the first book as he ordered all things that are said according to a comparison together with the problems from the accident, adding, after having talked about the accident: 'and let all mutual comparisons be attached to the accident, too, in whatever way they are said from the accident.'<sup>5</sup>

10

That comparison comes about in accidents only is clear also in another way: in fact, only an accident can belong to some things more or less. For it is not possible that the genus belong to something more and to something less of the things to which it belongs appropriately,<sup>6</sup> nor that the proprium or the definition do. As for the accident, instead, by being outside the substance of the thing to which it belongs as an accident, it is both possible that the same accident belongs more or less to one or several things and that one accident belongs [to something] more than another [accident] or that one accident belongs [to something] less than another [accident], namely whenever it also [belongs to the subject] in a certain respect.

And the matter for comparative problems is also provided according to any [area of] philosophy. For example, with reference to moral [philosophy], since all [problems] involving an enquiry about what is more choiceworthy are moral: for choiceworthy things are led back to<sup>7</sup> action and moral philosophy.<sup>8</sup> Those that make a comparison between some natural things, instead, are natural, for example when one investigates what is bigger, whether the moon or the earth, or what is better, whether perception or [scientific] knowledge, or which motion is simpler, whether the circular or the rectilinear one. Furthermore, some things are enquired into comparatively in logic too, e.g. what is more persuasive, whether induction or deduction, or what is the primary syllogism, whether the categorical or the hypothetical one,<sup>9</sup> or which figure is first or better. However, it is possible to find things that are enquired into comparatively in the other sciences and arts too. For example, what attunement is more acute, whether the Lydian or the Frygian one, is a musical problem;<sup>10</sup> perhaps one could even

20

218,1

10 enquire into [the claim] that the heroic [verse] is the most beautiful of meters with respect to musical matter.<sup>11</sup> And again, one could enquire into what therapy is more choiceworthy, whether the one through surgery or the pharmacological one, which is a comparative problem with medical matter as its subject.<sup>12</sup>

The matter of comparative problems, then, [is taken] pretty much according to any science and art, while the categories<sup>13</sup> in which the objects of enquiry according to comparison are seem to be nine: for it seems that only with respect to substance no comparative problem can be set up.<sup>14</sup> For comparison is with respect to an accident but substance does not belong as an accident to anything.<sup>15</sup> Every comparison, then, falls under what is relative.<sup>16</sup> The things with respect to which the comparison occurs sometimes are [a] quality, as when one enquires about some things which one is whiter or warmer or lighter or more musical or any such thing: for all such things are according to quality. With respect to  
 20 quantity, when one enquires whether the moon is greater than the earth (for such an enquiry is with respect to quantity). With respect to the relative, when one enquires whether geometry is more of a science than music, or which one is more of a [sense of] perception, whether touch or hearing. And the enquiry is with respect to where when one enquires in which [part of the body] the hegemonic [part of the soul] is, whether in the heart or in the brain. The enquiry is with respect to when if one enquires whether sailing at the equinox or rather in the summer is more choiceworthy. With respect to acting: which [doctor] heals more, whether the surgeon or the one who gives medicines; with respect to being affected: which one is more unaffected,<sup>17</sup> whether the body or the soul; with respect to having: whether animals have a soul more than plants; with  
 219,1 respect to position,<sup>18</sup> when one enquires which one is closer to Earth, whether the Sun or Venus's star. And it will seem that a comparison can take place with respect to substance when we enquire whether the primary substance is more of a substance than the secondary one.<sup>19</sup>

And the things between which the comparison is drawn sometimes are two and are compared with respect to one single accident, as when one enquires whether health or wealth is more choiceworthy: for the mutual comparison is for both with respect to [being] choiceworthy. Sometimes the comparison is of several things in relation to<sup>20</sup> several things with respect to something common which belongs to them, as when one enquires whether prudence with wealth is more choiceworthy than health with temperance. The comparison can also be of one thing in relation to many, if one enquires whether prudence is more  
 10 choiceworthy than health with wealth. The comparison can also be of one thing with respect to two accidents, as when we enquire whether prudence is more

practical or more contemplative. But the comparison can also occur when two things are considered together with respect to two accidents, for example when one enquires whether prudence taken together with wisdom is more practical or more contemplative. But it can also be two things about two, as when one enquires whether prudence is more practical than wisdom is more contemplative. But it can also be two things with respect to several accidents, if one enquires whether wisdom or prudence is at the same time more practical and more contemplative.<sup>21</sup>

And about the matter of comparative problems and the categories according to which they are set up and the things that are compared, in how many ways they are put together with each other and compared, this much [be said]. However, it is worth enquiring why indeed,<sup>22</sup> given that [he]<sup>23</sup> discusses the comparative [problems] in this book, he did not put all comparative *topoi* in this book and rather mentioned some in the former [book] too.<sup>24</sup> For those from the more, and those from the similar [degree],<sup>25</sup> and one of the two showing [things] from addition,<sup>26</sup> and the one which shows that, if something [*a*] is said [to be] more or less [P] than something else [*b*], then it [*a*] is also [P] without qualification[:]<sup>27</sup> [all these *topoi*] were comparative. Perhaps his goal in this book is not to discuss comparative *topoi* but rather comparative problems: and comparative problems are those in which what is enquired into and shown is comparative. In this book, he discusses all of these, how it is possible to show them constructively and destructively. The comparative *topoi* he used in the previous book, instead, were not meant to show anything comparative, but rather that something belongs or does not belong [to something else] without qualification.<sup>28</sup> And it is not the same to show something through a comparative [*topos*] and [to show something] comparative – which he discusses in this book.

And he provides the teaching about comparative problems or *topoi* with reference to the example of the choiceworthy since in this way their exposition will be clearer, being about something determinate. He accorded preference to the more choiceworthy because very many philosophical enquiries are about this, and cognition (*gnôsis*) and discernment (*epikrisis*) about the more choiceworthy is more useful than that about the greater or the warmer or some other such thing. Furthermore, an argument about it<sup>29</sup> [can be produced] through most attacks and *topoi*. Nonetheless, after the exposition of the *topoi* with reference to this, he will show<sup>30</sup> that the *topoi* given earlier are also useful with reference to the other comparative problems, teaching us that the aforementioned *topoi* are not useful for one single species of problems, but for all those that are enquired into comparatively.

116a3 *And which one of two or several things is more choiceworthy or better.*

This should not be understood as if the more choiceworthy and the better were set next to each other [as equivalent]:<sup>31</sup> for the better [is said] of more things than the more choiceworthy. For the more choiceworthy [is] in<sup>32</sup> the things that are choiceworthy and in those only, whereas the better is in other things too. In fact, the enquiry about what is better [occurs] also in contemplative, i.e.<sup>33</sup> natural, and logical [problems]. For the one who enquires into what substance is better, whether the immobile or the mobile one, tackles a natural problem; the one who  
20 enquires into what is better, whether induction or deduction, tackles a logical problem.

He said 'of two or several things'<sup>34</sup> since, as we said before, sometimes the comparative enquiry is about two things compared with respect to one, whereas sometimes it is about several things in relation to several things or about one with respect to several accidents or about several with respect to several.<sup>35</sup> For there no is comparison of one thing [only], unless with respect to time, <e.g.><sup>36</sup> when we enquire into whether this thing here is whiter now than [it was] before. But in these cases, too, it turns out that the things the enquiry is about are two in a certain way, since they take on a difference through the addition of time: for the same thing turns out to be one thing and another thing through the addition of different times.

And the comparative problems are in these things, of these and with respect to these.<sup>37</sup> Before the exposition of the *topoi*, in the first place he outlines how  
221,1 the compared things must stand to each other and [how]<sup>38</sup> one should use the *topoi* that will be presented with reference to things that stand in what way to each other. For in this way he shows also what they are useful for. He says, then, that one must not make the comparison among things which differ much from each other and have an obvious and 'great difference from each other'<sup>39</sup> (for the difference between things that are in this condition is blatant to everybody and not worth the enquiry;<sup>40</sup> in fact, for this reason nobody 'puzzles whether happiness or wealth is more choiceworthy',<sup>41</sup> i.e. not because they are not both choiceworthy, but because the superiority of happiness with respect to being choiceworthy is obvious and blatant; and, for this reason, even if one has the  
10 resources to show that wealth is in some respect superior to happiness,<sup>42</sup> he is not believed).<sup>43</sup> Rather [one must draw a comparison] among the things that are close to each other and are matter for a controversy since the superiority of the one over the other is not obvious, as in the case of health and good physical condition, and of seeing and hearing, and of the contemplative and the practical

life. For it is in things that are so close [to each other] and are for this reason worth the enquiry that, once some superiority (be it in one respect or in several)<sup>44</sup> has been shown, the thought, that has kept wandering up to this time, gives its assent based on the things that have been shown since one of them exceeds the other in being choiceworthy or in some other feature, which has been enquired into and shown.<sup>45</sup>

In the first [book], then, when he discussed cognition of differences<sup>46</sup> and of similarities<sup>47</sup> in cases that are worth the enquiry, he said that one should do the selections<sup>48</sup> (i.e. differences are the object of enquiry in things that are close to each other:<sup>49</sup> for one would enquire in what respect a *daimon* and a god differ [from each other], but not in what respect a god and a stone [differ]; and in what respect a wolf and a dog [differ from each other], but not a horse and a dog; and in what respect self-control and temperance [differ from each other], but not [self-control and] wisdom; similarity, on the other hand, [is the object of enquiry] in things that are very different:<sup>50</sup> for one would enquire in what respect a human being is similar to a horse, but not in what respect a human being [is similar to] a human being). In the same way, he says, comparative problems, too, make room for an enquiry in those cases in which the superiority is not apparent; and [in these cases] even if one has shown a small [superiority], he turns out to be trustworthy.<sup>51</sup>

And since comparative problems demand not only that something obtains<sup>52</sup> but also an excess, on the one hand of what exceeds, with respect to which the comparison is carried out, on the other hand of what is exceeded,<sup>53</sup> the attacks and the *topoi* must do this too, i.e. they must show not only that [something] obtains, but also the excess of the one and the defect of the other. For the one who has shown that something is good has not yet shown that it is also more choiceworthy [than something else] if he has not shown that this is more of a good than this [other] thing, with which it is compared.

116a13 First [of all] then, what lasts longer or is more stable is more choiceworthy than what is such to a lesser extent. 222,1

He presents first a *topos* through which we will show that something is more choiceworthy than something else from [its] lasting longer and being more stable: for of the things that seem to be similar in other respects, if one has been shown to last longer or to be more stable than the other, then it would be more choiceworthy in virtue of its superiority in this respect. 'What lasts longer or is more stable' are not set next to each other [as equivalent];<sup>54</sup> rather there are

aspects in which they will seem to diverge: in fact, it is possible that something be more stable than something else while being less long-lasting than that, as [scientific] knowledge [is more stable but less long-lasting] than sense perception: 10 for sense perception lasts longer in the sense that we have sense perception since our youngest age; [scientific] knowledge, instead, occurs when we are complete, and yet it is more stable and harder to change than sense perception. For this reason, we have to handle<sup>55</sup> the *topos* in accordance with what is useful for our purposes.

By resorting to this *topos* it is possible to show that good reputation is more choiceworthy than wealth: for, although both of them are choiceworthy, good reputation persists also after death, while nobody is still wealthy [after death].<sup>56</sup> However, even if good reputation has been shown to last longer than virtue or happiness, it is not yet shown that it is also more choiceworthy, since the superiority in which virtue and happiness surpass good reputation is obvious. If, however, the origin of the good reputation were about virtue, also in this respect 20 virtue will be more choiceworthy than good reputation, since this is also the cause of good reputation's being to start with. And in this way, it would be shown that health is more choiceworthy than good physical condition.

Or, again, we have to pay attention to the case in which what is more long-lasting is included in what is less long-lasting: for if they are in this condition, what is short-lasting turns out to be more choiceworthy by having in itself what is more long-lasting (with which it was compared) and [by having] an external addition of something choiceworthy. <For example,><sup>57</sup> good physical condition is of this sort: it does not occur without health and, in addition to health, it has something else which is choiceworthy too. When an addition of something choiceworthy occurs, then, what comes later<sup>58</sup> is more choiceworthy, even if it is rather short-lasting. But when one is the cause of the other, then what comes first 223,1 is more choiceworthy, even if it is rather short-lasting. <Alternatively,><sup>59</sup> health [is more choiceworthy] based on being more long-lasting, whereas good physical condition [is more choiceworthy] based on some other features.

By resorting to being more stable, we will show that knowledge is more choiceworthy than correct opinion, although both of them are choiceworthy; that virtue [is more choiceworthy] than good luck; and what comes to be through craft than what comes to be by luck; and what is the result of previous deliberation than what is correctly done without previous deliberation;<sup>60</sup> and what is necessary than what is contingent, if they are both choiceworthy; and what depends on us than what depends on other things<sup>61</sup> (in this way, good counsel is more choiceworthy than reputation: for the former depends on us, whereas reputation

does not depend on us; and for this reason the former is more stable too, whereas the latter is unstable); and the contemplative life [is more choiceworthy] than the practical one: for several things are of impediment to the practical life. It is in virtue of being more stable that the intermediate life is also more choiceworthy than [a life lived] in prominence.<sup>62</sup> It is indeed said: 'several things are best in the middle: I want to be a middle [man] in the city.'<sup>63</sup> And Euripides' [verses] would bear witness to the same [claim]: 'I envy you, old man; and I envy the man who went unknown and fameless through a life free from peril; but I envy less those who live in honour.'<sup>64</sup> Memory, too, lasts longer than sense perception, and a relative longer than a friend.

And resorting to these same starting points, it is also possible to show that something is to be avoided more than something else: for of the things that are to be avoided, what lasts longer is to be avoided more, as bad reputation [is to be avoided more] than poverty. And what is more stable [is to be avoided more] than what is less so, as need [is to be avoided more] than wastefulness, and illiberality more than slackness: for those who are illiberal hardly change.<sup>65</sup> Based on these considerations, also cowardice is to be avoided more than intemperance, since intemperance comes to an end once the body has passed its prime: for [then] the desires that cause intemperance come to an end, too. Cowardice, instead, increases as age advances. In this way one would also show that vice is a greater bad and to be avoided more than bad luck.

*116a14 And what the prudent man or the good man or the correct law would rather choose or what the excellent in each thing would choose in as much as they are such.*

He presents the second *topos* for showing the more choiceworthy,<sup>66</sup> which is from the choice (*hairesis*) and the assessment (*krisis*) of the better [men]: for what is <more choiceworthy><sup>67</sup> for the better is more choiceworthy. And prudent men are better than those who are not prudent, good ones [better] than those who are not good, the correct law than the one which is not correct, and in general those who are excellent about something, with respect to the thing about which they are such, when they choose it: they are more trustworthy than those who are not excellent about these things. For the craftsmen are better than the unskilled in the things concerning their respective crafts, and this is even more so, if all those who are [excellent] in the same craft say the same: and it is also reputable<sup>68</sup> to say that the things which all or most of those who deal with the same craft choose are more choiceworthy than those that are not choiceworthy for all [of them].<sup>69</sup>

So that, in the case of things concerning the crafts, the things that all or most  
 10 [craftsmen] choose are more choiceworthy than those that seem to be more  
 choiceworthy to the unskilled or to fewer of those that practice the same craft.

In the same way and without qualification the things that seem [to be  
 choiceworthy] to all or to most would be more choiceworthy: for the things that  
 seem [to be choiceworthy] to all are more choiceworthy than those that do not  
 seem [to be choiceworthy] to all and those [that seem to be choiceworthy] to  
 most [are more choiceworthy] than those [that seem to be choiceworthy]  
 to fewer.

And he did not say 'the prudent man or the good [man]'<sup>70</sup> as if they were set  
 next to each other [as equivalent]:<sup>71</sup> for the prudent and the good are not co-  
 extensive,<sup>72</sup> but rather the good has a greater extension. For also, but not only, the  
 prudent man is good: for example, the courageous man and the temperate one  
 are good, too. What is said, then, is equal to: 'the prudent man or, in general, the  
 good one'; for every good man, and not only the prudent one, is more trustworthy  
 in the matters concerning choice than the one who is not such. It is also possible  
 that he spoke of the prudent man with respect to the rational<sup>73</sup> virtue and of the  
 20 good one with respect to the moral one: for he calls 'good' specifically those with  
 respect to these virtues (as, on the other hand, [he calls] 'prudent' those with  
 respect to the rational ones) because it is according to these [virtues] that they  
 are more capable of doing fine things. In fact, prudence is about assessment,<sup>74</sup>  
 whereas the virtues of character are about action.<sup>75</sup> What good men ought to  
 honour above other things is more choiceworthy because it seems to be so to  
 those who are prudent: for this is the assessment of the prudent. But one should  
 also honour common things above<sup>76</sup> the private ones: 'for what is common binds  
 together, whereas what is private dispels the states', as Plato [says].<sup>77</sup> And  
 as Thucydides [says]: 'in fact, the one who is doing well as far as his own is  
 concerned is nonetheless destroyed if the fatherland is destroyed, whereas if he  
 is ill-fortuned while [the fatherland] is prospering he will be preserved much  
 more.'<sup>78</sup> And acting well rather than being affected well is more choiceworthy,  
 30 since this is more choiceworthy for the good men. Similarly, suffering injustice is  
 225,1 more choiceworthy than doing injustice because good men rather choose this.<sup>79</sup>  
 But also dying gloriously is more choiceworthy than surviving disreputably for  
 the same reason and being poor by being just [is more choiceworthy] than being  
 rich by being unjust.

And again, since not all laws are correct, but some are also praised as correct,  
 such as those of Lycurgus, those of Zaleucus, those of Solon,<sup>80</sup> when the  
 controversy is about something determined by the laws, what the correct laws

determine is more choiceworthy, since correct laws too are set down according to prudence. Alternatively, we do not have to think that 'the prudent man [...] or the correct law' are the same: for what pertains to the laws is already determinate and is said about already determinate things, whereas the things that pertain to the prudent man fit the particular moments and the circumstances and the chances, and are different in different cases.<sup>81</sup> In this way, then, it will be shown that common messes are more choiceworthy in the cities, since the correct laws have established them, and also that those who excel in virtue but not in wealth rule.<sup>82</sup> However, also the assessment of the fine man could find some room, if [the *topos*] requires that one do not look at what is written in the laws but rather at the intention of the one who wrote them and what he would have done if he had been present and had assessed [the situation] <himself>, according to the correct reason and law, and not based on the things that are written, <where><sup>83</sup> [these] are not fully sound, since he had other motives<sup>84</sup> in view.

And more choiceworthy in war are the things that those who are good in these matters choose, such as keeping rank and not starting first, obeying to the commander, keeping in mind that 'the one best omen is to fight for the fatherland.'<sup>85</sup> And Odysseus's [claim] is also of this kind: 'not good is the rule of many; one be the ruler, one the king.'<sup>86</sup> [More choiceworthy] with respect to the constitution [of a state] are the things which those who are good in these matters [choose]. In this way, not doing what pleases the masses instead of what is advantageous is more choiceworthy: for this is more choiceworthy for those who are good at these things. But also with respect to the arts: more choiceworthy are those things which seem [to be more choiceworthy] to all or to most experts.

And he added 'in as much as they are such'<sup>87</sup> because in medical matters we have to follow the doctors and their choice in these things, whereas in musical matters [we have to follow the choice] of the musicians. For if those who excel in music say something about medical matters, they will not speak as musicians; and similarly, also if those who [excel] in medicine [say something] about matters of war. That in each art those things are more choiceworthy which all experts in that art choose, strikes [us] as true from these considerations. That [in each art those things are more choiceworthy] which several [experts choose], on the other hand, is reputable, but not also true: for it is often the case that the choice and the assessment of the one who is better in the art is better than that of all others. For this reason, the attack in these cases [can proceed] in both directions: for [it can be] from<sup>88</sup> the several and from the better. And not only in the case of the arts the things which all or several experts say are more choiceworthy, but also without qualification one would show that the things that

all or most people choose are more choiceworthy than those that not all [choose]. In this way, one could show that being is more choiceworthy than learning or knowing: for all choose to be,<sup>89</sup> but not all choose to learn or know. And [in this way one could also show that] feeling pleasure [is more choiceworthy] than doing physical exercise: Plato,<sup>90</sup> at least, by resorting to this [claim] as being reputable, said that the good is what all things<sup>91</sup> desire. But also Eudoxus<sup>92</sup> showed that pleasure is the greatest good from [the claim] that animals choose it, and none of the other goods is so universally chosen. On this [account], health is more choiceworthy than reputation, too, because all human beings choose  
 20 health,<sup>93</sup> but not all [choose] reputation. But the majority also choose wealth over reputation: so that one would also show through this [*topos*] that wealth is more choiceworthy than reputation. And also being in possession of the arts is more choiceworthy than not [being in possession of them] for the majority [of people].

And he says that we should use each of the [*topoi*] that were said with a view to what it is useful for: for not all things are suitable for all cases. For example, it is not possible to show through the same [*topoi*] that pleasure is more choiceworthy than virtue and that virtue [is more choiceworthy] than pleasure; rather, if we want to show that pleasure [is more choiceworthy than virtue] we will resort to the choice of all or of the many, whereas [if we want to show that] virtue [is more choiceworthy than pleasure we will resort] to the [choice] of the excellent.

And since he carried out the discussion about the more choiceworthy, but the same thing is not more choiceworthy for all, he draws a distinction about this, too, and says that some things are more choiceworthy without qualification,  
 30 whereas some others [are more choiceworthy] for some: more choiceworthy without qualification are those according to<sup>94</sup> the better branches of knowledge:<sup>95</sup>  
 227,1 for example, if philosophy is a better branch of knowledge than carpentry, then the things according to philosophy are more choiceworthy than those according to carpentry. For the carpenter, however, the things according to carpentry [are more choiceworthy] than those according to philosophy, and for the one who needs something about carpentry what seems to the carpenter is more choiceworthy. One can use the given one also as a *topos* for the discernment (*epikrisis*) of what is more choiceworthy without qualification.

116a23 Furthermore, what is precisely this something [is more choiceworthy] than what is not in the genus.

‘What [is] precisely’<sup>96</sup> is indicative<sup>97</sup> for him<sup>98</sup> of [what something is] strictly speaking, and the [expression] to which ‘what [is] precisely’ is added signifies

being that thing strictly speaking: for example, 'what [is] precisely a human being' [signifies] what is a human being strictly speaking, and 'what [is] precisely being' [signifies] what is being strictly speaking, and 'what [is] precisely good' [signifies] what is good strictly speaking. And of the things that are 10  
predicated of something else, the one to which 'what [is] precisely' is added signifies that this is predicated strictly speaking of that and that the being of the subject is, strictly speaking, in this and is this [very thing]. Since, then, genera are predicated of the things that [fall] under them strictly speaking, being predicated in [their] what-it-is, he says that they are predicated in the 'what [is] precisely' and says that the things under the genus are <what is precisely the genus>.<sup>99</sup> For example, colour is predicated in the 'what [is] precisely' of the white, and the white is what is precisely colour. And again, animal is in the 'what [is] precisely' of the human being, and the human being is an animal. Since, then, of the things that are predicated, the same are predicated of some things as genera and of some other things as accidents (for the colour is predicated as a genus of the white understood as a colour,<sup>100</sup> but as an accident of the white body), he presents to us a certain *topos* from this, through which we will get to 20  
know what is more choiceworthy. For if, of the things between which we are drawing the comparison, one turns out to be in<sup>101</sup> the thing with respect to which their comparison is made as in its genus, e.g. in the [genus] choiceworthy and good,<sup>102</sup> whereas the other thing [turns out to] have it as an accident, what is in it as in a genus is more choiceworthy. For what is in the good as in its genus turns out to be what is precisely good and what is precisely choiceworthy, which is indicative of what is [choiceworthy and good] strictly speaking, whereas what is not in it as in its genus but has it as an accident is not choiceworthy strictly speaking and, similarly, it is not good either. If, then, what is choiceworthy strictly speaking is more choiceworthy than what is [choiceworthy] not strictly speaking, then also what is in the good as in a genus is more choiceworthy than what has the good as a predicate but not as a genus. For, in general, of the things that are compared to each other with respect to something, the one which is in the genus with respect to which the comparison [is made] is [that with respect to which the comparison is made] to a higher degree than the one which is not in it in this way but rather has it as an accident. For that of which 228,1  
quantity is predicated as a genus is a quantity more than that which is a quantity incidentally, as the surface [is more of a quantity] than the white thing, and that of which quality is predicated as a genus is more of a quality than that of which [quality is predicated] as an accident: for whiteness is more of a colour than the white thing.

And he formulated the *topos* briefly, saying that what is precisely this something [is more choiceworthy] than what is not [in it] as in a genus through [the words] ‘not in the genus.’ And he said ‘of the just’ man, but not ‘of what is said according to the disposition’:<sup>103</sup> for the latter is similar to justice and is itself in the genus good.

Using this *topos* we will show that justice and each of the virtues is more choiceworthy and more of a good than the [person] who has each of them, i.e.  
 10 than the just [man], the temperate [man], the courageous [man]. For each of the virtues is in the genus virtue and (as he now speaks of the good, taking the more general genus) in the [genus] good. For this reason, also each of them is what is precisely virtue and what is precisely good. Of the things that have the virtues, however, none is in the genus virtue or [in the genus] good: for the just man is neither what is precisely virtue nor what is precisely good. But he is good, because he has virtue and the good as accidents. The [words] ‘for nothing, which does not happen to be in the genus, is said [to be] what is precisely the genus’<sup>104</sup> is equivalent to ‘for nothing is said to be what is precisely its predicate, too, if it is not in the predicate as in a genus.’ For colour is predicated of the white, and the white is said  
 20 to be what is precisely colour, because [colour] is predicated of it as a genus; but colour is predicated of the white human being, and yet it is not the case that for this reason the human being is what is precisely colour, since colour is predicated of it not as a genus but as an accident. The same reasoning [applies] to the other predicates, too: for as colour is predicated of some things as a genus and of some others not as a genus, the same holds in the other cases too. It is possible that [the words:] ‘and similarly in the other cases too’<sup>105</sup> indicate that, as in the case of the virtues and of goods, what is in the good as in a genus is more choiceworthy than what is not in it as a genus, in the same way also in the other cases that thing, which is in that [predicate] based on which the comparison is made between the two as in a genus, is that more than the thing which is in it,<sup>106</sup> but not as in a genus. <And this would be the case also for things><sup>107</sup> [that are in the predicate] as in a  
 30 species: for species, too, are predicated in the ‘what [is] precisely’ of the things they are species of.<sup>108</sup> For also what is in what-is-to-be-avoided as in a genus is to be avoided more than what is in what-is-to-be-avoided not as in a genus.

229,1 116a29 *And what is choiceworthy because of itself [is more choiceworthy] than what is choiceworthy because of something else.*

This *topos*, too, is obvious. For since of the things that are good and choiceworthy<sup>109</sup> some are choiceworthy because of themselves, as happiness and the things that

are honourable, whereas others [are choiceworthy] because of something else, e.g. going through surgery, doing physical exercise, doing business and, in general, the things that are useful, and some [are choiceworthy] both because of themselves and because of something else,<sup>110</sup> as the virtues (for we choose them both because of themselves and because of happiness), similarly for health, wealth and the things that are good as capacities,<sup>111</sup> it is clear that what someone chooses because of itself is more choiceworthy than what someone chooses, however not because of itself but rather because of something else, as he has made intelligible through the examples, too. For if we choose being healthy because of itself (for this is [one] of the things that are choiceworthy because of themselves),<sup>112</sup> and doing physical exercise because of something else (i.e. 10 because of health or because we want to compete and get the crown of victory), then health is more choiceworthy than doing physical exercise. In the same way also if we choose a friend because of ourselves, if the friend is another self,<sup>113</sup> and riches not because of themselves, the friend is more choiceworthy than the riches. For everybody is choiceworthy to themselves because of themselves, so that <the> friend is also [choiceworthy because of himself]. But also wakefulness is more choiceworthy than sleep, since sleep is led back<sup>114</sup> to wakefulness: for we need sleep and breaks so that we can be awake. In this way, one would also show that philosophy is more choiceworthy than rhetoric.

And he adds to the aforementioned *topos* another one, that what is choiceworthy in its own right is more choiceworthy than what [is choiceworthy] 20 incidentally.<sup>115</sup> And choiceworthy in its own right is what is choiceworthy in virtue of its own nature and presence, whereas incidentally [choiceworthy] is that which, without being choiceworthy in virtue of its own nature, happens to be choiceworthy based on some circumstance.<sup>116</sup> And he himself made clear through the examples what each of these two cases is like. For friends' being just is choiceworthy in its own right: for we choose this not because of ourselves or in order to get something out of this for ourselves; rather, because friendship is a wish of good things [for friends] for their own sake, we prefer<sup>117</sup> that the good things belong to our friends; and justice is good for the one who has it, too. Enemies' being just, instead, is no longer choiceworthy for us in its own right: for 30 the wish of good things for the enemies for their own sake is not proper of enmity, for [, if it were,] enmity would be the same as friendship. We do not, 230,1 then, prefer this in its own right but incidentally: for since not doing injustice belongs incidentally to just people, we prefer that they are just thinking that the enemy would not commit injustice against us. But if this is choiceworthy incidentally, whereas that [is choiceworthy] in its own right, it is clear that what

is choiceworthy in its own right is more choiceworthy than what is [choiceworthy] incidentally.

And he says<sup>118</sup> that this *topos* (i.e. the one saying that what is [choiceworthy] in its own right is more choiceworthy than what is [choiceworthy] incidentally) is the same as the one before it (i.e. the one showing that what is choiceworthy because of itself is more choiceworthy than what is [choiceworthy] because of something else), since what is [choiceworthy] because of itself is the same as what is [choiceworthy] in its own right and what is [choiceworthy] because of something else is the same as what is [choiceworthy] incidentally. For that  
 10 friends are just is choiceworthy both in its own right and because of itself, just like health; that enemies are just, instead, is [choiceworthy] incidentally (for it belongs incidentally to them that, if they turn out to be just, they do not do harm [to us]) and because of something else: for [it is choiceworthy] in view of the fact that they will not harm us. And doing physical exercise is of this sort too: for [we choose it] because of something else (i.e. because of health) and incidentally, because being healthy belongs incidentally to those who do physical exercise. And he said that the only difference between them concerns the mode of their formulation,<sup>119</sup> because in one case we use 'because of itself' and 'because of something else', whereas in the other case [we use] 'in its own right' and 'incidentally'.

Or, perhaps,<sup>120</sup> the difference consists only in the mode of the formulation in the case of the given examples, but in other cases it is possible to find in them more  
 20 [differences] <than><sup>121</sup> the difference in the mode of the formulation. For there are things that are choiceworthy in their own right, and yet not because of themselves: for those who are freezing, at least, a warm garment is choiceworthy in its own right; but if it is [choiceworthy] in its own right, it is not [choiceworthy] incidentally; however, [the warm garment] is not choiceworthy because of itself but because of something else: because not freezing is the result that comes out of it. Rather, the garment which we choose in its own right when we are freezing is incidentally white or grey or of any other colour. And also a horse is choiceworthy in its own right for the horseman: for in this way he will be able to exercise his horsemanship; however, it is not also [choiceworthy] because of itself, whenever indeed being a horseman itself, with reference to which the use of the horse [is determined], is not choiceworthy because of itself either; but the bay [horse] or the black one [is choiceworthy] incidentally. And also being fed for the one who  
 30 is in need of food will seem to be choiceworthy in its own right, but not because of itself. Being choiceworthy in their own right follows upon things' being choiceworthy because of themselves, but it would not seem to convert any longer.<sup>122</sup>

Or perhaps, incidentally good is, in general, what, without being good by its own nature, is said to be good<sup>123</sup> because some good is its accident. For in this way enemies' being just will appear to be good incidentally, because, without being good itself, some good is an accident of it (for not suffering injustice from them is a good that belongs [to them] not for their own sake but for our sake), and not like wealth or any other instrumental good<sup>124</sup> which is good in its own right, but not because of itself: for wealth [is good] in its own right, because it is, by its own nature, an instrument for fine acts, but it is not [good] because of itself, because every instrument is choiceworthy because of something else. What is choiceworthy incidentally, then, will be in all cases choiceworthy because of something else, but what is choiceworthy because of something else will not be also incidentally [choiceworthy] in all cases: for many of the things that are good by their own nature are choiceworthy because of other things, whereas only those that are choiceworthy because of some accident of theirs are [choiceworthy] incidentally: for in this way even poverty and disease and death turn out to be choiceworthy sometimes. So that, if what is [choiceworthy] in its own right is not the same as what is [choiceworthy] because of itself nor what is [choiceworthy] because of something else is the same as what is [choiceworthy] incidentally, the *topoi* would not be the same either.

*116b1 And what is the cause of a good thing in its own right [is more choiceworthy] than what is [a cause of a good thing] incidentally.*

Having said that what is choiceworthy in its own right is more choiceworthy than what is [choiceworthy] incidentally, since some difference of this sort [obtains] also among the causes (for some things are causes of some things in their own right, whereas others [are causes] incidentally, for example: the builder is the cause of the house in its own right, whereas the Athenian or the pale one [is the cause of the house] incidentally),<sup>125</sup> he presents to us some *topos* from the causes,<sup>126</sup> too, for the discernment (*epikrisis*) of the more choiceworthy. For when some two good things are causes of something good and choiceworthy, the one in its own right and the other incidentally, the one [which is a cause of a good and choiceworthy thing] in its own right is more choiceworthy. And this *topos* would lead on to<sup>127</sup> the [claim], which is agreed upon, that the cause of the choiceworthy is also choiceworthy itself. In this way, virtue is more choiceworthy than luck: for virtue is a cause of the things that are rightly done<sup>128</sup> with reference to it in its own right. Whenever, then, luck too turns out to be a cause, it would be [a cause] incidentally: for it was shown universally that luck is a cause incidentally.<sup>129</sup>

232,1 In this way, one would show that medicine, too, is more choiceworthy than luck, when both are causes of health. And health [would be] more choiceworthy than good complexion for this reason too: for health is a cause of good in its own right, whereas good complexion [is a cause of good] incidentally. And doing physical exercise [is more choiceworthy] than <entering into a contest><sup>130</sup> with this particular person: for the former produces health in its own right, the latter incidentally. For it is clear that also the one who enters into a contest with this particular person is doing physical exercise, not, however, because of doing physical exercise but because of entering a contest.

*116b4 Similarly also in the case of the contrary.*

10 Based on the same reasoning one would also show that what is a cause of something bad in its own right is more to be avoided than what [is the cause of something bad] incidentally, as vice [is more to be avoided] than luck. And the steersman who capsizes the ship himself is worse than the one due to the absence of whom the ship capsized:<sup>131</sup> for the latter is the cause of the capsizing incidentally, whereas the former is the cause in its own right. And a similar reasoning [applies] to the general and the doctor: for the general who, by being there, destroyed the army is worse than the one who turns out to be responsible of the destruction through his absence; and the same applies to the doctor.

*116b8 And what is good without qualification [is more choiceworthy] than what is more choiceworthy for someone.*

20 As in the case of healthy things those that are healthy without qualification are such for those who are healthy and who are in their natural state<sup>132</sup> (for example: walks, physical exercise, such and such food), whereas others are not healthy without qualification, but for some, e.g. for those who are ill (e.g. surgery for those who need it, and fasting, rest, medicaments), in this way also [of good things] some are good without qualification, [i.e.] those that are such for all those who are in their natural state, others [are good only] for some. For example, health is good without qualification, for it is good for all those who are in their natural state; disease, on the other hand, is bad without qualification, but it could turn out to be good for some, e.g. for Theages, if indeed 'the nursing of the disease of the body' held him in philosophy, as Plato says.<sup>133</sup> Similarly, wealth and reputation are good without qualification; but also poverty and lack of reputation

could occasionally turn out to be good for someone, if due to poverty and lack of reputation they were not the target of plotting and were not killed by some tyrant who kills those who are reputable and wealthy. Things being in this way, then, he says that things that are good without qualification are more choiceworthy than those that are not so without qualification but for some and occasionally. And the *topos* is clear. And it would be the same *topos* as the one given a little earlier from what is in its own right and incidentally.<sup>134</sup>

116b10 *And what is by nature [is more choiceworthy] than what is not by nature, as justice [is more choiceworthy] than what is just.* 233,1

This *topos*, too, is potentially<sup>135</sup> the same as the one before it: for things that are good by their own nature are also good without qualification, whereas those that are acquired<sup>136</sup> are neither [good] without qualification nor for all. It would differ in its conception:<sup>137</sup> for it is not because it is [of this sort] without qualification, but because it is of this sort by its own nature. And, in general, things that are constituted by nature are better than those that are not by nature but are acquired and based on craft and established by use;<sup>138</sup> for the things that are based on the crafts, being imitations of nature, are second to nature. But also things that are according to customs, conventions, and law are second to those that are by nature: for, for the latter, their own nature is the cause of their being of this sort, whereas, for the former, it is rather a convention about them of these particular [people] or a custom [that makes them of this sort]. And, of the goods, at least, those that are good in virtue of their own nature are more choiceworthy than those that are not of this sort by nature. For example, justice as well as every virtue is good by its own nature; however, what is just among each [people] is not such in virtue of its own nature, but rather based on custom or based on the law. For different things are customary among different people, and for each of them what is according to their own customs is good and choiceworthy. But, provided that they are both good, both justice and the just things established by convention, justice according to nature is more choiceworthy than such a just thing, because the former is by nature and the latter is not by nature. In this context he takes the just thing that is not by nature since there is also some just thing which is by nature, which comes to be such according to justice. Alternatively, he says 'of the just'<sup>139</sup> [meaning] 'of the one who has justice': for, for the latter, justice is a good that is acquired and is not by nature, if indeed the just are not just by nature; justice, on the other hand, is a good by its own nature.

116b12 And what is more choiceworthy<sup>140</sup> for the one who is better or more honourable, e.g. for a god rather than for a human being, and for the soul rather than for the body.

The *topos* is clear: for through it [Aristotle] says that what is good for what is better is more choiceworthy than what is good for what is worse. For what is said is not, as it could seem, that what is more choiceworthy for the better, this is also  
 234,1 more choiceworthy: for it does not draw a comparison between the things that are good or choiceworthy for the same [subject], but between those [that are good or choiceworthy] for different natures.<sup>141</sup> Nonetheless, the *topos* is in need of some explanation. For if it is plausible to take what is more choiceworthy by its own nature without qualification and not [what is more choiceworthy] to the one who makes the assessment about this, the *topos* is true without qualification, since what is choiceworthy for the one who is better and more honourable, insofar as he is better and more honourable, is more choiceworthy and good to a higher degree than what is choiceworthy for the one who is not such. Things that are choiceworthy for the gods, then, are more choiceworthy without qualification and better than the things that are choiceworthy for human beings: for example, immortality or the ordering of all things and unaffectability are [more choiceworthy and better] than wisdom, health, virtue, wealth, philosophy,  
 10 and such things that are choiceworthy for human beings. If, on the other hand, the assessment turns out to be about what is more choiceworthy for the one who chooses, the *topos* is no longer sound without qualification: for the things that are choiceworthy for the gods are not more choiceworthy for us than the things that are choiceworthy for us, if indeed many of the things that are choiceworthy for them are impossible for us, and only the foolish choose impossible things. For this reason, we should add ‘if both are possible’. For if they are both possible to the one who does the assessment of what is more choiceworthy, what is choiceworthy for the better and the more honourable is more choiceworthy; for example, what is of common utility is more choiceworthy than what is of private utility: for both are possible for the human being, and, for the gods, what is of common utility is choiceworthy and according to nature. Similarly, acting well is also [more choiceworthy] than being well affected:<sup>142</sup> for acting well is choiceworthy for the gods, and both are possible for the human being. In the  
 20 same way also if being prudent (*to phronein*) and, more generally, the virtues are choiceworthy for the soul, whereas being healthy and strong [are choiceworthy] for the body, then being prudent and the virtues are more choiceworthy, and,<sup>143</sup> in general, the things that are [choiceworthy] for what is more honourable and

better are more choiceworthy: for the soul is better than the body. Similarly, knowing, too, is more choiceworthy than perceiving, since perceiving is rather bodily (for [it occurs] through the body), whereas knowing is proper (*oikeion*) and specific (*idion*) to the soul.

And this *topos* would differ from the one already mentioned: ‘and what the prudent [man] would rather choose, or the good man [...]’,<sup>144</sup> because in that one the attack took place from what is more choiceworthy for the better, when both are choiceworthy for the same [agent], whereas in this case, when one thing is choiceworthy for the better and another thing is choiceworthy for the worse, it is shown that what is [choiceworthy] for the better is more choiceworthy, as in the case of soul and body. For they are not both choiceworthy for each of them. Furthermore, in that case the enquiry was about what is more choiceworthy for the one who chooses, whereas in this case it is about what is more choiceworthy without qualification and not for someone.

235,1

*116b13 And what is specific to what is better is better than what [is specific] to what is worse.*

Having presented a *topos* which sets up<sup>145</sup> what is more choiceworthy from what is choiceworthy for the better, since it is not true in all cases that what is choiceworthy for something is already also specific (*idion*)<sup>146</sup> to it (for example, health is choiceworthy for the human being, but being healthy is not specific to the human being), he now presents a *topos* from what is specific<sup>147</sup> (for what is specific to the better is better than what is specific to the worse), without drawing the comparison with reference to what is more choiceworthy but with reference to what is better without qualification.<sup>148</sup> For what is specific to what is better, if it is not possible for the worse, would not be more choiceworthy for the latter either. (Alternatively, he takes what is better without qualification to be more choiceworthy without qualification too). <For this reason,><sup>149</sup> he also uses them as different: for he does not always make a comparison about what is more choiceworthy for something, but <also> about what is [choiceworthy] without qualification and according to its own nature, as he did also in the *topos* before this one.

10

And he showed that what is specific to the better is better through [the claim] that the better is also better in some [part or aspect] of its own: but with respect to the things that are common and similar for the worse and for the better, neither is superior to the other (for they do not differ [in these respects]). [The option] left is that their difference obtains according to the [aspects] that are

specific to [each of] them and that in this respect what is better is superior to what is worse. If, then, the difference between the two of them and the superiority is with respect to these things, then also what is specific to what is better would  
 20 be better. For example, if the god and the human being and the horse are animated beings, they do not differ from each other with respect to the common genus. But since the god is better than the human being, and the human being than the horse, [the option] left is that their difference obtains with respect to the [features that are] specific [to each of them]. If then, immortality is specific to the god, being able to receive knowledge [is specific] to the human being, and being able to neigh to the horse, immortality is better than being able to receive knowledge, and being able to receive knowledge [is better] than being able to neigh. In this way, also if impulse is specific to the soul and inclination to the body, impulse would be better than inclination, since the soul, too, [is better] than the body.

And it seems to me that [he]<sup>150</sup> takes the better and the worse among things of the same kind,<sup>151</sup> since the comparison, too, obtains among things that have a commonality with each other. For this reason, he also said: 'for they do not differ  
 236,1 with respect to the things that are common in both',<sup>152</sup> as if the things that are compared were bound to have something in common too.

*116b17 And what is in things that are better or prior or more honourable is better.*

The *topos* is like this: if, of the things that are compared to each other with respect to [being] choiceworthy, one is in<sup>153</sup> better things and the other in worse things, or one is in things that are prior and the other in things that are posterior, or one in things that are more honourable and the other in things that are less so, what is in things that are superior is better. For example, if one enquired into whether knowledge or health is more choiceworthy, he could show that knowledge [is better],<sup>154</sup> although both of them are choiceworthy, because knowledge is in the soul, whereas health is in the body, and the soul is better than the body. Again, if  
 10 one enquired into whether health or strength or beauty is more choiceworthy, it could be shown that health is, because it is in prior things, if in truth health is in the commensurability of the first bodily powers, which are heat, coldness, wetness, dryness; of those, instead, strength is in the commensurability of homeomerous parts (nerves, bones, and breath), whereas beauty is in the commensurability of our anhomeomerous parts (face, neck, hands, and the other parts which are posterior to the primary powers in us). And again, with the same argument one could show that strength, too, is more choiceworthy

than beauty: for homeomerous parts in us, in which strength is, are prior to the anhomeomerous one, in which beauty is. For each of the anhomeomerous parts is composed from the homeomerous ones, as the face from bones and nerves and flesh. For this reason [the former] are also removed at the same time if [the latter] are removed, whereas they do not remove [the latter] at the same time if they are removed. And again, if one enquires whether contemplation or action is more choiceworthy, it could be shown that contemplation is, because its activity is about the more honourable things<sup>155</sup> (for action is about things that can be done and are up to us, whereas contemplation is about the divine things), and [also] since it occurs in the most honourable part of the soul: for the intellect, of which contemplation is the activity, is the most honourable of the capacities of the soul. 20

116b22 *And the end [seems to be] more choiceworthy than the means to it.* 237,1

This *topos* is almost included<sup>156</sup> in the one already given a little earlier: ‘and what is choiceworthy because of itself [is more choiceworthy] than what is choiceworthy because of something else.’<sup>157</sup> For the end is choiceworthy because of itself, whereas the means to the end [are choiceworthy] because of something else, i.e. because of the end. However, [this *topos*] might differ [from the previous one] because, there, it was not the means to the end that were compared to the end, but, rather, things that are choiceworthy because of other things in whatever way ([i.e. things] which were choiceworthy not because of this very same thing, i.e. that they have an end) were compared, in general, to those that are choiceworthy because of themselves; here, instead, the comparison is between ends and means to them. In this way, health is more choiceworthy than physical exercises, walks, food, and, in general, style of life, since the former is the end, while the latter are for its sake. And happiness [is more choiceworthy] than virtue, health, wealth, and the other goods: for the former is the end, whereas the latter are for its sake. And knowing [is more choiceworthy] than learning, and being active with respect to dispositions [is more choiceworthy] than having dispositions.<sup>158</sup> 10

116b23 *And of two [means] the one that is closer to the end [is more choiceworthy].*

The *topos* is about the comparison between things that contribute to an end. For if there are some two things that are led back to<sup>159</sup> some one end, the one which is closer to the end is more choiceworthy and better than the one which is farther removed. For example, both cutting one’s hair<sup>160</sup> and doing exercise are causes

of health; but since physical exercise is closer to health, it is better and more choiceworthy: for what is closer to the end seems to stand in the same proportion to the cause before it as the end [stands] to it: for in a way this is also an end for that.<sup>161</sup> In this way also the activity in accordance with virtue is more choiceworthy than the disposition: for it is closer to happiness, which is the end of both. In this way, it would also seem that things that preserve health are more choiceworthy than those that produce it: for they obtain at the same time as health, whereas the latter come before it. In this way, horsemanship is better than the art of bit-making, although both of them contribute to the art of military command, since horsemanship is closer [to the latter]; and carpentry [is better] than the art of wood felling, although both of them are useful for shipbuilding, and gymnastics [is better] than medicine, although they both contribute to good physical condition.

238,1 116b24 *And, in general, the means to the end of life is more choiceworthy rather than the means to something else.*

For the things that contribute to the most complete end are more choiceworthy than those contributing to something else; and the most complete end is happiness: for all other things are led back to this.<sup>162</sup> If, then, also the ends of other things are led back to happiness, it is clear that also the things that contribute to some of them would be second among the things that contribute to happiness.

And this *topos*, too, is in the one before it potentially<sup>163</sup>. For since the most complete end is one (for also the other [ends], which seem to be ends of other things, are for the sake of the most complete end), it is clear that also the ends of some other things will be themselves for the sake of the complete end. And the difference among them is that some are close to the most complete end, some are far. For example, happiness is the most complete end; prudence, which is also itself an end of something else, is itself for the sake of happiness too. Both [prudence] itself, then, and the things that come about because of it have happiness as an end, but prudence is close to happiness (for the latter is its end proximately), whereas what is productive of prudence, e.g. education, has prudence as its proximate end, and happiness as its last: for prudence is closer to happiness than education and the things that are productive of prudence. It is, therefore, reasonable that [prudence] is also more choiceworthy than them.

20 Accordingly, if one enquired into whether health or wealth is more choiceworthy, since health is led back to the end of life, i.e. to happiness, whereas

wealth [is led back] to the activities in accordance with liberality, which are also led back themselves to happiness, health would be more choiceworthy than wealth. But the activity in accordance with justice is also more choiceworthy than the things that are productive of prudence: for the former is itself productive of happiness. And through this *topos* one would show that virtue is more choiceworthy than the honour from the king, if indeed happiness is the end of virtue, whereas ruling over a people [is the end] of the honour from the king.

116b26 *And what is possible [is more choiceworthy] than what is impossible.* 239,1

This is no longer more choiceworthy without qualification, but [more choiceworthy] for the one who is making the choice.<sup>164</sup> And the *topos* is clear: for if, of the things compared, one is possible and the other is impossible, what is possible is more choiceworthy for the one for whom the other is impossible. For example, since long life is possible for the human being, whereas immortality is impossible, long life would be more choiceworthy for the human being than immortality. Similarly, moderation in emotions [is more choiceworthy for the human being] than lack of emotions. For, without qualification, immortality and lack of emotions would be more choiceworthy, since they are choiceworthy for the one who is better, i.e. god. For he shows that he says that impossible things, too, are choiceworthy, not for those for whom they are impossible, but without qualification, if there are such things, by drawing a comparison about what is more choiceworthy also with reference to what is impossible: for this is more choiceworthy. Without qualification, then, it is also possible to show that what is impossible is more choiceworthy than what is possible: but, for the one who chooses, what is possible is more choiceworthy.<sup>165</sup> 10

116b26 *Furthermore, of two productive things, the one whose end is better.*

The *topos* was said unclearly due to brevity. It is like this: if there are some two things that are productive of some two ends, the thing 'whose end is better' and more choiceworthy is itself better. In this way one could show that education is better than physical exercises, if indeed physical exercise is productive of health, whereas education [is productive] of prudence, and prudence is more choiceworthy than health. Again, doing physical exercise is more choiceworthy than doing business: for the latter is productive of wealth, the former of health, and health is better than wealth.

And it is clear that, if it is taken that both things are productive of their proper ends or they are so in a similar way,<sup>166</sup> the *topos* is sound. For if one thing is proximately<sup>167</sup> productive of the less choiceworthy end, whereas the other thing is remotely [productive] of the more choiceworthy [end], it is not the case in general that what is productive of the more choiceworthy is more choiceworthy. For cutting one's hair is not more choiceworthy than doing business, although the former leads to health, and the latter to wealth: but cutting one's hair is more distant from health than doing business is from wealth.<sup>168</sup>

240,1 116b27 [What is more choiceworthy] between what is productive and an end [can be established] from a proportion.

In the previous *topos*, he said that what is productive of the better end is better, based on the idea that ends and the things productive of them stand in proportion to each other (for in the same amount in which the end exceeds the end also the productive thing exceeds the productive thing). By resorting to this proportion he [now] teaches us a *topos* by using which we will be able to compare an end of something and something productive of another end.

And the discovery of this *topos* is very subtle: for he says that 'from a proportion' we will find both the excess and what is choiceworthy in these things.

10 For if we have taken the proper end of the productive thing which is being compared to the end, [i.e. if we have taken the end] of which [the compared thing] is productive, and again the proper productive thing of the end which is compared to the productive thing, and have found how much the end of the productive thing exceeds the end which is compared to it, it is clear that we would also have how much the compared productive thing exceeds the productive thing which is productive of the compared end. For as the end stands to the end, so also what is productive stands to what is productive, as he showed in the previous *topos*. Accordingly, if this is the situation, then if the end exceeds the end more than the exceeded end [exceeds] its own productive thing, then also the productive thing of the exceeding end would exceed the productive thing of the exceeded end more than the exceeded end [exceeds] its proper

20 productive thing. For if to the extent to which the end exceeds the end, to the same extent also the productive thing exceeds the productive thing, and the end exceeds the end to a greater extent than the exceeded end [exceeds] its own productive thing, it is clear that also the productive thing exceeds the productive thing to a greater extent than its own end [exceeds the latter productive thing]. But what exceeds the same thing to a greater extent is better than what exceeds

[it] to a lesser extent: therefore, also the productive thing will be superior to the end with which it was compared, and it will be more choiceworthy than it.<sup>169</sup>

For example: let prudence be what is productive of happiness, and let the enquiry be whether prudence, which is productive of happiness, or health, which is also an end in itself, is more choiceworthy. If we then took happiness, of which prudence is productive, and that which is productive of health (which is an end), e.g. physical exercise, it will result that as the end stands to the end, i.e. as happiness stands to health, so also what is productive stands to what is productive, i.e. so prudence stands to physical exercise. For as happiness stands to prudence (its own productive thing), so also health stands to its own productive thing, which is physical exercise. But if things are in this way, then also as the antecedent stands to antecedent, i.e. as happiness stands to health, so also the consequent stands to the consequent, i.e. so prudence stands to physical exercise: indeed, to the same extent that happiness is more choiceworthy than health, prudence too [is more choiceworthy] than physical exercise.

241,1

These things being laid down,<sup>170</sup> let us check again whether happiness exceeds health to the same extent that health exceeds physical exercise, which was its productive thing, or to a greater or to a lesser extent. For if happiness exceeds health to a greater extent than health [exceeds] physical exercise, then prudence, too, which was productive of happiness, will exceed physical exercise to a greater extent than health does. But if it exceeds it to a greater extent, it is clear that it is also more choiceworthy than health: for by exceeding the same thing to a greater extent it would also exceed that.<sup>171</sup> If, instead, happiness exceeds health to the same extent as health exceeds physical exercise, then also prudence and health would exceed physical exercise to the same extent; and if to the same extent, [prudence] and that [i.e. health] would be similarly choiceworthy too. If, again, happiness exceeds health to a lesser extent than health exceeds physical exercise, then also prudence would exceed physical exercise to a lesser extent than health does; and, by exceeding to a lesser extent, it is clear that it would also be less choiceworthy. And in this way an end, i.e. health, would be shown to be more choiceworthy than the productive thing, i.e. prudence, with which it was compared.

10

20

One could also show that happiness exceeds health to a greater extent than health exceeds doing physical exercise because happiness does not require health in the same way in which health requires doing physical exercise: for doing physical exercise is productive of health, whereas health, even if it contributes to happiness, it does not [contribute] as what is productive of it but rather more remotely, so that happiness would exceed health to a greater extent than health

[exceeds] doing physical exercise; therefore, prudence, too, [exceeds] doing physical exercise to a greater extent than health does: and what exceeds the same thing to a greater extent with respect to being good is also more choiceworthy.

And he not only found the *topos* ingeniously, but he also expressed it in a powerful and concise manner.

242,1 116b37 Furthermore, what is finer in its own right and more honourable and more praiseworthy.

Here he uses these words in a rather common<sup>172</sup> sense: ‘finer’ and ‘more honourable and more praiseworthy’. For in the division of the goods<sup>173</sup> he said that, of the goods, honourable are those that have more the character of principles,<sup>174</sup> such as gods, parents, happiness; fine and praiseworthy are the virtues and the activities in accordance with them; capacities are those of which it is possible to make good or bad use; useful, instead, are the things that are productive of these goods and contribute to these things. Here, however, he seems to introduce the fine and the praiseworthy and the honourable also with reference to the things that are good as capacities.<sup>175</sup>

10 And the *topos* is like this: what is finer in its own right (and this is what is finer by its own nature) and more honourable and more praiseworthy is more choiceworthy than what is less so by its own nature. For friendship is a finer thing by its own nature and more honourable and more praiseworthy than wealth, and similarly justice than strength: for wealth and strength, even if they seem to be good in their own right and fine and worthy of honour and effort, nonetheless are chosen by being led back to something else:<sup>176</sup> wealth is led back to use, and strength is led back to doing what is set before us without impediments. Friendship and justice, instead, are honoured because of themselves.

One might wonder in what this *topos* differs from the one which was given a little earlier, in which he said that the things that are choiceworthy in their own right are more choiceworthy than those that are choiceworthy incidentally<sup>177</sup> or  
20 that those [that are choiceworthy because of themselves are more choiceworthy] than those [that are choiceworthy] because of other things.<sup>178</sup> Perhaps in those [*topoi*] he said that things choiceworthy because of themselves are more choiceworthy than those [choiceworthy] because of other things and those choiceworthy in their own right than those [choiceworthy] incidentally by comparing the useful goods to those that are choiceworthy because of themselves. For one ought not to assess<sup>179</sup> the *topoi* from the examples. In this case, instead, he says that of the [goods that are] fine and honourable, those that have what is

finer and more honourable and more praiseworthy through themselves are more choiceworthy, in the sense that both have [these features] because of themselves, but [some] more than the others. In this way, this *topos* would also differ from that one, in which he said ‘and what is by nature [is more choiceworthy] than what is not by nature’;<sup>180</sup> for in this case both are by nature. For friendship and justice are more choiceworthy than wealth and strength in that they are finer 243,1 because of themselves and more honourable and more praiseworthy, although those too are choiceworthy by their own nature. [The claim] ‘and nobody honours wealth because of itself but because of something else’<sup>181</sup> does not remove [the claim] that wealth is choiceworthy by its own nature. For insofar as it is a tool, it is of this sort; but insofar as it has it in its own nature that it is a tool for the excellent man for activities in accordance with virtue, while it is not turned into a tool for activities in accordance with virtue by the excellent man, it is good in its own right and choiceworthy: for it has its being useful in its own nature. For that it is not the excellent man that makes it into such a thing is clear from the fact that [the excellent man] does not turn poverty into such a thing, 10 even if he uses this too, and, furthermore, [from the fact that] he chooses richness instead of poverty.<sup>182</sup>

## <Chapter 2>

117a5 *Furthermore, when two things are too close to each other.*

He gives us a *topos* from the consequents.<sup>183</sup> For when the things between which we are drawing the comparison, enquiring into which one of them is more choiceworthy, are close to each other and on this ground the excess is hard to discern and hard to detect,<sup>184</sup> he says to do the assessment from their consequents: for the thing upon which the greater good follows, provided that [the compared things] are similar in other respects,<sup>185</sup> this thing is more choiceworthy. If, on the other hand, their consequents are bad (for nothing prevents some things that are unpleasant and should be avoided from following upon some choiceworthy things too), the thing that is followed by the lesser bad, this will be more 20 choiceworthy. For example, if we enquire into whether learning or doing physical exercise is more choiceworthy, we take their consequents: knowing follows learning, and being healthy follows doing physical exercise. <Since knowing> is a greater good <than being healthy>,<sup>186</sup> we will say that learning is more choiceworthy than doing physical exercise. <Similarly, since> also what is in

want of naught <is more choiceworthy><sup>187</sup> than what is in need, when we enquire into whether acting well or being acted upon well is more choiceworthy, since being similar to god and to the things that are in want of naught follows acting well, whereas being acted upon well is proper of things that are mortal and in need, we will say that acting well is more choiceworthy than being acted upon well. In this way, it will be shown that self-control is more choiceworthy than toughness, if indeed winning follows self-control and not-losing follows toughness, and winning is more choiceworthy than not-losing. If, instead, the consequents are bad, we will do the assessment of the more choiceworthy from the lesser bad. For if we enquire whether being cured or sailing is more choiceworthy, since being sea-sick follows sailing and being cauterised and going through surgery follow being cured, and the latter is a greater bad than being sea-sick, we will say that sailing is more choiceworthy than being cured. And it is possible to do the assessment with reference to these very same things and from the goods that follow them: for since health follows being cured, 244,1 whereas gain or direct observations<sup>188</sup> follow sailing, and health is a greater good than those, in this respect being cured will be more choiceworthy than sailing. 10

Using this *topos* it is also possible to show that the contemplative life is more choiceworthy than the practical one: for being looked down upon and being ignored and being disdained follow the contemplative life, whereas being envied and being plotted against, which are greater bads than being looked down upon and being disdained, follow the practical life. And one could also show that reputation is more choiceworthy than wealth, since vanity follows reputation, but wanton violence, which is a greater evil than vanity, follows wealth. And in this way it is possible to show that bad things follow the compared things that are choiceworthy.

On the other hand, it is possible to show from the things that follow and are bad and to be avoided, that one [of the compared things] is to be avoided more 20 than the other. For since being hated follows doing injustice, whereas being pitied follows suffering injustice, and being hated is a greater bad than being pitied, suffering injustice is less to be avoided than doing injustice. And again, if the mutual plotting against each other between people of the same kin is a greater bad than that between strangers, and the mutual plotting against each other between people of the same kin follows sedition, while that between strangers follow war, being at war is less to be avoided than being in a sedition. In this way it will be also shown that madness is a lesser bad than anger, if it is true that misfortune follows madness but doing wrong follows anger, which is a greater bad than misfortune.

He also mentions a difference between the consequents of some things: some are prior in time than the things they are said to follow, whereas others are posterior.<sup>189</sup> And for the most part, of the things that follow choiceworthy things, those that are posterior are better than the first. For what follows learning as first [in time] is being ignorant (for if he learns, he was ignorant: the consequence is in a hypothesis)<sup>190</sup>, whereas [what follows learning] as posterior is knowing (for if he has learnt, he knows). And [what follows] being cured as first is being ill (if one is being cured, then he is ill), as second being healthy (for if one is being cured, then he is healthy); and [what follows] doing business [for profit] as first is poverty, as second having riches; and [what follows] as first the things that come to be is not being, as posterior being. And the other way around for perishing and, in general, for things that have to be avoided: for [what follows] disease as first is health, as posterior is perishing; and [what follows] loss as first is possession, as posterior is lack; and as for those that are enslaved, freedom was before, slavery after. So that there are cases in which what is first is better, whereas what is second is worse. 30 245,1 10

Having shown, then, the two [types] of consequents, he says that one ought always to take the one among the consequents which is useful to show what is submitted.<sup>191</sup> For from the goods that follow later we will show that learning is more choiceworthy than being restored to health, since knowledge follows the former and health follows the latter, and knowledge is a greater good than health and knowing [a greater good] than being healthy, since the soul's good disposition follows the former, whereas the body's well being, which is a lesser good than that, follows the latter. And the other way round, from the bad things that follow later it will be shown that being fond of contemplation<sup>192</sup> is more choiceworthy than being strong in the body: for the bad which follows those who are fond of contemplation is lack of concern and ignorance of the necessary things, whereas arrogance and injustice, which is a greater bad than the lack of concern and the ignorance of necessary things, follows those who are strong in their body. And from the good and bad things that follow later one would show that dying in war is more choiceworthy than being enslaved in fleeing: for the good that follows those who die in war is good reputation, while the bad thing is being pitied, whereas the good thing that follows those who flee is being alive, and the bad thing is slavery. If good reputation is certainly a greater good than being alive and being pitied a lesser bad than slavery, on both [accounts] dying in war would be more choiceworthy than being enslaved in fleeing. 20

Through the good and bad things that follow first, on the other hand,<sup>193</sup> one could show again that learning is more choiceworthy than being restored to

30 health: for the antecedent of the former is deliberating to get rid of ignorance,  
 246,1 whereas [the antecedent] of the latter is [deliberating to get rid] of disease, and,  
 although both of them are choiceworthy, deliberating to get rid of ignorance  
 is more choiceworthy; so that also the thing that this latter follows is more  
 choiceworthy. And the antecedent bad things of these are the other way round:  
 for ignorance is the antecedent of learning, whereas disease is [the antecedent]  
 of being restored to health, and disease is a lesser bad than ignorance; so that,  
 according to this [argument], being restored to health would appear to be more  
 choiceworthy than learning. Or perhaps these things are not consequents strictly  
 speaking: for this reason [this *topos*] could be brought under another *topos*  
 requiring that the thing through which an end is put to a greater bad is more  
 choiceworthy than the thing through which an end is put to a lesser one. And it  
 is possible, for the sake of what is submitted, also to take alternately the prior  
 consequent of one thing and the posterior [consequent] of the other: for we will  
 10 show that knowledge is more choiceworthy than pleasure by taking the prior  
 consequent of knowledge (i.e. learning) and the posterior [consequent] of  
 pleasure (i.e. having enjoyed oneself): and since learning is more choiceworthy  
 than having enjoyed oneself, then also knowledge would be more choiceworthy  
 than pleasure.

*117a16 Furthermore, more goods [are more choiceworthy] than fewer goods,  
 either without qualification, or when the ones are included among the others.*

He says that more goods are more choiceworthy than fewer goods, either without  
 qualification, when [goods that] differ from each other are taken, e.g. health and  
 nobility of birth and wealth and memory [are more choiceworthy] than honour  
 and strength (for they have been taken [in such a way that they] differ from each  
 other without qualification since none of one [group] is [included] among the  
 20 others), or not without qualification, but when the ones [are included] among the  
 others, i.e. when the fewer are included by those that are more. And this seems to  
 be more true.<sup>194</sup> For in the case of [goods that are] different without qualification  
 and completely this [does] not [seem to be]<sup>195</sup> true: for it is possible that those  
 that are fewer in number are more choiceworthy than those that are more, if  
 those that are fewer are greater and those that are more are not so: for example,  
 justice with prudence is more choiceworthy than health, wealth, strength, beauty,  
 and nobility of birth taken together. But this would no longer be the case if  
 the fewer [were included] among those that are more: for health and wealth and  
 honour and nobility of birth and more choiceworthy than health and wealth.

And having presented the *topos*, he says that there is an objection to it: for not in all cases [the goods] that are more are more choiceworthy than the fewer if the first include [the others] and the others are included. For when one takes two goods, the end and what is for the sake of it, e.g. being healed and health, and compares them to health, which belonged among the two goods mentioned at the beginning, the two are not more choiceworthy than health, even if they are more [than health alone], since we choose being healed for the sake of health. Similarly, knowledge with learning, which are two, is not more choiceworthy than knowledge [alone], which is one, because we choose learning for the sake of knowledge. But it is also not the case that happiness with the virtues is more choiceworthy than happiness alone, since the virtues too are included in happiness. And also doing good to one's family is included in doing good to the city, so that it is not the case that both of them [taken together] would be more choiceworthy than doing good to the city [alone]. And good physical condition, in which health is included, does not become more choiceworthy in virtue of that. For the things that are included among others are not counted with those that include them, as he said in the first book of the *Ethics*,<sup>196</sup> and this means that they cannot be compared: for this reason the additional qualification is needed that the goods that are more and include [the others and are] more choiceworthy than those that are fewer and included be among these things, [i.e.] those that are naturally such as to be counted with [each other].<sup>197</sup>

*117a21 And nothing prevents that things that are not good be more choiceworthy than things that are good.*

He says that nothing prevents that some good together with something that is not good be more choiceworthy than several goods. For it is not the case that, if only not good things are taken, they would be more choiceworthy than good things; rather if something that is not good is composed with something good [then they could be more choiceworthy than good things] – for the other case is impossible. And potentially he sets down through these things the objection which we raised against what was said first, namely that several goods are more choiceworthy without qualification than fewer [goods].<sup>198</sup> For temperance with something indifferent<sup>199</sup> (e.g. a small oil-flask or young hair or curliness of hair or standing still or walking), or with a small bad thing (e.g. lack of reputation), is more choiceworthy than health and wealth and strength. But if temperance, even if taken together with something bad, is more choiceworthy than several goods all together, such as wealth, nobility of birth and reputation, it is clear that

it would be more choiceworthy than them also on its own. But in this way it would no longer be the case that more goods are more choiceworthy than fewer, not even if what is opposed to the more is not their end.<sup>200</sup> And, similarly, happiness with some indifferent is more choiceworthy than justice and courage, too.

*117a23 And the same things with pleasure [are more choiceworthy] than without pleasure.*

248,1 This *topos* does not draw a comparison about some things in relation to some other things, but about the same things in relation to the same. For the same goods with pleasure are more choiceworthy than without pleasure: for example, courage with pleasure is more choiceworthy than courage without it.

Alternatively, if pleasure too is a good by its own nature,<sup>201</sup> then he would be showing in this case too that more goods are more choiceworthy than fewer goods since the fewer are included among those that are more.<sup>202</sup>

Furthermore, even if the same goods are not with pleasure but rather with lack of pain, they turn out to be more choiceworthy. And this is likely so: for the same goods turn out to be more choiceworthy to a lesser extent [if they are taken] with some bad than if they are taken without it. And he clearly says that lack of pain is something else than pleasure.<sup>203</sup>

*117a26 And each thing [is more choiceworthy] at the time when it can do more.*

10 Through this *topos* he shows that each of the choiceworthy things is more choiceworthy at the time<sup>204</sup> at which it is more effective.<sup>205</sup> And each thing is more effective when its usefulness is the greatest. For usefulness shows most of all the capacity of each thing, and likely so. For [he] says that the one who is already full is neither in pleasure nor in pain, but the one who is fed when he is in need feels pleasure. And the one who neither sees anything pleasant nor hears anything of this sort is neither in pleasure nor in pain, but when he is in one of these conditions, he feels pleasure. For example, since lack of pain is a choiceworthy thing, and old people feel more pain than the young (for youth has a connaturate joyousness), in old age lack of pain is more choiceworthy than in youth: for [lack of pain] has more strength then, since it prevails over pain, which  
20 is greater at this age, and its usefulness is greater at that time.

But also prudence, which is choiceworthy, is more choiceworthy in old age: for its usefulness is greater for people at an advanced age, since these are also

expected to have it and undertake things which require prudence (for [people] do not expect such a thing from the young), and the test<sup>206</sup> <of the strength><sup>207</sup> of prudence becomes accurate in these cases. Courage, on the other hand, is more choiceworthy for young people and those who are in this age: for its usefulness is greater for the young and this is also expected from them as appropriate.<sup>208</sup> Similarly, temperance too is stronger in the young: for these are those who are most troubled by pleasures, against which temperance is needed. And through this argument one would also show that poverty is more to be avoided in old age (for old age needs more things due to weakness), whereas weakness [is more to be avoided] in the youth: for these need strength the most. 30

117a35 *And what is more useful at every time or in most cases.*

249,1

Having said 'at every [time]', he made what he said more solid by adding 'in most cases'. And this *topos*, too, is clear: of things that seem to be choiceworthy to the same extent as each other, the one which we need at every time is more choiceworthy than the one we do not [need at every time]. In this way it would be shown that justice and temperance are more choiceworthy than courage, because justice and temperance are useful<sup>209</sup> at every time (i.e. both at war and in peace), but courage is useful only in war. And he is probably not comparing both of them together, i.e. justice and temperance, to courage, but each of them separately. In this way one would show that prudence is more choiceworthy than all other virtues: for each of them is about some determinate things, whereas prudence is about everything. However, this would not be said about the perfect virtues: for these are together with each other.<sup>210</sup> Or perhaps, even if they obtain together, still the activities in accordance with them and their usefulness are not together.<sup>211</sup> 10

117a37 *And that which, if everybody has it, we do not need anything else.*

Of some two choiceworthy things, if one is such that, if everybody had it, the usefulness of the other would be removed and there would be no need for it, whereas the other is such that, even if everybody had it, they would still find a use for the other, he says that the thing such that, if we have it, we no longer need the other, is more choiceworthy. Using this *topos* it is possible to show that justice is more choiceworthy than courage. For if all are just, there is no need for courage, if it is true that courage is useful for wars, but war would be removed, if all were just (for enduring surgery and suffering seems to be toughness rather 20

than courage). However, even if all are courageous, there is still a use for justice: for contracts, for which justice is useful, are not removed, and even for war itself justice has its usefulness. And that he does not consider the perfect virtues is clear from the examples.<sup>212</sup> In this way, again, friendship is more choiceworthy than justice: for friends do not need justice, whereas the just still need friendship.

*117b3 Furthermore, from the corruptions and the losses and the generations and the acquisitions and the contraries.*

In the second book<sup>213</sup> he used the *topoi* from corruptions and generations and productive things and corruptive things to establish that something is choiceworthy or to be avoided in this way: the thing whose corruptive factors are to be avoided is choiceworthy, and the thing whose productive factors are choiceworthy is also choiceworthy; but, the other way round, the thing whose corruptive factors are choiceworthy is to be avoided, and the thing whose productive factors are to be avoided is to be avoided too. And it is indeed these [topoi] that he transfers into<sup>214</sup> the comparative: for if that whose corruptive factor is to be avoided is choiceworthy, then also that whose corruptive factor is more to be avoided is more choiceworthy. In this way it would be shown that knowledge is more choiceworthy than health: for forgetfulness, which is corruptive of knowledge, is more to be avoided than disease, which is corruptive of health. And [it would] also [be shown] that wealth is [more choiceworthy] than knowledge, if wastefulness, which is corruptive of wealth, is more to be avoided than forgetfulness, which is corruptive of knowledge.

As for ‘the losses’, he said [this] either by setting it next to ‘the corruptions’ [as equivalent]<sup>215</sup> (for the same [considerations] apply to the case of corruptions and to the case of losses), or corruptions would be of those things of which there is no way back and no recovery, as in the case of privations,<sup>216</sup> whereas losses would be of those things that can be recovered again, as in the case of the one who loses [something]. For example, blindness and deafness are corruptions; on this account, if the corruption of sight is more to be avoided than the corruption of hearing, it would be shown that sight is more choiceworthy than hearing. Losses, instead, concern <also><sup>217</sup> health and wealth, which can also be recovered once they have been lost: for example, if the loss of health is more to be avoided than the loss of wealth, health would be more choiceworthy than wealth.

But if corruptions are about these things, how will it still be the case that some corruptions are choiceworthy? For these will [have to] be corruptive of privations: but it is not possible that there be corruption of privations. Corruption, then, is

no longer said of inseparable things, the loss of which comes about through corruption<sup>218</sup> since they cannot survive once they are separated from the things in which they are; and these are the qualities and the dispositions. The loss, on the other hand, is about things that can be separated, such as belongings. For if the loss of land is to be avoided more than the loss of a house, then the land is more choiceworthy than the house. 30 251,1

And he added 'and [from] the contraries', because in the case of the contraries the situation is the same again, as in those cases: for since some of the losses come about through the presence of the contraries, whereas other are <this> very thing only, i.e. losses, he added the contraries to the losses. For the loss of a shield is not through the contrary; nor is forgetting contrary to knowing, although it is a loss of knowledge, as filling oneself up with food, which is a loss of health, is not contrary to it. And if forgetting is to be avoided more than getting too full, also knowledge is more choiceworthy than health. And if the loss of disease is more choiceworthy than the loss of ignorance, then disease is to be avoided more than ignorance. Again: if the loss of virtue is to be avoided more than the loss of health, then also virtue is more choiceworthy than health. And disease and poverty are contrary to health and wealth; and, as things are in the cases of corruptions and losses, so they are also in these and such cases. For the things whose contraries are to be avoided more (in the same way as things whose corruptions or losses are to be avoided more) are more choiceworthy. And the things whose contraries are more choiceworthy are themselves to be avoided more, if it is added 'if the one is not brought together with the other':<sup>219</sup> for it is for this reason that, although disease is to be avoided more than bad physical condition, health is not more choiceworthy than good physical condition, i.e. because good physical condition brings health with it. In this way, since injustice is to be avoided more than wastefulness, justice is more choiceworthy than liberality. 10

And [it is] just the other way round in the case of generations and acquisitions, as he says himself:<sup>220</sup> for the things whose generations and acquisitions are more choiceworthy are themselves more choiceworthy, whereas those whose [generations and acquisitions] are to be avoided more are themselves to be avoided more. For if learning is more choiceworthy than doing physical exercise, and learning is the generation of knowledge whereas doing physical exercise is [the generation] of health, then also knowledge is more choiceworthy than health. And if doing physical exercise is more choiceworthy than doing business, also health would be more choiceworthy than wealth. And if living modestly <as an obliging [man]><sup>221</sup> is more choiceworthy than [living] arrogantly and 20

shamelessly, and the former is productive of the philosophical life whereas the latter is productive of the public life, then the philosophical [life] is more choiceworthy than the public one. And if enjoying knowing more than the  
 30 [mere] appearance [of it] is more choiceworthy,<sup>222</sup> and the one is productive of the philosophical character whereas the other [is productive of] the sophistic [character], then also being a philosopher is more choiceworthy than being  
 252,1 a sophist. Again, if forgetting base things is more choiceworthy than being healed, then ignorance of base things is more choiceworthy than health. And if submitting oneself to justice having made a mistake is more choiceworthy than being healed, <then justice too is more choiceworthy than health.><sup>223</sup> And again, if taking other people's things with force is to be avoided more than getting a disease, then also injustice is to be avoided more than disease. And if learning is more choiceworthy than doing business, then knowledge [is more choiceworthy] than wealth: for both, i.e. learning and doing business, consists in acquiring something. However, he himself used these *topoi* to show only that something is more choiceworthy.<sup>224</sup>

*117b10 Another topos: what is closer to the good is better and more choiceworthy; and what is more similar to the good [is better and more choiceworthy].*

- 10 If these are taken as two *topoi*, the first one, which says that what is closer to the good is better, would be the same as the one already mentioned earlier: 'and of two things the one closer to the end'.<sup>225</sup> For what is 'closer to the good' and what is 'closer to the end' are equivalent. In fact, it is clear that he says 'to the good' in the sense of 'to the end': for how could one take that justice is closer to the good otherwise, if one did not say that [it is closer] to the end and to happiness? Either, then, [the *topos*] is the same as this or [it is the same] as the one mentioned earlier: 'Furthermore, what is precisely this something [is more choiceworthy] than what is not in the genus,'<sup>226</sup> for also the examples that he uses in this case seem to be of this sort. For justice – he says – is closer to the good than the just [man]; and this is so because justice is in the genus virtue and [in the genus] good, whereas this is  
 20 no longer the case for the just [man]. Alternatively, he is not saying that this is just, i.e. the man who has justice, but rather something just which can be such by convention and law and not by nature.<sup>227</sup> And in this way, too, the difference between them is that justice is in the genus of the good, whereas what is just is not [in the genus] in all cases. And this *topos* was mentioned earlier, as I said.

If, instead, the *topos* is [only] one, he would say through it that what is closer to the good is better; and in spelling out what he meant by 'closer' he added 'and

what is more similar to the good': for what is closer in this way, i.e. as what is more similar to it, this is more choiceworthy. If this is what he might be saying, then, the examples for this are <two>:<sup>228</sup> that justice is more similar to the good, which is happiness, than the just thing or than the just [man].<sup>229</sup> And in fact he 253,1 did not say 'what is closer to [a] good' but rather 'to the good' and 'what is similar to the good', which would signify the supreme among the goods. Furthermore, the *topos* after this is from the similarity in relation to the other goods. In this way it would be also shown that virtue is more choiceworthy than good luck: for it is closer and more similar to happiness. And that good reputation [is more choiceworthy] than pleasure: for it is more similar to the fine; and also doing well to friends bears a greater resemblance to the fine than damaging enemies does. On the other hand, if one then divided the *topos*,<sup>230</sup> the activity in accordance with virtue and these states would be examples of what is closer to the good: for the activities are closer to happiness; whereas acting well [would be an example] 10 of what is more similar [to the good] than being well affected: for acting well is certainly more similar to happiness.

He then adds<sup>231</sup> to the aforementioned *topos* another one, which says that also what is more similar to the better, of the two things that are compared, is better and more choiceworthy. He made this intelligible through the example: for since Achilles is better than Aias and than Odysseus, the one of these who is more similar to Achilles is better; for this reason, Aias [is better] than Odysseus, for he is more similar to Achilles. He then brings an objection<sup>232</sup> to what is submitted through the *topos*: for if one is similar to him not insofar as he is better, the former is not better than the other who is less similar, if the latter is similar to him in the respect in which he is better. For example, Achilles was courageous, and in this respect better than Aias and Odysseus, but he was also inclined to 20 anger: if, then, of the [men] compared to each other, one was very much similar to him in being inclined to anger, and the other only a little in being courageous, it is not that, since the one inclined to anger is more similar to him, because of this he is better than the other.

And one must intend also the formulation 'the other one being good but not similar'<sup>233</sup> as if it said 'not similar' instead of 'not similar to the same extent': for in this way the comparison would be preserved.<sup>234</sup> Alternatively, it is possible to say [this] also without qualification: for also in the case adduced he does not say that the horse is less similar to the human being than the monkey, but rather that the monkey is similar with respect to the more ridiculous things, whereas the horse is not similar at all. For one can, as he says, be similar to something also in 254,1 what is more ridiculous, as the monkey to the human being; it is not the case

that, since this is similar in this way to the human being, which is better than both the monkey and the horse, it will already be better than the horse. Therefore, the similarity must obtain with respect to the things that are better and not with respect to the things that are rather ridiculous, if it has to be the case that the one who is more similar to the better is in turn better. In this way it would be shown that the one who gives is better than the one who takes, for [the one who gives] is more similar to god; and that contemplation [is better than] action for the same reason.

*117b20 And again in the case of two, if one is more similar to what is better and the other to what is worse.*

Having said the *topos* from the similarity, in which the thing with respect to  
 10 which the similarity between the things compared to each other was taken is one, he adds another: [this *topos* applies] if the [terms of comparison] for the enquiry into what is more similar are not one but two, and one of them is better and the other is less so. And if, of the things compared, one is similar to what is better and one to what is worse, then what is similar to what is better is better. And also in this case, if one is supposed to keep a watch on objections, the similarity has to be with respect to what is better and it [ought] not to be taken in such a way that there obtains a weak similarity in one case and a greater one in the other. For, if one of them is similar not with respect to what is better, then it is not better (in fact, for this reason the monkey is not better than the horse: and yet one is similar to a human being and the other to an ass; but that one [is similar to a human being] in what is worse and not better, whereas the other [is similar to an ass] in what is better). And again, if what is similar to what is better  
 20 bears a little resemblance to it, whereas the other [bears a] strong [resemblance] to what is worse, what is similar to what is better will not be better in all cases in this way either. For if Odysseus is a little similar to Nestor, who is better than Achilles, whereas Aias is very much [similar] to Achilles, it is not yet the case that Odysseus is better than Aias. He himself, however, having taken in the example Achilles as better than Nestor,<sup>235</sup> has drawn the comparison in this way. And in each of the two things one has to take the similarities in those respects in which the similarity holds something good. In this way it is possible to show that disdain <is more choiceworthy than arrogance: for disdain><sup>236</sup> is more similar to magnanimity, whereas arrogance [is more similar to] courage; for it is laid down that magnanimity is a better virtue.<sup>237</sup> Also doing good services [is more choiceworthy] than receiving them, if indeed the former resembles what is in

want of naught and the latter what is in need. And virtue in actuality [is more choiceworthy] than virtue in [a state of mere] possession: for the former resembles beings that are in actuality and the latter those that are in potentiality. 30

117b28 Another [topos]: what is more apparent [is more choiceworthy] than what is less so. 255,1

He says that, of two choiceworthy things that are in [all] other respects equivalent, the one that is more apparent is more choiceworthy than the one that is less so. So, if the city does well [, this] would be more apparent than if the single individual [does well], or if the ruler [does well, this would be more apparent] than if the private citizen [does well]; and doing well [is] more [apparent] than being wealthy; speaking in the assembly more than speaking for private suits; courage more than temperance; magnificence more than liberality. In this way, one would show that action is more choiceworthy than contemplation: for the practical life is more apparent than the contemplative life.

And he adds<sup>238</sup> to the aforementioned [topos] that also what is more difficult is more choiceworthy than what is easy: for the goods that are rare and hard to come by and difficult to acquire are loved more and held in higher esteem. In this way it would be shown that virtue is more choiceworthy than wealth and health: for it is rare and difficult to get. As Hesiod says: ‘the gods put sweat before virtue.’<sup>239</sup> And contemplation [is more choiceworthy] than action: for knowing the gods is more difficult. And beauty [is more choiceworthy] than wealth: for, of all belongings, such things are most difficult and rare [to come by]. 10

Furthermore, he also says<sup>240</sup> that what is ‘more specific’ is more choiceworthy than what is more common. And more specific is what belongs to one only or [is shared] with few. In this way, prudence is more choiceworthy for the human being than health: for the former is specific to it, whereas the latter is common to it with the other animals. And knowledge [is more choiceworthy] than strength, and reason than beauty. And nobility of birth is also loved more than one’s belongings: for this is more specific to those who have both. But beauty, too, is more specific than wealth. And virtue, too, is more specific to good people than belongings are: for bad people share in [the possession of] belongings, too, but not at all in virtue. In this way, also the things that some people find out by themselves about sciences and crafts, [these] they love more. 20

And he says<sup>241</sup> that ‘what has less in common with bad things’<sup>242</sup> is more choiceworthy. In this way it would be shown that temperance is more choiceworthy than self-control: for temperance is without any base desire, whereas the other

has base and strong desires. And the contemplative life [is more choiceworthy] than the practical one: for it is unmixed with the nuisances of the circumstances and is less bothered. And it would be shown in this way also that health is more choiceworthy than wealth, since wealth is with fear; and also temperance [is more choiceworthy] than courage, if indeed fatigue and injuries follow courage; and nobility of birth [is more choiceworthy] than beauty.

256,1 117b33 *Furthermore, if this thing is better than this without qualification, then also what is best among the things in this is better than what is best in the other.*

The *topos* is like this: if some genus is better than a genus or some species [better] than a species without qualification, then the best thing in the better genus or species will be better than the best in the lesser [genus or species]. One has to understand ‘in this’<sup>243</sup> in the sense of ‘in the genus or species’. For example, if the whole animated genus is better than the whole inanimate genus, then also the best of the animated things will be better than the best of the inanimate things; and if the human being is better than the horse without qualification, then also the best human being is better than the best horse; and if the soul is better than  
10 the body, then the best soul is better than the best body; and if the man is better than the woman, then the best man is better than the best woman.

Also, if the best of the things in some genus is better than the best of the things in another genus, then also the genus will be better than the genus without qualification.<sup>244</sup> And this is the conversion of the first *topos*. For if the best man is better than the best woman, then also man [as a universal] is better than woman [as a universal].<sup>245</sup> And if the best human being is better than the best horse, then also human being [as a species] is better than horse [as a species]. One could object to the conversion by saying that the best death is better than the best walk, but it is nonetheless not the case that death is more choiceworthy than a walk without qualification. Alternatively, the best death is not in the species Death in the same way in which the best human being is in the species  
20 Human Being. For the best human being is a human being to the highest degree (*malista*) (namely: according to the human virtue and everything that is best in a certain genus is that to the highest degree). But the best death is not death to the highest degree: for what is good about death does not come about in the death itself (as in the case of the human being), but what is good about death is in something else, and not in as much as it is death, but on account of the presence of something else: namely, on account of virtue, not that of death, but of the one who dies. For the best death is a compound of the virtue of the

human being and of death. It is because of the fact that <what><sup>246</sup> is attached to death (which is a bad thing), i.e. virtue, is a great good that [a good death] is better than what is healthy and than the best walk: for it was said before<sup>247</sup> that nothing prevents some good taken together with something that is not good from being more choiceworthy than several goods, let alone than a small good, 30 such as what is healthy, given that the walk is an intermediate.<sup>248</sup>

*118a1 Furthermore, the things in which friends can take part.*

257,1

Of the things that seem to be equally choiceworthy as each other, he says that those in which friends can take part are more choiceworthy than those in which they cannot. In this way, it will be shown that virtue is more choiceworthy than health, and wealth more than nobility of birth: for friends can take part in the former, but it is not possible that they have the others in common. In this way it would be shown also that education is more choiceworthy than pleasure: for only the one who experiences pleasure enjoys the pleasure. And liberality [is more choiceworthy] than calm, if in truth calm only soothes the one who has it against anger; and strength [is more choiceworthy] than beauty, if beauty is an ornament only for the one who has it, whereas strength is most useful for 10 friends too.

But also the things that we want to do for a friend more than for a random person, these are more choiceworthy too.<sup>249</sup> In this way it would be shown that doing just things is more choiceworthy than giving the impression<sup>250</sup> of doing just things: for towards friends we choose to do the just things for real, whereas towards random people we think that it is enough if we give the impression of doing just things. We must remember that the attacks are reputable and persuasive.<sup>251</sup> One would show in this way that it is more choiceworthy to give than to lend: for giving is for friends, lending for random people. And teaching [is more choiceworthy] than showing off: for we choose to teach friends, but to show off to random people.<sup>252</sup>

*118a6 And superfluous things are better than those that are necessary.*

20

First, one has to know what things are superfluous and what are necessary: for in this way it will be possible to use the *topos*. Necessary, then, are the things without which it is impossible to be;<sup>253</sup> superfluous, on the other hand, are those whose presence is not necessary, and, as he himself says, 'when, once the necessary things are already there, one procures in addition for oneself some other fine

things.<sup>254</sup> For example, living is necessary, living well is superfluous: for through the presence of what is well, which is not necessary for being, living, which is necessary, is adorned. Superfluous things, then, are better than necessary ones, he says: for living well is better than living and speaking well is better than speaking. However, better things are not always also more choiceworthy for us, even if they are more choiceworthy without qualification: for certainly the things that are impossible for us, even if they are better than those that are possible, are nonetheless not more choiceworthy.<sup>255</sup> For example, immortality is better than a long life, but it is not more choiceworthy for us. And of the things that are superfluous, then, some are also more choiceworthy in addition to being better (as speaking well [is also more choiceworthy] than speaking), whereas others are better, and yet not choiceworthy. Doing philosophy, at least, and contemplating is better than negotiating to make money, and yet it is not also more choiceworthy for those who are in need and cannot exist otherwise: for as Phocylides say: ‘one has to seek sustenance; and virtue, once life is already given.’<sup>256</sup> In this way, then, also being healthy would be more choiceworthy than doing philosophy for the one who is sick. For this reason, he also says that ‘roughly speaking’<sup>257</sup> superfluous things are better, but the necessary ones are more choiceworthy (adding ‘roughly speaking’ not to the things that are better, but to those that are necessary).<sup>258</sup> For it also seems that the choice of superfluous things is in accordance with nature after what is necessary: for one has to be first, and then choose superfluous things in this way; but necessary things contribute to [one’s] being. For as good physical condition comes about on top of health, and sharp-sightedness on top of sight, and speed on top of movement, and, in general, doing well in each thing on top of that [thing’s being], when the latter already obtains, in this way also superfluous things seem to be chosen on top of the necessary ones, when the latter already obtain. For none of these is of any help without those, if indeed it is not possible to be without them.

*118a16 And what cannot be procured by someone else [is more choiceworthy] than what can be procured by someone else.*

It seems that rarer things are more choiceworthy than those that are more common: for this reason, what cannot be procured by someone else, but only this person has it or it is possible to acquire it only from oneself, is more choiceworthy than the things that can come from another. In this way you will show that the virtues are more choiceworthy than the goods that come from luck (for the acquisition of the former only [comes about] through ourselves, whereas

the occasions and causes of acquisition of the latter are many). And again, nobility of birth [is more choiceworthy] than wealth: for there are many ways to wealth and one can incur in it from several [people], whereas it is not possible to acquire nobility of birth from anyone. In this way we hold in higher esteem those belongings and those books which we cannot get from someone else, <also><sup>259</sup> if they are left [to us by someone], than those that are more common and [that one can get] from many people. And for this reason, we hold our own writings in the highest esteem. In this way it would also be shown that doing physical exercise is more choiceworthy than being healed, and being crowned for being superior to the opponent [is more choiceworthy] than [being crowned] because of [someone else's] support.<sup>260</sup> 259,1

And he himself<sup>261</sup> says that this is what happens to justice with respect to courage. And what is said might become clear if it were first known what comes to us from each of these virtues. It seems, certainly, that rescue from perils comes to us from courage, whereas being capable of distributing equally comes to us from justice; but, of these, the rescue from perils, which comes about from courage, can come to us also from others, even if we are not courageous ourselves, whereas being capable of distributing equally would not come to anybody without their own justice; for this reason, justice is more choiceworthy than courage. And it is possible to say this the other way round too: for being rescued from perils [can come to us] through ourselves, whereas the equal [distribution] that derives from justice [can come to us] from others. It is possible that 'and what cannot be procured from someone else'<sup>262</sup> is said with reference to those things which one cannot acquire anymore once one has lost them since there is no producer left, for example if [one loses] a book of which no copy exists, or a piece of work of an artisan who is no longer around. 10 20

*118a18 And if this is choiceworthy without this.*

Of some two things that are choiceworthy, if one of them is not choiceworthy without the other, whereas the other is choiceworthy in its own right and without the other, then [the latter] is more choiceworthy than the former. In this way, prudence would be more choiceworthy than power, if power is not choiceworthy without prudence, whereas prudence is choiceworthy without power. And this [applies] not only to what is called 'power' specifically, but the reasoning is similar also with reference to the other goods which he is used to call 'capacities':<sup>263</sup> for none of them is choiceworthy without prudence. And you would show that virtue is more choiceworthy than pleasure in this way: for pleasure is not 260,1

choiceworthy without virtue, whereas virtue is choiceworthy also without pleasure. But also health [is more choiceworthy] than pleasure: for being healthy is choiceworthy even without pleasure, but nobody would choose to enjoy the pleasures of the sick without being healthy. In this way it would be shown also that being healthy is more choiceworthy than being wealthy or having a good reputation: for none of these is choiceworthy if health is damaged, whereas we choose being healthy even without them.

*118a20 And of two things, if we deny one so that the other seems to belong to us.*

- 10 If, of two choiceworthy things, we deny that we have one so that<sup>264</sup> it seems that we have the other, the one that we want to seem to have more is more choiceworthy. In this way, it would be shown that natural talent is more choiceworthy than studiousness: for we deny that we are studious because we want to seem naturally talented. And this applies similarly to objects of learning as well as to physical exercises. But women deny that they use make-up, too, since they prefer<sup>265</sup> to seem naturally beautiful. In this way it would be shown that also having self-control is more choiceworthy than enjoying the pleasure and being tough more than not feeling pain: for we rather pretend that we disdain pleasures so that it seems that we have self-control, and [we pretend that we disdain] pain so that we appear to be tough.

- 118a24 Furthermore, the thing such that [people] are less to be blamed if they find it hard to endure its absence is more choiceworthy.*
- 20

- Since, of those who find it hard to endure the absence of some things among those that are choiceworthy, some are reasonably blamed more, some less, the things such that those who find it hard to endure their absence are less to be blamed, these things are more choiceworthy than those such that those who find it hard to endure their absence deserve being blamed more. But also the things such that those who do not find it hard to endure their absence deserve to be blamed more, these are also more choiceworthy than those such that those who do not find it hard to endure their absence deserve to be blamed less. For example, since we blame less those who find it hard to endure the loss of their children rather than the loss of their belongings, children are more choiceworthy than belongings. And health is more choiceworthy than pleasure based on the same reasoning: for those who find it hard to endure the loss of health deserve less blame than those who find it hard to endure the loss of pleasure. And the one
- 30

who finds it hard to endure the loss of necessary things deserves less blame than the one [who finds it hard to endure] the loss of honour or reputation, so that necessary things are more choiceworthy than reputation. Similarly, then, it would be shown that wealth, too, is more choiceworthy than reputation: for we blame less those who find it hard to endure poverty than those [who find it hard to endure] lack of reputation. And friends [are more choiceworthy] than belongings: for those who find it hard to endure the loss of friends deserve less blame than those who find it hard to endure the removal of their belongings. 261,1

But 'also the thing such that the one who does not find it hard to endure its loss is more to blame,'<sup>266</sup> this thing, too, is more choiceworthy. In this way knowledge is more choiceworthy than health: for we blame more those who do not find it hard to endure ignorance than those who do not find it hard to endure disease. And again, health is more choiceworthy than wealth: for we blame more those who do not care about the former. And also the care of the common things 10 is more choiceworthy than that of private ones: for we blame more those who do not find it hard to put up with the lack of care of common things than those who do not find it hard to put up with the lack of care of private ones. And based on this [argument] taking care of [one's] parents is more choiceworthy than taking care of [one's] children: for those who do not find it hard to endure not taking care of their parents deserve more blame. And receiving an education [is more choiceworthy] than doing physical exercise: for those who despise education are blamed more than those who despise physical exercise.

### <Chapter 3>

*118a27 Furthermore, of the things that fall under the same species, the one that has the proper virtue [of the species] is more choiceworthy than the one that does not.*

Since the proper virtue of each thing is the excellence and perfection of its proper nature, and everything that is perfect without qualification is more 20 choiceworthy, it is likely that, of the things that fall under the same species, the one which has the proper virtue [of the species] is more choiceworthy than the one which does not. In this way, the human being who has virtue is more choiceworthy than the human being who does not have virtue: for all human beings fall under the same species. A horse, then, [is more choiceworthy] than a horse, a dog than a dog, but also the object which delivers the proper service for

which it was made is more choiceworthy than another object. Through this *topos* you will show that a cup which is more apt to drink from is more choiceworthy than the one made of gold or silver (for this is the virtue of a cup, and not luxury); and the house which is more apt to being a shelter is more choiceworthy than the one built of beautiful stone but not equally equipped with what is useful for  
 30 being a shelter. The same reasoning [applies] also to garments: for the one which  
 262,1 is warm, and not the one which is purple or golden [is more choiceworthy]; also in the case of the sword: for not the one with an ivory hilt, but the one which is more useful for the service of the sword is more choiceworthy.

And he added 'of those falling under the same species' accurately: for in this way the *topos* is true. In fact, it is not yet true to say: 'of the things that fall under the same genus, the one which has the proper virtue is better than the one which does not.' For the hare which has its proper virtue is not better than the human being who does not have its proper virtue: for no hare is finer than a human being. Of the things that are co-specific, instead, and admit of the same virtue, the one which has [its] proper virtue is indeed better than the one which does not have it. And if both things that fall under the same species have their proper virtue, it  
 10 is clear that the thing that has it to a higher degree is more choiceworthy:<sup>267</sup> for the sight that can see sharper is more choiceworthy, and the hearing that can hear better, and the horse that is more docile and capable of racing, and the knowledge that is more accurate [are more choiceworthy].

*118a29 Furthermore, if one thing makes that in which it is present good, whereas the other does not, then the one which makes [it good] is more choiceworthy.*

Since the goods are said in many ways, and some of them make those who have them good through their own presence, as the virtues, whereas some others do not, as wealth, nobility of birth, pleasure, those, among the goods, which are such as to make [those<sup>268</sup> who have them] good by being [in them] are more choiceworthy. In this way, it would be shown that every virtue is more choiceworthy than every pleasure and than every good luck and than the external and corporeal goods <since what makes what has it good is more of  
 20 a good than what does not>,<sup>269</sup> and what is more of a good is also more choiceworthy, in the same way as what warms and makes things warm is <warmer><sup>270</sup> than what does not: for fire is warmer than snow, which also has some warmth,<sup>271</sup> because the one warms whereas the other does not, or one does it more and the other less. And if both compared things make [those who have them] good through their presence, the one that makes [what has it] good to a

higher degree is more choiceworthy. Based on this [reasoning], perfect virtue would be shown to be more choiceworthy than the natural one too: for both of them make those who have them good, but perfect virtue more so. But also what makes the better thing good is more choiceworthy than what makes the worse thing good. In this way virtue is more choiceworthy than health and strength: for the former makes the soul good, the latter the body; but the soul is better than the body. In this way also wisdom is more choiceworthy than temperance: for the former makes the intellect good, the second the desiderative [part of the soul]; but the intellect is better than the desiderative part of the soul. 30

*118a34 Furthermore, from the inflections and the uses and the actions and the outcomes.*<sup>272</sup> 263,1

As in the previous [book] he showed that the choiceworthy can be shown without qualification from the inflections and the coordinates,<sup>273</sup> in the same way [he now shows] that also the more choiceworthy [can be shown from the inflections and the coordinates]. For these *topoi*, too, are common, as indeed also those from the generations and the corruptions where shown to be.<sup>274</sup> For if, of some things that are formulated based on inflection, the one [expressed] through one inflection is more choiceworthy than the other [expressed] through the other inflection, then also what is said without qualification is more choiceworthy than what is said without qualification of the things the inflections were [inflections] of.

Inflection are 'justly', 'courageously'<sup>275</sup> and all those whose linguistic formulation is constructed in this way; the things whose inflections they are, instead, are justice, courage. If, then, [acting or being]<sup>276</sup> justly is more choiceworthy than [acting or being] courageously, then also justice is more choiceworthy than courage; and, vice versa, if justice is more choiceworthy than courage, then also what is [done] in accordance with the inflection of justice is more choiceworthy than what is [done] in accordance with the inflection of courage. 10

And as it is in the case of inflections, so it is in the case of uses too. For if [acting or being] justly is more choiceworthy than [acting or being] courageously, then the just use is also more choiceworthy than the courageous use, i.e. the one who uses justice, who is precisely the just man, [is more choiceworthy] than the one who uses courage, who is precisely the courageous one. And the just action and the just deed is more choiceworthy than the courageous action and the courageous deed:<sup>277</sup> for there is a just action (*praxis*) and activity (*energeia*) as well as a just deed (*ergon*). And similarly in the case of courage. 20

And all these convert with each other: for no matter which one among them is taken as more choiceworthy than another, so all the others [corresponding to the former are more choiceworthy] than the others [corresponding to the latter]. And what is said is equivalent to [the *topos*] from the coordinates (and coordinates were: justice, just [man], just [thing], justly).<sup>278</sup> For, in general, [with respect to] the thing the use of which is more choiceworthy, also who uses it [is more choiceworthy] than who uses [the other thing] and the [corresponding] state [is more choiceworthy] than the [other] state and the outcome than the outcome, and vice versa.

It is also possible that one *topos* is the one from the inflections, one other the one from the actions, and still another the one from the outcomes. For uses, too, are said strictly speaking of things that are useful: for a use is a use of something, for it is a determinate activity either about what is useful or of what is useful; and, of the goods, specifically the instrumental ones are said to be useful.<sup>279</sup> The things of which the uses are more choiceworthy, then, are themselves choiceworthy too: 30 for if the use of wealth is more choiceworthy than the use of strength, then also 264,1 wealth is more choiceworthy than strength; and, converting,<sup>280</sup> if wealth is [more choiceworthy] than strength, then also the use of wealth [is more choiceworthy] than the use of strength.

And again, another *topos* is the one from the actions: and action is, quite generally, every rational activity, but specifically and more properly the one based on prior choice,<sup>281</sup> i.e. the activity that comes about in accordance with virtue or vice. Those, then, whose actions are more choiceworthy, these are more choiceworthy: for example, if doing just things is more choiceworthy than doing courageous things, also justice is more choiceworthy than courage. And vice versa, if justice is more choiceworthy than courage, also doing just things is more choiceworthy than doing courageous things.

Similarly also for the *topos* from the outcomes. For the thing whose outcome 10 is more choiceworthy, is also [more choiceworthy] itself. For example, if the outcome of the housebuilding craft is more choiceworthy than the outcome of carpentry, then housebuilding is more choiceworthy than carpentry. And vice versa, if housebuilding is more choiceworthy than carpentry, then also the outcome [is more choiceworthy] than the outcome. And since the deed of a friend is more choiceworthy than that of a benevolent person, friendship is [more choiceworthy] than benevolence: for the deed of a friend is an action with the will [to bring about] good things for the friend, whereas the one of the benevolent person is the [act of] will only. And vice versa, since friendship is

more choiceworthy than benevolence, then also a deed of friendship is more choiceworthy than that of benevolence. And if acting well towards friends is [more choiceworthy] than acting badly towards enemies, and acting well towards friends is the deed of the liberal man, whereas acting badly against enemies is the deed of the courageous one, then liberality is also more choiceworthy than courage. <And, converting, if liberality is more choiceworthy than courage, then also the deed of liberality is more choiceworthy than the deed of courage. And if curing is better than housebuilding, then the doctor is better than the housebuilder;><sup>282</sup> and, converting, if the doctor is better than the housebuilder, then also the outcome of the doctor is better than that of the housebuilder. And the action is the activity which tends towards the end, whereas the outcome is the end. 20

*118b1 Furthermore, if one thing is a greater good and another thing is a lesser good than some thing which is the same, the greater one is more choiceworthy.*

As what is greater than a certain magnitude which is greater is also greater than what is lesser (for if the three-cubit is greater than the two-cubit, it is clear that it would also be greater than the one-cubit, which is less than the two-cubit), in the same way, also if <something><sup>283</sup> is a greater good and more choiceworthy than something else, this very same thing [is also a greater good and more choiceworthy] than the things such that what is lesser than it is a greater good and more choiceworthy than them.<sup>284</sup> In this way it will be shown that virtue is more choiceworthy than pleasure, since it is superior to health, which is more choiceworthy than pleasure, in being choiceworthy. In a similar way, the contemplative life, too, is more choiceworthy than the life devoted to enjoyment, since it is also [more choiceworthy] than the practical life, which is more choiceworthy than the one devoted to enjoyment. 265,1

But also if any two things are more choiceworthy than one single thing, what is more choiceworthy to a higher degree than it, is more choiceworthy than the one which is more choiceworthy to a lesser degree:<sup>285</sup> for of two things that are superior to one, the one which is more superior is greater. For example, since virtue and health are more choiceworthy than wealth, but the superiority of virtue is greater than that of health, virtue is more choiceworthy than health. In this way knowledge is more choiceworthy than correct opinion, too: for they are both more choiceworthy than perception, but having knowledge is more [more choiceworthy than perception] than having correct opinion. 10

*118b4 Furthermore, the thing whose greater amount is more choiceworthy than the greater amount [of something else] is also more choiceworthy itself.*

The thing of which the extreme, he says, and the greater amount is more choiceworthy, is also more choiceworthy itself. For example, since the extreme in friendship is more choiceworthy than the extreme in wealth, also friendship is more choiceworthy than wealth. And since the extreme in health is more choiceworthy than the one in pleasure, then health [is more choiceworthy] than  
 20 pleasure too. For the extreme of health is good physical condition, whereas that of pleasure is what is unmixed with pain.

*118b7 And the thing for which one would choose to be himself the cause for himself more than that for which [he would choose] someone else [to be the cause].*

That which one would choose to acquire through himself, this is more choiceworthy than that [which one would rather choose to acquire] through another. For example, we rather choose to acquire friends through ourselves than through others, whereas we rather want to receive possessions from other people than to procure them ourselves; therefore, friends are more choiceworthy  
 266,1 than possessions. In this way it would be shown that fine actions are more choiceworthy than victory, too: for we ourselves want to be the cause of fine activities for ourselves, whereas we choose to win also through others. But also the contemplative life is more choiceworthy than the political one; for we choose that contemplation belong to us and that the activity in accordance with it come about through ourselves, but [we choose] that others be involved in politics and deal well with political things: for in this way we will have more spare time for contemplation. And if we [choose] to set our fatherland free by ourselves, but to make it rich through others, a free fatherland is more choiceworthy than a rich one.

And this *topos* is not the same as the one mentioned a little earlier: 'And what cannot be procured by someone else [is more choiceworthy] than what can be  
 10 procured by someone else.'<sup>286</sup> For there [he was talking about] what cannot be procured by someone else but only by oneself, whereas here [he talks about] that for which one would [choose] himself, rather than someone else, to be responsible for himself: for also of the things which can [come to us] through another there are some which we choose rather than those [that come to us] through ourselves.<sup>287</sup>

118b10 Furthermore, from addition, if something added to the same thing makes the whole more choiceworthy.

The *topos* is this: if one thing and then in turn something else is added to the same, and the whole with the additions becomes more choiceworthy in one case and less so in the other cases, then that through the addition of which [the whole] becomes more choiceworthy is more choiceworthy than the other things that are added to it. For example, if, when virtue is added to wealth and then in turn health [is added], wealth with virtue becomes more choiceworthy than with health, then virtue is more choiceworthy than health. And since, if we add to 20 living once the just way and once the pleasant way,<sup>288</sup> living justly is more choiceworthy than living pleasantly, then the just way is more choiceworthy than the pleasant way; and in this way also justice [is more choiceworthy] than pleasure. And again, if once the painless way and once the reputable way<sup>289</sup> are added to dying, if dying painlessly is more choiceworthy than dying reputably, then also painlessness is more choiceworthy than reputation.

It would be shown in a similar way also that pain is more to be avoided than lack of reputation through [the claim] that dying in pain is more to be avoided than dying unknown: for as the thing through the addition of which something becomes more choiceworthy is more choiceworthy itself, in the same way also 267,1 the thing through the addition of which something becomes more to be avoided is more to be avoided itself.

And the *topos* does not seem to be true in all cases. For, since liberality with wealth is more choiceworthy than liberality with strength, it is not yet the case that wealth is more choiceworthy than strength. Nor, again, since strength with courage is more choiceworthy than wealth with courage, for this reason then strength is more choiceworthy than wealth. For the same thing would be more choiceworthy to a lesser and to a greater degree than the same thing, if it is true that in the case of liberality wealth [is more choiceworthy] than strength, while in the case of courage strength is more choiceworthy than wealth, which is absurd. But it is not the case that, if strength is more choiceworthy with courage than with temperance, then courage is already more choiceworthy than 10 temperance. And the cause<sup>290</sup> of the fact that the *topos* does not turn out to be true in all cases is that in many cases what is common, to which something is added, either makes use of one of the two things that are added or, in general, cooperates<sup>291</sup> with it; for this reason, even if it is not more choiceworthy in itself, nonetheless the whole turns out to be more choiceworthy. For liberality uses

wealth, while it does not use strength with respect to its proper activity; and again, courage [uses] strength, while it does not use wealth; and strength cooperates with courage, but not at all with temperance. For this reason he also said that one has to 'be careful' not to 'submit' such things, [i.e. those] 'in which what is common uses one of the added things or cooperates [with one of them] in any other way, while it does not use the other nor cooperates with the other.'<sup>292</sup> For it is not the case that, if a saw with carpentry is more choiceworthy than a pruning-knife with carpentry, on this [account] it is necessary that a saw is more choiceworthy than a pruning-knife: for it is rather because the saw is a tool for carpentry, whereas the pruning-knife is not, that it is more choiceworthy, since also the pruning-knife is in turn more choiceworthy than the saw with the art of culturing vine. In those cases, then, in which the added things stand to the common thing in a similar way, the *topos* is true.

*118b16 And again, if something added to what is lesser makes the whole greater.*

The *topos* is like this: what is added to the lesser good and makes the whole a greater good is more choiceworthy than what is added to the greater [good] and makes the whole a lesser [good] than the [first] whole. For if there are some two goods, the one greater and the other lesser, and some things are added to each of them, so that through their addition the one [which started] as lesser turns into a greater good, whereas the one [which started] as greater turns into a lesser good, the thing that is attached to the lesser good is more choiceworthy than the one attached to the other, which [was] greater. For both good physical condition and health are goods; then, be virtue added to health, which is a lesser good, and wealth added to good physical condition, which is a greater good; since, then, health with virtue is a greater good than good physical condition with wealth, then also virtue is more choiceworthy than wealth. And again, since, provided that speaking and being quiet are two things and that speaking is more choiceworthy (because it is also much more useful), when the temperate way is added to being quiet and the rhetorical way is added to speaking, being quiet temperately is more choiceworthy than speaking rhetorically, also temperance is more choiceworthy than rhetoric. And since good physical condition is a greater good than health and, once contemplating has been added to health and being active to good physical condition, contemplation with health is more choiceworthy than action with good physical condition, contemplation is more choiceworthy than action too.

*118b17 And similarly from subtraction too.*

He says that one has to attack in a similar way, as from addition, so also from subtraction: for if from things that are equally choiceworthy some things are subtracted and what is left through the subtraction of the one turns out to be lesser than what is left through the subtraction of the other, the thing through the subtraction of which [what is left] is lesser, that is more choiceworthy. And not only if some two similarly choiceworthy things are taken, but also if only some one choiceworthy thing [is taken], and then the things through which it is more choiceworthy are subtracted, if they are two and what is left through the subtraction of one of them is greater with reference to choice, the thing through the subtraction of which the same thing turns out to be less choiceworthy, that thing is more choiceworthy than the other one, [i.e. the one] after the subtraction of which [what is left] is more choiceworthy. 20

And this is most evident in the case of magnitudes and numbers:<sup>293</sup> for ten is diminished both through the subtraction of three and through the subtraction of five. But since it is more diminished through the subtraction of five than through that of three, five is greater than three. The same reasoning applies to the case of magnitudes too.

In the case of choiceworthy things, then, with reference to which the discussion is made,<sup>294</sup> it would be shown in this way: if from health and wealth and beauty, the three of them obtaining together, the remaining two become less choiceworthy once health is subtracted than when wealth is, then health is more choiceworthy than wealth: for wealth with beauty is less choiceworthy than beauty with health. And [this is shown] in this way about the same thing. But it is also possible to show [this about different things] in this way: if, given that wealth with strength and health with nobility of birth are equally choiceworthy, once strength is subtracted from wealth and nobility of birth from health, wealth is less choiceworthy than health, it is clear that strength is more choiceworthy than nobility of birth. For what is equally choiceworthy becomes more choiceworthy to a lesser extent, once some things are subtracted from them, when what is subtracted is choiceworthy to a greater extent. 269,1

*118b20 And if one thing is choiceworthy because of itself, whereas another because of opinion.*

What we choose because of itself is more choiceworthy than what we choose because of the opinion of others. In this way health is more choiceworthy than 10

beauty: for we choose health because of itself, even if nobody will ever know, whereas [we choose] beauty because of the opinion [that people have] about it: at least, it seems that beauty is pointless if nobody acknowledges it.

And he defined what is choiceworthy with reference to opinion: for what one would not care about whether it belongs to him if nobody realises it, this is choiceworthy because of opinion. In this way it would be shown that wealth is more choiceworthy than honour, and a house favourably placed more than the one fully adorned, and a more useful garment more than the luxurious one, and, of pieces of property, those that bring revenues more than those that are at distinguished and always attended places.

269,20 *118b22 And if one thing is choiceworthy both because of itself and because of opinion, while the other [is choiceworthy] because of one of the two only.*

He says that what is choiceworthy because of both is more choiceworthy than what is so only because of opinion <...>: for it is evident that what is [choiceworthy] because of both is more choiceworthy.<sup>295</sup> Since what is [choiceworthy] because of itself only is more choiceworthy than what is such with respect to opinion, also what [is choiceworthy] because of both, he says, is [more choiceworthy] than what is such only with respect to one of the two: for what is choiceworthy because of two things is more choiceworthy than what is choiceworthy because of only one of them. In this way the house that has decoration together with what is useful is more choiceworthy than the one which is only decorated or has only what is useful. Similarly, also for a garment or an object. And also a horse which, in addition to being obedient and fast, is also beautiful to watch is more choiceworthy than the one which has only one of these two [features].<sup>296</sup> But also the other possessions that have both [are more choiceworthy] than those that have only one of the two [features]. And it would be shown in this way that, if beautiful things are also in the eyes of the many, this is more choiceworthy than if they remain hidden, and having the semblance of being just in addition to being just is [more choiceworthy] than only being just.<sup>297</sup> And similarly for the other choiceworthy things: hence it is said 'unacknowledged, I would have no beauty'.<sup>298</sup> And similarly it would be shown

270,1 that what is to be avoided both because of itself and because of opinion is to be avoided more than what [is to be avoided because of one of the two only]: for committing injustice manifestly is to be avoided more than [doing so] secretly; and similarly for indulging in licentious behaviour.

10

118b24 *And whichever of the two is more honourable because of itself, that is also better and more choiceworthy.*

As what is choiceworthy because of itself is more choiceworthy than what [is choiceworthy] because of opinion, and [what is choiceworthy] because of itself and because of opinion [is more choiceworthy] than what is [such] because of only one of them, in the same way also of the things that are choiceworthy because of themselves and honourable, what is choiceworthy because of itself and honourable to a greater extent is more choiceworthy. For example, if contemplation is more honourable because of itself than action (for every action seems to come about to correct something,<sup>299</sup> whereas contemplation itself is for the sake of itself), then it is more choiceworthy. And if prudence is more honourable because of itself than courage, then it is also more choiceworthy: for the activity of the former is [choiceworthy] on any occasion, whereas that of the latter is [choiceworthy] only in situations of peril. And what is more honourable because of itself, which is more choiceworthy, has been defined, in the same way as what was choiceworthy with respect to opinion [has been defined] a little earlier: for what we rather choose because of itself, even if nothing else will belong [to us from it], this is more honourable in its own right and because of itself. In this way health is more honourable than wealth and nobility and strength and beauty. 20

118b27 *Furthermore, [one should] divide in how many ways the choiceworthy is said and for the sake of what things.* 271,1

He says that one should take the starting points also from the division of the choiceworthy: for once we have divided in how many ways the choiceworthy is said, since it is not [said] in one way [only], we will have a great supply of attacks for establishing the more choiceworthy.

Indeed, the choiceworthy is said in three ways: for what is fine and what is pleasant and what is advantageous are choiceworthy. Certainly, that to which all of these belong and is choiceworthy because of all [of them], is more choiceworthy than the things which do not have all of them; and that to which more [of them belong] is more choiceworthy] than those to which fewer [of them belong], if they belong to them to a similar degree, since it is indeed possible that what is extremely choiceworthy in one respect be more choiceworthy than what is choiceworthy in all respects and yet not strongly so. Prudence, at all events, which is choiceworthy because of itself only, is more choiceworthy than strength, which is choiceworthy in all respects: for strength, too, seems to be choiceworthy 10

because of itself, and as fine and as advantageous and as pleasant, but prudence is superior to all of these in being choiceworthy because of itself. But even if one thing is choiceworthy because of itself, and another because of the pleasant and the useful, what is choiceworthy because of itself, although choiceworthy only because of one thing, would be more choiceworthy than what is choiceworthy because of those – and yet the latter is choiceworthy because of several things. Temperance, at all events, being choiceworthy only because of itself, is more choiceworthy than honour, which is choiceworthy both because it is pleasant and because it is useful. Alternatively, every virtue is choiceworthy both because

20 of itself and because it is pleasant, because the activities based on virtue are pleasant in their own right. For this reason, even if something is choiceworthy in several respects without being virtue, by being inferior to virtue both in being fine and in being pleasant, it will be less choiceworthy than it.<sup>300</sup> Therefore, what is [choiceworthy] according to all [ways in which the choiceworthy is said] will be more choiceworthy than what is [such] according to some, and what is [such] according to more [is more choiceworthy] than what is [such] according to fewer, if what is [choiceworthy] according to several is choiceworthy to a similar extent to what is [choiceworthy] according to fewer [ways of being choiceworthy] with respect to each [way of being] choiceworthy and, furthermore, the fewer are included among the several.<sup>301</sup> In this way he showed in the *Ethics*<sup>302</sup> that friendship for the sake of what is fine is more choiceworthy than that for the sake of what is pleasant and that for the sake of what is useful: for the one for the sake of what is fine, in addition to being choiceworthy for the sake of what is fine, is

272,1 also pleasant and useful. And it would also be shown that strength is more choiceworthy than wealth by being choiceworthy on several grounds: for the latter [is choiceworthy] only because it is advantageous, whereas the former seems to be both fine and pleasant. But health [is more choiceworthy] than pleasure, too: for it is both pleasant and advantageous. And if the compared things are choiceworthy because of the same things, then the thing to which these belong more will be more choiceworthy. In this way, temperance [is more choiceworthy] than self-control: for they are both [choiceworthy] in virtue of the same things, but temperance is more so. And learning, too, is more choiceworthy than doing physical exercise, although both are choiceworthy in virtue of being advantageous: but this belongs to learning to a greater extent. In this way it will also be shown that justice is more choiceworthy than courage: for

10 they are both [choiceworthy] in virtue of being fine and in virtue of being pleasant, but courage is not characterised by being pleasant to a similar extent

due to the injuries and the destructions [that come with it]. But also what is choiceworthy for the sake of what is better is more choiceworthy, as learning [is more choiceworthy] than doing physical exercise: for the former is for the sake of knowledge, the latter for the sake of strength. And also the worthy dispositions of characters [are more choiceworthy] than the exercise of the body: for those are [choiceworthy] because of philosophy, the latter because of contest. And being educated [is more choiceworthy] than celebrating: for the former is for the sake of virtue, the latter for the sake of pleasure.

And the *topos* was already potentially<sup>303</sup> said in the previous ones:<sup>304</sup> for the things whose ends are more choiceworthy, are choiceworthy themselves. The same reasoning applies to the case of things to be avoided: for in these cases, too, what is an impediment for more goods and what removes the things that are good to a greater extent is to be avoided more. In this way disease [is to be avoided more] than ugliness: for disease is an impediment for more things, i.e. 20 both for pleasure and for being excellent; [ugliness], instead, only for pleasure. And poverty [is to be avoided more] than lack of reputation, and the natural inaptitude of the soul more than that of the body, for it is an impediment for what is more choiceworthy. And the loss of pieces of knowledge [is to be avoided more] than the loss of possessions, for it removes what is better. And what is choiceworthy because of opinion<sup>305</sup> [falls] either under what is pleasant or under what is advantageous.

*118b37 Furthermore, [one should] show from what is to be avoided and choiceworthy to a similar extent.*

What is choiceworthy and to be avoided to a similar extent is less choiceworthy than what is choiceworthy only. For example, if being involved in politics is both choiceworthy and to be avoided (for it is to be avoided because of the annoyances and the insults), whereas doing philosophy is only choiceworthy, then doing philosophy is more choiceworthy. And if reputation and beauty and wealth are both choiceworthy and to be avoided (for they are to some extent to 273,1 be avoided because of the plots [that arise] because of them), whereas health and strength are only choiceworthy, these will be more choiceworthy than those which are both choiceworthy and to be avoided. And both sailing and trading too would have something to be avoided in addition to what is choiceworthy because of the perils of the sea, whereas being a farmer [would be] only choiceworthy.

## &lt;Chapter 4&gt;

119a2 *And the same topoi are also useful to prove that anything is choiceworthy or to be avoided.*

Having presented the *topoi* through which it is possible to draw comparisons based on the choiceworthy, he says that the same *topoi* are suitable also for  
 10 showing that something is choiceworthy without qualification.<sup>306</sup> For since the more choiceworthy is also choiceworthy, precisely as the more useful is also useful and the more beautiful is beautiful, if we eliminate the excesses and the mutual comparisons of each of them, it is clear that we would show that they are such and such also without qualification through the same *topoi*. For it is on the same [ground] on which what is honourable is choiceworthy that what is more honourable than something is also more choiceworthy than that. So that in taking that something is honourable one would be taking that that thing is choiceworthy too. Similarly, the more useful, too, is more choiceworthy because what is useful is choiceworthy. So, once we have taken away the mutual comparison, we have to take that everything that is honourable is choiceworthy; and let us say that a principle is honourable;<sup>307</sup> so, it is choiceworthy, too. Similarly in the case of the useful, too: the useful is choiceworthy; and wealth is useful. The  
 20 same reasoning applies to the other things based on which the more choiceworthy is shown and which are such that, by being admittedly<sup>308</sup> choiceworthy with respect to the aspects based on which they are compared, are shown to be more choiceworthy. For not only the more honourable and the more useful are more choiceworthy. But also what is more painless, if it so happens, and what is more pleasant and what the excellent man would rather choose. And we will have shown that each of the things is choiceworthy with respect to all such aspects in which it is shown that there is an excess based on the choiceworthy, if, once we have taken away the mutual comparison and the excess, we assume what is without qualification.

He says that, 'in some cases',<sup>309</sup> [the claim that] either of them is choiceworthy, or that at least one of them is, is obviously included and refuted directly in the  
 274,1 comparison with the other thing. For in all cases both compared things must be such and such, but it is posited that one of them is evidently so: for the thing to which the good is attached, this evidently has the choiceworthy attached to it as well. But it is no longer equally obvious that the choiceworthy is included in the comparison based on the useful. What he says, then, is that, in some of the things that are said based on comparison, there is no need of a constructive argument

to show that they are choiceworthy: for perhaps one needs an argument to show that the useful or the pleasant or the painless or the long-lasting are choiceworthy. But when the comparison is based on the good, these things evidently have the choiceworthy: for what is choiceworthy is good.<sup>310</sup>

Alternatively, this is not what is meant by 'similarly in the other cases, too, which have such a comparison'.<sup>311</sup> Rather, since some of the things that are said based on a comparison do not also display [the same property] without qualification in all cases (for it is not the case that, if something is more than something else by one unit and, on this account, three is more than two, then it is already possible to show that three is many through the set *topos* by removing from it the excess with respect to two; but it is also not the case that, since any taken magnitude, even if it is small, exceeds something, and what exceeds something is greater [than it], it is thereby the case that, because it is greater, it is also great) – for this reason, then, he added 'with respect to those things that present such a comparison': and those that present such a comparison are those that show that something is more choiceworthy than something else through a more long-lasting good,<sup>312</sup> a more stable [one],<sup>313</sup> and such things. For the one who says that what is good by nature is more choiceworthy than what is good not by nature, through [the claim] that what is good is choiceworthy and by taking this<sup>314</sup> with reference to both [terms of the comparison], also posits that they are both choiceworthy. And in fact, if something is good by nature, this is choiceworthy; and even if something is [good] not by nature, but nonetheless good, this thing, too, is choiceworthy: for every good thing is choiceworthy. In drawing the comparison, then, we will say 'what is good by nature is more choiceworthy than what is good not by nature; and health is good by nature, whereas winning in a fight [is good] not by nature; therefore, health is more choiceworthy than victory in war.' And if we are showing that it is choiceworthy, we will say 'what is good by nature is choiceworthy; health is good by nature; therefore [health] is choiceworthy.' And again: 'every good thing is choiceworthy; so that also what is good not by nature is choiceworthy.' Similarly in the case of the more honourable: if this is more choiceworthy than this by being more honourable, since the honourable is choiceworthy, and what is more honourable than something else is honourable (for it would not be more honourable if it were not honourable), then this is choiceworthy. Similarly if this is more choiceworthy than this by being a more long-lasting good than that one: this very same thing would be choiceworthy by being long-lasting. It is, then, clear how it is possible to use the comparative *topoi* also to show that something is choiceworthy without qualification.

One might enquire whether it is correct in all cases that what is more something [than something else] is also that thing without qualification: for earth, too, is said to be lighter than earth without being light without qualification. And fire is said to be heavier than fire without being heavy without qualification. Or perhaps the comparative [predications] are not said strictly speaking with reference to those things which do not receive the account of that based on which the comparison [is drawn].<sup>315</sup> for it is neither the case that earth, which is indeed heavy without qualification, receives the account of the light (light is what moves by itself towards the upper place), nor does fire receive the account of the heavy. For earth is not said to be lighter by moving upwards by itself faster; rather, [it is said to be lighter] by yielding more and being easier to be forced to move upwards – which is not [characteristic] of [what is] light. Similarly, also the fire which can be more easily drawn downwards is said to be heavier. These things, then, are said based on a certain similarity and not strictly speaking.

## <Chapter 5>

*119a12 The topoi should be taken in the highest degree of generality.*

Having given to us the comparative *topoi* about the more and the greater and, in general, the [properties] that are [ascribed] in a comparative way with reference to something determinate (i.e. with reference to the choiceworthy: for all [*topoi*] drew the comparison with reference to this, since the exposition of the *topoi* is easier to follow with reference to something determinate <...><sup>316</sup>), since comparisons do not only come about with reference to the choiceworthy, through what he adds [now] he spells out for us, perfectly complying with the right method,<sup>317</sup> how we will be able to use these same *topoi* universally and with reference to all other things about which the comparison comes about. For since the more, which is comparative, and similarly the greater, are not only in things that are good and choiceworthy, but also in other things (for ‘more’ is said also with reference to being hot and heavy and white, and thousand other things; similarly the greater, too, which is comparative, is not said only with reference to things that are good or bad and choiceworthy and to be avoided, but also with reference to other things; in fact, [they are said] most of all with reference to magnitudes, and the comparison based on being greater refers to numbers and weights, and thousand other things) – [since, then, this is so,] he says that one

has to take the comparative *topoi* in the more universal form, as he indicated in the addition ‘about the more and the greater’. For, if they are taken in this way, they will be useful for more things and not only for things that are choiceworthy and to be avoided, with reference to which we have just used them.

And having said this, he sets down<sup>318</sup> how it is possible to make the aforementioned *topoi* universal. For if we make a small modification<sup>319</sup> in the [way in which they are] set out, by adding what is more common instead of what is more specific, the aforementioned [result] would come about. And he makes clear how this would come about through examples about *topoi*, and first about the [*topos*:] ‘what is good by nature is more choiceworthy than what is [good] not by nature.’<sup>320</sup> For, formulated in this way, this *topos* only [applies] to good things 10 and is useful for their comparison; but since it is not only the case that what is good by nature is good to a greater extent and is more choiceworthy than what is good not by nature, but also what is to be avoided by nature is to be avoided more than what is [to be avoided] not by nature, and what is white by nature is whiter than what is [white] not by nature (and the same reasoning [applies] to the case of what is healthy and sweet and to the cases similar to these), if we say instead of ‘what is good by nature <etc.>’<sup>321</sup>: ‘what is such and such by nature is more such and such than what is such and such not by nature’, we will make the *topos* universal and we will be able to use it with reference to all things in which what is by nature and what is not by nature are [found]. For all things have been admitted<sup>322</sup> if the *topos* is posited in this way. Again, let it be laid down that what 20 makes [people] good through its presence is more choiceworthy than what does not do that.<sup>323</sup> Certainly, if instead of ‘what makes [people] good is more choiceworthy than what does not make [people good]’, which is formulated specifically, we take ‘what makes what has it such and such is such and such to a greater extent than what does not make [what has it such and such]’, we will make the *topos* universal and will be able to use it for many things. And he himself posited the *topos* in this way: ‘if one thing makes what has it ([i.e. that] to which it belongs) such and such, and one other thing does not do so, whatever does so is such and such to a greater extent than what does not.’<sup>324</sup> For in this way also what makes [something] warm is warmer than what does not make [something warm], and what makes something sweet and what makes something beautiful and what makes something pleasant <are sweeter and more beautiful and more pleasant than what does not do so.><sup>325</sup> And if both things do the same, 277,1 the one doing so more is such and such to a greater extent, e.g. if both make what has [them] sweet or warm or good or greater. For the shift to what is more genus-like, which is ‘such and such’, made the *topos* more common and more versatile.<sup>326</sup>

119a20 Furthermore, if one thing is more and another is less such and such than some same thing.

He had presented some such *topos*: ‘if one thing is a greater good and the other a smaller one than some same thing, the greater one is more choiceworthy.’<sup>327</sup> For in this way good physical condition is more choiceworthy than wealth, because  
 10 good physical condition is more choiceworthy than health, and wealth is less choiceworthy [than health]. He says how, then, we will make this more universal, too, through [the way of] setting [it] out and the [use of] general terms.<sup>328</sup> For once it has been formulated in this way: ‘if one thing is more and another thing is less such and such than some one and the same thing, then what is more such and such than the same thing is such and such to a greater extent’ will be universal, once we have taken ‘such and such’ instead of ‘good’. For if this is laid down, then we will also be able to show that something is greater and warmer and sweeter and all things similar to these than something else, since ‘such and such’ can be adapted to<sup>329</sup> all these.

And if one thing is more such and such than such and such, whereas another thing is not [more such and such] <than such and such a thing>,<sup>330</sup> it is clear that the thing mentioned first is more such and such. And this *topos*, which he sets out, is [the] universal [formulation] of the *topos* saying: ‘if one thing is a greater  
 20 good than some good, and another thing is good, but is not greater than any good, the one which is greater than some good is more choiceworthy.’ For through this [universal *topos*] we can also show that one thing is warmer than another and sweeter and other thousand things, since the ‘such and such’ can be adapted to many things and not only to those that are choiceworthy.

And it would seem that this *topos* is another, beyond those that have been mentioned, if one intends it in this way, and namely: what is warm, if it is warmer than what is very warm, is warm to a much greater extent,<sup>331</sup> and what is [sweeter] than what is very sweet <...>,<sup>332</sup> similarly in the case of the cold, the spicy, and such things.

119a22 Furthermore from addition.

He shows how also the *topoi* from addition and subtraction which he set out would themselves become more universal too. Those from addition that he set  
 278,1 out, then, were these: ‘if something, when added to the same thing, makes the whole more choiceworthy [etc.]’<sup>333</sup> and ‘if something added to what is lesser makes the whole greater [etc.]’<sup>334</sup> Those into which he now modifies them are

these: 'if [something, when] added to the same thing makes the whole more such and such' (for 'more such and such' is more universal than 'more choiceworthy', and is suitable for white and sweet and bad and such things), and 'if added to what is less such and such makes the whole more such and such' (for 'less such and such' and 'more such and such' are more universal than 'less choiceworthy' and 'more choiceworthy').

Again, from subtraction, the [*topos*] said about the choiceworthy was: 'for the thing such that, once it has been subtracted from the same thing, what is left is lesser, that would be greater, whenever, once it has been subtracted, it made what is left lesser.'<sup>335</sup> And the one with which [he] now replaces [it] is this: 'the thing such that, once it has been subtracted, what is left is less such and such, that is more such and such itself': for 'less such and such' and 'more such and such' are more common and more universal than 'lesser' and 'greater', which he used then. For this reason it is possible to use the *topos* laid down in this way for more cases. 10

*119a27 And the things that are more unmixed with the contraries are more such and such.*

This [*topos*] has been transferred into the more universal [*topos*] from the one [saying] that the good thing that is unmixed with the bad is more choiceworthy than the mixed one: for he said that the same things taken together with painlessness are more choiceworthy than with pain.<sup>336</sup> For he [now] says universally that 'more such and such' are the things which are more unmixed with the contraries: for what is more unmixed with the contrary is white and sweet, and also pleasant, to a greater extent.<sup>337</sup> Similarly also in the other cases for which there is a contrary. It is also possible that this was transferred from the *topos* mentioned as last: 'Furthermore, [one has to] show [that something] is to be avoided from what holds in a similar way.'<sup>338</sup> 20

*119a28 Furthermore, next to the things said before, what admits to a greater extent the proper account of what is submitted.*

Next to the presented comparative *topoi*, he now adds this, which is from the definition: for he did not mention it with reference to the comparison according to what is choiceworthy.<sup>339</sup> For what admits the definition of what is submitted to a greater extent is more such and such. For example, what admits the account of the white to a greater extent is white to a greater extent: for the colour which pierces sight more is white to a greater extent, since white is colour that pierces 279,1

sight. Similarly, what admits the account of the sweet more is sweeter. And, based on the same [considerations], what admits the account of the choiceworthy more is also more choiceworthy, and what [admits] that of pleasure [is] also more pleasant. Perhaps he has not presented this *topos* with reference to the *topoi* showing what is more choiceworthy because there was no single account of what  
 10 is choiceworthy nor of what is good: for the good and choiceworthy things are of those that are said in many ways.<sup>340</sup>

## <Chapter 6>

*119a32 If the problem has been set as particular and not as universal.*

In the second [book] and in this one, about the universal problems concerning the accident, which can be enquired into either without qualification or comparatively, he said what *topoi* are suitable for them. Now, he does not talk any longer about the comparative problems but shows how it is possible to use the presented *topoi* also for establishing or demolishing particular problems.<sup>341</sup>

He starts off by showing that the *topoi* that are said universally are useful not only for the universal problems but also for the particular ones (which he said  
 20 also at the beginning of the second book):<sup>342</sup> for through [the *topos*] which establishes the universal the particular is also established at the same time, and, the other way round, through what is universally destructive the particular is demolished too.<sup>343</sup> Even if the problem which is laid down is particular, then, the universal *topoi* are useful. For if one is enquiring into whether this pleasure is good, the one who showed that every pleasure is good showed that the one under investigation is good too. And again, if the task is to show that this specific pleasure is not good, the one who showed that no pleasure is good showed that the submitted one is not [good] either. And he mentioned these things, as I said, also at the beginning of the second [book], when he said ‘those that are universally constructive and destructive are common to both kinds of problems.’<sup>344</sup> And now this has been worked out more clearly.

280,1 And he said that all universal [*topoi*] are useful for particular problems, too, (for every universal that has been shown at the same time also proves what [falls] under it). He [now] says that the ‘most suitable and common’ *topoi* both for the universal and for the particular problems, in the sense that not only they can prove at the same time also the particulars by having shown the universals, but they can also be transferred<sup>345</sup> from the universal to the particular [problems],<sup>346</sup>

are those from the opposites<sup>347</sup> and from the coordinates<sup>348</sup> and from the inflections.<sup>349</sup> For it is not possible to show all the particulars through the universals, because some particulars are true or false in their own right too:<sup>350</sup> for this reason some specific *topoi* for them are needed too. For, in order to show that some human being is musical, it is not possible to use 'every [human being] is musical,' because this is not true, nor [is it possible to use] 'no [human being] is literate' to [show] 'some [human being] is not literate.' 10

And since the opposites are said in four ways, he shows<sup>351</sup> for each kind of opposition, with the exception of the opposites according to contradiction, that the same *topos* applies in a similar way, both if the problem is universal or particular, since it is transferred from those to these. And at any rate he shows this first in the case of the contraries. For – he says <sup>352</sup>– it is similarly reputable to require, if the enquiry is whether every pain is bad, that if every pleasure is good, then also every pain is bad, which is a universal *topos* from the contraries, and to require, if the enquiry is whether some pain is bad, that if some pleasure is good, then also some pain is bad: for example, the pleasure about fine activities would be good and the pain about the same activities would be bad. For when the problem is universal and the enquiry is whether every pain is bad, it is reputable to carry out the attack from the contrary in this way: if every pleasure is good, every pain is bad too. On the other hand, if the problem is particular and the enquiry is whether some pain is bad or not, it is no less reputable to require that, if some pleasure is good, then some pain is bad too. 20

And again, it is possible to use the *topos* from the opposites according to possession and privation in a similar way both for universal problems and for particular ones. And he mentioned only the particular ones, since he talked about the universal in the first [sections of the books about the accident].<sup>353</sup> For example, perception and lack of perception are opposed according to possession and privation. And speaking about the particulars, he says:<sup>354</sup> if some perception is not a capacity, then some lack of perception would not be an incapacity either. For if we want to show that some lack of perception is not an incapacity, we would show [this] having taken that some perception is not a capacity. If, instead, our task was to show the problem universally, that every lack of perception is an incapacity, having taken the opposite universally about the possession, i.e. that every perception is a capacity, we would have shown that every lack of perception is an incapacity too. For the requirement is similar in each of these problems. And again, if we wanted to show that no lack of perception is an incapacity, we would take that no perception is a capacity. For also the example he provided follows upon this: if some perception is not a capacity, some lack of perception 281,1 10

is not an incapacity either: for if the possession of this perception which was taken is not a capacity, then its privation would not be a incapacity either.

And he adds also a [particular] example of the opposites as relatives, showing that it is possible to transfer the universal to the particular. For if the enquiry is whether some conception<sup>355</sup> is knowledge, one could attack from the opposite in this way: if some conceivable thing is knowable, then some conception is knowledge, too. For conception is conception of what is conceivable. And if the problem had been universal and the enquiry whether every conception is knowledge, also the opposite of the conception, i.e. the conceivable, would have been taken universally in this way: if every conceivable is knowable, then every  
 20 conception is knowledge, too.

But he does not make further mention of the opposites according to affirmation and negation because there is no contradiction in what is particular: for 'something is not the case' is not opposite [as a contradictory] to 'something is the case'. In fact, the oppositions according to contradiction obtain between the universals and the opposite particulars. For this reason, the one who has shown that the universal affirmation is false about something, [also] shows that the particular negation about the same is true; and if he has shown that the particular negation is false, he has [also] shown that the universal affirmation is true. Similarly for the universal negation and the particular affirmation. However, it is no longer the case that the one who showed that the particular affirmative is false has already shown the particular negative in its own right, but, if at all, in virtue of the fact that it falls under the [corresponding] universal:<sup>356</sup> for it is not  
 30 the case that the one who showed that it is false that some human being is musical has also already shown that some human being is not musical.

282,1 Having talked about the opposites and having shown how it is possible to use the same *topoi* both in the case of universal and in the case of particular [problems], he shows again how it is possible to use the [*topos*] from inflections also in the case of particular problems. For 'unjustly' is an inflection with respect to the unjust thing.<sup>357</sup> If, then, the particular enquiry is whether some unjust thing is good, one would attack from the inflections in this way: if some of the things that come to be unjustly is good, also some unjust thing is good. If, on the other hand, one enquired universally whether the unjust is good, the inflection would be taken without qualification: if what [is] in the unjust way is in the good way, then the unjust is good, too. For as in the case of the universal [one takes] the universal, so in a similar way [one] also [has] to take the particular in the case of the particular.

10 And next he shows that the *topos* from the coordinates is adapted to the particular [problems]. And coordinates of each other are courage, the courageous

[man], courageously,<sup>358</sup> the courageous [thing], and again pleasure, [the one] feeling pleasure, pleasantly, pleasant, and all things standing to each other in this way, as was said in the former [books].<sup>359</sup> If the enquiry is particular, whether some pleasure is to be avoided or not, then, the attack will be from the coordinate in this way: if something pleasant is to be avoided, <then some pleasure is to be avoided, too>;<sup>360</sup> and similarly, if something pleasant is useful, then some pleasure is good, too: for what is useful is good.<sup>361</sup> But if the enquiry is universally about every pleasure, whether it is to be avoided, it would be taken universally: if all pleasant things are to be avoided, also every pleasure is to be avoided.

119b8 *And in the case of corruptive things and generations and corruptions.*

20

He says that, in a way similar to the *topoi* from the opposites and the inflections and the coordinates, also those from corruptive things and generations and corruptions are both suitable for and common to the particular problems, too, and their reputability is similar in the case of universal problems and in the case of the particular ones.<sup>362</sup> For as the universal ‘if everything that is destructive of pleasure is good, then also every pleasure is bad’ is reputable, in the same way ‘if what is destructive of some pleasure is good, then some pleasure is bad’ is reputable too: for it was laid down that the things whose corruptive [factors] are good belong themselves among the bad things, whereas those whose corruptive [factors] are bad, they belong themselves among the good ones.<sup>363</sup> And the other way round for generations. And the same [that holds] in the case of corruptive things also [holds] in the case of corruptions. And the thing corruptive of knowledge is, if it so happens, forgetfulness, whereas its corruption is ignorance; and the thing corruptive of health is filling oneself up with food, whereas [its] corruption is disease. The same reasoning [applies] to knowledge: for as ‘if the thing corruptive of knowledge is good, knowledge is bad’ is reputable universally, it will be reputable in the same way even if taken particularly, for if the thing corruptive of some knowledge is good, then also some knowledge is bad. And these are the examples of the *topos* from corruptive things.

30

283,1

Universal examples of *topoi* from corruptions and generations, instead, would be like this: if the corruption of knowledge is good, knowledge is bad; if the generation of knowledge belongs among the bad things, knowledge is bad. For the *topos* from corruptions is: ‘the thing whose corruption is good is itself bad’, and ‘the thing whose corruption is bad is itself good’, as I said. The one from generations: ‘the thing whose generation is bad is itself of this sort’ and ‘the thing whose generation is good is itself good too.’ The universal examples of the *topoi*,

10

then, are of this sort; but he himself does not add this anymore since he has already talked about them before.<sup>364</sup> The particular ones, instead, which he is discussing now, showing that the *topoi* are similarly useful for these too, are these: ‘if the corruption of knowledge belongs among the good things or [its] generation among the bad ones, some knowledge belongs among the bad things:’ for this would be an example of both *topoi*<sup>365</sup> at the same time. For if forgetting the evil things that were done to someone is good, knowing the evil things that were done is bad. And this is the example of the [*topos*] from corruptions and

20 corruptive things: for forgetting is corruptive of knowledge and cognition (for he uses the word ‘knowledge’ rather generally,<sup>366</sup> instead of cognition); and having forgotten would be the corruption. [An example] of the [*topos*] from generations: if remembering the evil things done is bad, then also knowing them is bad: for remembering is a sort of generation. And he says that the same applies also in the other cases: for what is reputable is similar in the case of universal problems and in the case of particular ones. He said ‘in the other cases’<sup>367</sup> either with reference to the examples (for ‘the thing whose corruptive thing is choiceworthy is itself to be avoided’ and ‘the thing whose generation belongs among the bad things is bad itself’ are true not only in the cases mentioned, but

30 also with reference to the other things we might be dealing with, not with reference to knowledge only); or he says ‘in the other cases’ with reference to the consequents<sup>368</sup> of generations and corruptions, such as the productive things, the uses, the acquisitions. For it was laid down<sup>369</sup> that the thing whose productive thing is good is itself of this sort, and that whose use or acquisition is choiceworthy is also choiceworthy itself. Furthermore, as the thing whose corruptive [factor] is good is itself bad, in the same way also the other way around: that whose corruptive [factor] or corruption is bad is itself good. He says<sup>370</sup> that in these cases, too, what is reputable is similar in the case of the universal and in the case of the particular problems.

284,1

*119b17 Furthermore from what is more and less and similarly.*

Also the presented *topoi* from what is more and less and what is similarly – the one from the more is destructive only (for if what is something to a greater extent is not [that thing], then what is [that thing] to a lesser extent would not be [it] either); the one from the less, instead, is constructive only (for if what is something to a lesser extent is [that thing], also what is the same to a greater extent would be [it]); and the one from the similar is useful for both in a similar way, i.e. both for constructive and for destructive purposes (for if what is

10

<something><sup>371</sup> in a similar way to something else is that thing, also what is the same thing in a similar way to it would be [that], and if what is something in a similar way to something else is not [that thing], then neither would the thing which is the same thing in a similar way to it be [that]]<sup>372</sup> – he says, then, that these *topoi* too are similarly persuasive<sup>373</sup> in the case of particular problems as in the case of universal ones. And he does not mention anymore their difference, which he set out when he gave their exposition, as he said that either one is said about <one or one about><sup>374</sup> two or two about one or two about two: for he said this earlier. However, he uses an example in which one is said about two: for in the example the good is said about knowledge and pleasure. It is possible to use similar [examples] also if two were said about one: for if some injustice is more advantageous than pleasant and it is not advantageous, then it would not be pleasant either. But also if two are said about two: if some prodigality is liberality more than some folly is temperance, if not the first, then not the second either. The first presented *topos* of those from the more would no longer find room with reference to the particular problems. An example of it was: ‘if what is more [of a] pleasure is more good, also pleasure is good without qualification.’<sup>375</sup> And again he does not mention the universal ones in these cases, since he has already talked about them, but he shows the similarity of the particular ones <to><sup>376</sup> them. And he shows this first in the case of the *topos* from the more, which is destructive. A universal example of a universal problem, then, would be: if knowledge, which is more of a good than pleasure, is not good, then pleasure would not be good either. And he himself mentions the particular in this way: ‘for if some of the things from another genus is such and such to a greater extent, but none of them is [such and such], then what is said would not be such and such either.’<sup>377</sup> And he himself made clear what ‘from another genus’ is through an example, in that he said: ‘for example, if some knowledge is more of a good than pleasure [is], and no knowledge is good, then pleasure would not be [good] either.’<sup>378</sup> for knowledge is one genus and pleasure is another one. If, then, ‘if knowledge is more of a good than pleasure [is]’ had been taken without qualification, it would have been said universally about different genera, as if it had been said ‘if this genus is more such and such than this’, e.g. knowledge [more] than pleasure. But in the present case the addition of ‘some’ (*ti*)<sup>379</sup> to the one and of ‘some’ (*tis*)<sup>380</sup> to the other makes them particular. And since the problem is particular, in demolishing it [he] says universally: ‘no knowledge is good,’<sup>381</sup> because it is not possible to demolish the particular affirmative in any other way than through the universal negative, if what is posited indefinitely should be demolished without qualification,<sup>382</sup> as he will say himself in what follows.

The *topos* moves forward<sup>383</sup> not only in the case of different genera, but also in the case of things that fall under the same [genus]. For if someone, taking what seems to be most such and such of the things that are in the same genus, shows  
 20 that it is not such and such, he will demolish also [the claim] that some other thing of those under the same [genus] is such and such, i.e.: if, of the things in the same genus, what seems to be such and such the most is not such and such, then neither would any other things of those in the genus be such and such. For if the pleasure which seems to be the best thing<sup>384</sup> (and this is the [pleasure] of the soul) is not the best thing, then neither would any other pleasure be the best thing. And again, if the [part] of the contingent which appears to be [scientifically]<sup>385</sup> knowable the most is not [scientifically] knowable, then no other [part] of the contingent would be [scientifically] knowable either; and the [part] of the contingent which seems to be [scientifically] knowable the most is what is for the most part; if, then, this is not [scientifically] knowable, then nothing else which is contingent would be [scientifically knowable] either. In this way it is also not the case that some perception is [scientific] knowledge, since the one [which seems to be scientific knowledge] the most, i.e. sight, is not. But neither is any human being unaffected, since the one who seems to be  
 30 [unaffected] the most is not; and this is the excellent one. And he says himself a little later<sup>386</sup> that it is possible to carry out the demolition with reference to this genus from the more.

And as it is possible – he says – to use the *topos* from the more also in demolishing the problems about each particular thing,<sup>387</sup> in the same way it will be possible to remove and to establish the particular [problems] through the [topoi] from the similar degree and the less. But it will be different, because the *topos* from the similar degree, as was said before,<sup>388</sup> is both destructive and constructive, whereas the one from the less is only constructive, as the one from the more, too, is only destructive.<sup>389</sup> And he adds examples through which he shows clearly that the one from the similar degree is both constructive and  
 10 destructive, as in the case of universal problems, so also in the case of particular ones, whereas the one from the less is only constructive: for he showed that it is not possible to use the one from the less for destructive purposes. For once ‘if some capacity is less good than knowledge [is] [etc.]’ is laid down, if ‘some capacity is good’ were taken in addition,<sup>390</sup> it is shown and it is established that knowledge [is good] too. If, instead, it were taken in addition that no capacity is good, then it is not shown that knowledge [is not good] either: for it is not the case that, as it is necessary that, if what is something to a lesser extent [than something else] is [that thing], then also what is [that thing] to a greater extent

is [that thing], then in the same way it is also necessary that, if what is something to a lesser extent is not [that thing], then also what is [that thing] to a greater extent is not [that thing either]. And the example which has been used in these cases, too, has one thing said about two: for the good is said of capacity and of knowledge.

*119b31 And it is possible to demolish not only from another genus.*

20

He says that it is possible to use the *topos* from the more, which is destructive, not only with reference to different genera, as he said earlier, but also with reference to the same [genus]: and we have already shown this earlier through several examples.<sup>391</sup> Through the example he spoke more generally about the virtues as if they were [forms of] knowledge. The example would be more suitable if one showed that virtues are not [forms] of knowledge by showing that the one of them which seems to be knowledge the most (and this is prudence) is not knowledge. And what is said by him would be equivalent to 'if the problem were whether some knowledge is good', which would be equivalent to 'whether some virtue is good': if it were shown that knowledge to the highest degree, i.e. virtue to the highest degree, is not good, then any other virtue would not be good either.

30

*119b35 Furthermore, from a hypothesis, having required in a similar way that, if [it belongs] to one, then [it belongs] to all.*

287,1

He set out what *topoi* are useful for the particular problems, and, firstly,<sup>392</sup> he showed that the particulars [can be shown] through the same [*topoi*] through which the universals are shown since they fall under the universals; secondly,<sup>393</sup> he set out the *topoi* which have a similar reputability when they are said with reference to the universals and with reference to the particulars [respectively], and he showed that it is possible to attack from them in a similar way against both [targets].<sup>394</sup> Now, he discusses those from a hypothesis, and shows that they too are suitable for the particulars as for the universals: for he says that one should use the *topos* from a hypothesis with reference to particular problems too.<sup>395</sup> He made clear what the *topos* from a hypothesis is by adding 'having required'<sup>396</sup> in a similar way that if it belongs or does not belong to one, then [it belongs or does not belong] to all.' For this *topos* from a hypothesis is both constructive and destructive. For if the enquiry is whether every soul is immortal, the problem is universal and we will use the *topos* from a hypothesis by having required that, if it has been shown that one is, then all [souls] are so: for having

10

shown that the [soul] of the human being [is immortal], we would have also shown through the hypothesis that every [soul is immortal].<sup>397</sup> If, on the other hand, we are demolishing, having taken that, if one is not immortal, then any other is not [immortal either], if we have shown that the one of the human being or any other is not immortal, we would have shown universally that none is. But  
 20 if the object of the enquiry is whether some soul, e.g. the human one, is immortal, the problem will be particular: but using the *topos* from a hypothesis in a similar way and having taken [the claim] ‘if some is immortal, then every soul is immortal’, having shown that some is immortal, and, having taken through this that every [soul] is immortal too, we would have shown that the soul of the human being is immortal, which is what was in the problem. And again, the opposite, that it is not immortal, <we will show in this way: having taken that if one is not immortal, then no other is,> once we have shown <that the soul of plants or of animals is not immortal,><sup>398</sup> we would also have that none is: and from this we would conclude that the human one, about which the enquiry is, is not [immortal] either. And that the one showing [what was submitted] in this way necessarily shows the universal, even if the problem is particular, is known: for it is not possible to use the argument from a hypothesis in a different way,  
 30 since one has to require that, in a similar way, as [it is] for one, so [it is] for all.<sup>399</sup>

288,1 119b37 *If, then, it is laid down that it belongs to some.*

What is said is that, if what is laid down is an affirmative particular, which we want to demolish, we have to try to show that it does not belong to some by resorting to the *topos* from a hypothesis, by asking<sup>400</sup> that, if it has been shown that it does not belong to some, it will have been shown that it does not belong to any either. And through the latter it will also be removed that it belongs to some, which is what we want to remove. If, on the other hand, it is laid down that it does not belong to some, the other way round: [one has to] show the affirmative particular and take through this that [it belongs] to all too from the hypothesis. And ‘it is clear that the one who resorts to the hypothesis makes the problem universal’,<sup>401</sup> which is equivalent to  
 10 ‘through the hypothesis [one] shows the universal through the particular’, although the aim is to remove the particular, since the problem was particular.

120a6 *If, then, the problem is indeterminate.*

These [considerations], too, are still about the particular problems: for some are said without qualification and indeterminately, whereas others [are said] with

one or several determinations. He shows, then, how it is possible to demolish and establish the indeterminate particular [problems] and how the determinate ones,<sup>402</sup> and, of the latter, how some [are] less [determinate] and how some more [determinate],<sup>403</sup> and that it is easier to establish than to demolish the indeterminate ones. And he suitably discusses the particular problems too in the context of the things said about the accident: for, as has already been said several times, it is only in the accident that particular problems mostly are.<sup>404</sup>

20

Indeterminate particular problems, then, are 'some pleasure is good', and this is affirmative; negative, on the other hand, is 'some pleasure is not good'. For also 'the pleasure of the licentious man is good' is particular, but what [is said] in this way is a determinate particular and is not said without qualification. 'Pleasure is good', which is said [to be] indeterminate strictly speaking, and 'some pleasure [is good]', and again, 'pleasure is not good' and '<some><sup>405</sup> pleasure is not good' are used in this way,<sup>406</sup> [i.e.] as having equal force.<sup>407</sup> For it is for this reason and in this way that [these]<sup>408</sup> are indeterminate particulars, i.e. because the indeterminate ones have equal force as these particulars. For having said before 'e.g. if someone<sup>409</sup> said that pleasure is good or not good',<sup>410</sup> he takes 'some pleasure is good' to be the same as 'pleasure is good', and 'some pleasure is not good' as 'pleasure is not good'.<sup>411</sup> For he says: 'and similarly also if one said that some pleasure is not good'.<sup>412</sup>

289,1

These [propositions], then, are indeterminate particulars, <also><sup>413</sup> because it is not determined whether they posit the particular through the universal or in their own right. But he calls 'determinate particulars' those saying 'some pleasure is good and some is not', and the one [saying] that only one pleasure is good and that only contemplative pleasure is good.<sup>414</sup>

Since the differences among the particulars are these, he discusses first<sup>415</sup> the indeterminate particular and says that such a particular is demolished in one way but established in two ways. For it is only possible to demolish the [proposition] saying 'some pleasure is good' having shown universally that no pleasure is good. For the one who showed that some pleasure is not good has not yet demolished 'some [pleasure] is good', since this can be true too, even if that has been shown.<sup>416</sup> Similarly, it is also only possible to demolish the one saying that some pleasure is not good having shown that every pleasure is good. For the one who showed that some pleasure is good has not yet removed 'some [pleasure] is not good'. And having said himself about the negative particular that it is only removed through the affirmative universal, he added: 'for if we show that some pleasure is <not> good,<sup>417</sup> what is submitted is not yet removed',<sup>418</sup> saying this not with reference to the negative particular, but about the affirmative particular,

10

20

about which he talked earlier. But he does no longer add a similar [point] with reference to the negative particular, showing that it is not removed by the affirmative particular, assuming that this too has become clear through what was said about the affirmative particular.

And he says that it is possible to establish in two ways each of the [propositions] that are particular in this way. For both if we have shown universally that every pleasure is good and particularly that some pleasure is good, we would have established the affirmative particular. And the negative particular would also be established in a similar way, if it was shown that no pleasure is good (for if none  
30 [is good], it is not the case that some is) and that some is not good: for in both ways it turns out to be shown that some pleasure is not good.

290,1 120a20 *If, on the other hand, the thesis is determinate.*

If, instead, the problem (which he called 'thesis')<sup>419</sup> is determinate, and if the determination<sup>420</sup> in the problem is of this sort, e.g. if [one said that] some pleasure is good, and some is not (and it seems to me that 'and some is not' has been added not because it is fully compulsory to lay it down in the proposition,<sup>421</sup> but because it makes clear that the particular is true in its own right only, but not through the universal under which it is, and also not indeterminately:<sup>422</sup> for if two propositions were laid down,<sup>423</sup> it will no longer be the case that one single proposition is removed in two ways, but, being two, [they will be removed] by two, i.e. the affirmative by the negative universal and the negative by the  
10 affirmative universal), he says, then that it is possible to remove the particular [proposition] which is determinate in this way in two ways. For both once it has been shown that every [pleasure] is good it is removed that some is and some is not, and if it has been shown that none is good: for it is not possible that, if no pleasure is good, some is good and some is not.

If the determination of the particular is in this way instead, i.e. if [the proposition is that] only one pleasure is good, its removal will occur in three ways. For 'only one' is removed if it has been shown that every pleasure is good as well as if [it has been shown] that none is: for if none is good, 'only one [pleasure is good]' is not true either; but also if it has been shown that several [pleasures] are good: in this way, too, it is removed that only one is good.

If the determination of the particular problem goes even further and occurs in this way, [e.g.] if [the proposition is] only prudence among the virtues is  
20 knowledge, its removal will occur in four ways. For if it has been shown that every virtue is knowledge, or that no virtue is knowledge, or that several [virtues],

e.g. justice [too], [are knowledge] (for it would no longer be the only one), or that prudence is not knowledge – clearly provided that some other [virtue] is [knowledge]: for also if some other [virtues] are [knowledge], but this is not, what is laid down is removed. But also if it were laid down that only these three specific virtues are [forms of] knowledge, it would be removed in five ways, in the way just indicated: for [it would be removed] through ‘all’ and through ‘none’ and through ‘more’ and through ‘fewer’ and through ‘not just these three, which were mentioned in the problem.’ Theophrastus, too, seems to have discussed these things towards the end of [his work] *On affirmation*.<sup>424</sup>

*120a32 And it is also useful to survey the [individual] particulars in which something was said to belong or not [to belong to a subject], precisely as in the universal problems.* 291,1

As in the second [book]<sup>425</sup> he required, about universal problems, that, once the problem is posited, one survey the individuals or the things under the universal,<sup>426</sup> and if, having brought forward many of the things [falling] under it, it is found that what was posited to belong universally does not belong to any [of the things brought forward], one take universally that it does not belong to any, or, if it appears to belong to many, one posit that it belongs to all or ‘make an objection [specifying] in what case this is not so’<sup>427</sup> – he says that we should do the same also with reference to the particular problems: for this is what he meant through [the words] ‘in which something was said to belong or not [to belong to a subject]’.<sup>428</sup> 10  
For if it was laid down that some pleasure is good, one must survey the particular pleasures, as [one should] also if it were laid down universally that every pleasure is good. And if in such a survey<sup>429</sup> it is found that some pleasure is good, what is submitted would have been shown. If, on the other hand, it is found that in many cases this is not so, we will require the universal, that no [pleasure] is good. And in this way we will have demolish the submitted particular too, so that this [procedure] is also common to the particular problems.

*120a34 Furthermore, one should survey the genera by dividing [them] according to the species down to the indivisible things, as was said earlier.*

This, too, had been said about the universal problems in the second [book],<sup>430</sup> 20 that, in the problems in which something genus-like<sup>431</sup> has been taken, one should carry out its division into the species and again into the things under the species and check all the way down to the indivisible things, if what was posited

as belonging to the genus in the problem belongs to each of them. For if the problem was whether the same science is of the opposites or not, since the opposites [are said] in many ways, he required to take each of them separately, and then the things falling under each of them separately, and check if the same science [deals with] each of them: for this is useful both for destructive and for constructive purposes. So, as in the case of the universal [problems], he says that one has to do the same in the case of particular problems too, when something  
 30 genus-like is in them.<sup>432</sup> For example, if the problem is whether the same science  
 292,1 is of some opposites, one has to divide the opposites in a similar way and survey  
 each [result of the division], [by dividing] both the thing itself and the things  
 under it. And if it<sup>433</sup> appears to be so in many cases, [one has to] establish the  
 problem assuming that what was laid down as belonging to some of them  
 belongs universally to all. If, on the other hand, it is found that this is not so in  
 many cases, then, making a move from these, one has to require that it does not  
 [belong] to any instead. And the affirmative particular problem has to be  
 demolished in this way. Similarly, if someone says that some virtue is knowledge,  
 one has to divide the virtues: first, into rational and moral; then again the rational  
 ones and the moral ones each separately in their own right, and showing with  
 reference to those that are currently under consideration at each stage that they  
 are not knowledge, take the universal that none [of them is knowledge], and  
 demolish in this way that some is knowledge.

- 10 And this [*topos*] is not very different from the previous one, except that this  
 required to carry out a division of the genus into its species first, and then, by  
 proceeding in order to the things that fall under the species, to move on to the  
 particulars, whereas the one before this, even if what was taken was not a genus  
 but [just] something common, required to survey directly the indivisible things  
 under it.

*120a38 Furthermore, with reference to the things in which it is possible to  
 determine the accident in species or in number.*

- And having said that one has to divide the subject term in the problems from the  
 accident in a similar way in those that are universal and in those that are  
 particular, and if it is genus-like, [one has to divide it] into the species [and  
 20 down] to the indivisible things, now he says about the predicate and what is said  
 to belong incidentally the same thing he said about the universal [problems].<sup>434</sup>  
 For, also with reference to the particular [problems] in which this is possible, he  
 says that one has to divide this too and define,<sup>435</sup> according to the species or to

the number,<sup>436</sup> whether any of the things [obtained] from the division belong to the subject: for if it is found that some of them belong to the subject, the problem, being particular, will have been established. If, on the other hand, none is found [to belong to the subject], it will have been demolished. For example, if the enquiry is whether time changes or not, since change is said in many ways, one has to divide and take the species of change. Since, then, every change is either with respect to place or to quantity or to quality, one has to take each of the changes and enquire into whether it is possible that time changes according to any of them. And if it appears that it does not change according to place (for it cannot be displaced: for how is it possible that what does not persist is displaced?), but also not in magnitude (for change in quantity, too, is of what persists) nor in quality nor according to any other species of change, it would be demolished that time changes. And if the enquiry was whether time is change, the problem would turn out to be genus-related.<sup>437</sup> And one would show that it is not change because it is not local [change] nor qualitative nor in quantity: for if it were one of these, everything that is in time would be in some of these changes, [i.e.] in the same and continuous [change]. The same reasoning applies to the soul, if one enquired into whether it changes or not. But also if one enquired whether the soul is a certain number or not, since every number is either odd or even, if the soul is neither an odd number nor an even one, it would not be number either. And this division with respect to the species is rather genus-related; it would be with respect to the indivisible things if we showed [the same] by dividing each of these<sup>438</sup> into the [single] numbers under them. For if it is even, it will be two or four or six or eight or ten; if odd, three or five or seven or nine: but saying that the soul is any of these numbers is absurd; so that the soul is neither an odd number nor an even one; but if it is none of these, then it is not a number at all. However, it seems that, through the examples, he mentions the universal problems and no longer the particular ones.<sup>439</sup>



## Notes

- 1 Different manuscripts have slightly different titles at the beginning of each book for books 2–7: see Wallies' apparatus at 125,1–2; 217,1–2; 294,1–2; 368,1–2; 420,1–2; 496,1–2; 518,1–2. For the commentary on *Top.* 1, Wallies prints a title similar to that found in manuscripts A and D for books 2–4. Note, however, that the extent to which books 5–8 can be led back to Alexander's commentary is a complex issue: see Brandis (1835), Wallies (1891) and the most recent philological work by Gonzáles Calderón (2014).
- 2 'Without qualification' translates *haplôs* at 217,4. As Alexander will spell out a few lines later, both *Top.* 2 and 3 present *topoi* from the accident, i.e. *topoi* which can be used to establish or remove claims in which a predicate is ascribed to a subject as an accident. Presumably the remark at 217,4 means that, while *Top.* 2 deals with claims in which a predicate is ascribed to (or denied of) a subject in a standard (i.e. not comparative) predicative formulation, *Top.* 3 deals with comparative claims. On this point, see Alexander's comments at 219,20 ff., 273,8–10.
- 3 An 'attack' (*epikheirêma* or *epikheirêsis*) is a dialectical argument, and 'to attack' (*epikheirein*) is what the questioner does in a dialectical exchange. Alexander resorts systematically to this terminology in his commentary. About the military vocabulary to describe dialectical argumentation, see Castelli (2020: 32–3).
- 4 For the sake of brevity, I translate the Greek expressions *mallon* and *hêttôn* with 'more' and 'less' respectively whenever these are used as labels for a *topos* or when this translation seems appropriate in the context. Occasionally, when the expressions appear in their adverbial function within more complex sentences and 'more' or 'less' do not seem to be viable options in English, I rather translate 'to a higher degree' or 'to a greater extent' and 'to a lower degree' or 'to a lesser extent' respectively.
- 5 *Top.* 1.5, 102a14–16.
- 6 'Appropriately' translates *prosekhôs*. It is not completely clear to me what Alexander's point is. Alexander uses the adjective *prosekhês* to indicate what is 'proximate' or 'appropriate' to something else in different contexts. For example, from a general and common *topos* one can find the premises that are 'proximate' or 'appropriate' to the desired conclusion (126,22–6, quoted on p. 16); a genus should be first divided into the species that are more general and more 'proximate' to the genus itself than into those that are lower down (138,13; cf. 425,15; note however that 425,15 belongs to the commentary on *Top.* 6, and the authenticity of the last four books of the commentary is controversial). The adverb *prosekhôs* is also used to characterize the

proximity of the means to an end (for example in opposition to a more remote end, as in 239,22). Later (219,1–3; cf. n. 19) Alexander seems to have in mind cases in which the genus ('substance') can be said to belong more or less to the items of different generality falling under it (individuals, i.e. primary substances, and species and genera, i.e. secondary substances). If so, the point here would be that the genus is never predicated with a difference in degree of the species which are the result of the same immediate division and are at the same level of generality (while the possibility is left open that it might be predicated with a difference in degree of its immediate species and of species that are further down the division or, perhaps, of individuals falling under the genus). One other possibility is that Alexander is alluding here to a distinction between the way in which the genus is predicated of its species and the way in which the same genus is predicated incidentally. Such cases are considered in *Top.* 3.1, 116a23–8, for instance. If this is what Alexander has in mind, then the point would be that the genus is not predicated with a difference in degree of any of the things it is a genus of (which leaves open the possibility that it be predicated with a difference in degree of things of which it is a genus and of things of which it is not a genus).

- 7 Literally: 'the leading-back (*anaphora*) of choiceworthy things is to action and moral philosophy.' Alexander resorts to the language of 'leading back' in different contexts. In this context, what he means is that problems about what is more or less choiceworthy fall within the domain of investigation of moral philosophy. In other contexts, 'leading back' refers to the relation between means and ends (e.g. 237,15) and, more generally, to the relation between *x* and what is for the sake of *x* (e.g. 229,16: sleep is for the sake of wakefulness and can be 'led back' to it).
- 8 The distinction of the three parts of philosophy (ethics, physics, and logic) is well known from Hellenistic philosophy, but can already be found in Aristotle, *Top.* 1.14, 105b19–29. On Alexander's take on the distinction and his account of the ethical matter in *Top.* 3.1–4, see introduction, pp. 25–6.
- 9 On the importance of this passage for the reconstruction of Alexander's views about Peripatetic logic see Castelli (2020: 8–9).
- 10 Investigation into musical theory belongs in the history of the Peripatetic school: Aristoxenus of Tarentum, whose *Elements of Harmony* is a crucial source for the reconstruction of ancient Greek musical theory, was a pupil of Aristotle. Other writings, such as a treatise *De audibilibus* and collections of problems on acoustic and harmonic theory (Ps.-Arist., *Probl.* XI and XIX), survive and have been variously ascribed to the activity of Aristotle's immediate successors (Theophrastus, Heraclides Ponticus, and Strato). A collection of texts in English translation with comments can be found in Barker (1990).
- 11 For an introduction to Greek meter in relation to musical practice see Battezzato (2009).

- 12 'Medical matter as its subject' translates *iatrikên hulên hupokeimenên* at 218,11.
- 13 Alexander's attention to the categorial framework of the *Topics* is an interesting feature of his commentary (specifically on the commentary on *Top.* 3 see Introduction, pp. 6–10). Cf. 275,23–276,5 and Alexander's comments on *Top.* 1.9 (in *Top.* 65,6–68,3), where he spells out how the four types of predicate (accident, *proprium*, genus, and definition) fall under the ten categories and explicitly stresses the relevance of the *Categories* for dialectic (65,14–17). Note that in the *Categories* Aristotle addresses the issue of whether a category admits of the more and the less for each category (*Cat.* 5, 3b33–4a9; 6, 6a19–25; 7, 6b20–7; 8, 10b26–11a14; 9, 11b1–7). The relation between *Categories* and *Topics* is a well-known issue which was already discussed in antiquity: for an overview and some discussion see Bodéüs (2002: XI–XLI; LXIV–LXXX); Menn (1995).
- 14 'Set up' translates *sunistasthai* at 218,14 (cf. 219,19; 235,4). The point seems to be that it is not possible to formulate a (meaningful) comparative problem in which the predicate indicates the substance of the compared objects. It is not clear whether Alexander also means to say that the compared objects are supposed to be substances. Cf. *Cat.* 5, 2b22–8 and 3b33–4a9: no species of substance is more of a substance than another species (e.g. the species human being is not more of a substance or more of an animal than the species horse) and no individual substance is more of a substance than another individual substance (Socrates is not more of a substance or more of a human being than Plato). In this sense, the category of substance does not admit of the more and the less. See, however, n. 19 about the possibility of comparative problems with respect to substance.
- 15 It is not clear whether Alexander means (a) that substances are not accidents of anything or (b) that the predicates expressing what something x is (independently of the category x belongs to) never belong to x as accidents. Lack of clarity on this point might relate to the coexistence (in Aristotle) of two ways of thinking about the categories: as answers to different questions about primary substances (e.g. What is it? What is it like? How much is it? Where is it? ...) or as answers to the same question (What is it?) about different types of entities (for the distinction, cf. Ackrill 1963: 78–81).
- 16 On the meaning and relevance of this remark see Introduction, pp. 9–10, 19.
- 17 'More unaffected' translates *apathesteron* at 218,27.
- 18 'Position' translates *keisthai* at 218,28.
- 19 For the distinction between primary and secondary substance see *Cat.* 5, 2a9–19; 2b29–3a6. For the comparison between secondary substances of different generality and between primary and secondary substance cf. *Cat.* 5, 2b7–28.
- 20 'In relation to' translates '*pros*' and indicates the terms of the comparison; 'with respect to' translates *kata* + accusative and indicates the accident with respect to which the terms of the comparison are compared.

- 21 The distinction is based on both the number of objects that are compared and the number of properties with respect to which they are compared. For the two criteria cf. Arist., *Top.* 2.10, 114b37–115a14. Alexander's emphasis on the possibility that one thing be compared to several taken together and, more generally, on the possibility of comparing groups of objects is likely motivated by the relevance of comparison between combinations of good, bad and indifferent things in problems concerning the choiceworthy. See e.g. the *topoi* in Arist., *Top.* 3.2, 117a16; 117a21; 117a23; 3.3, 118b10; 118b16.
- 22 I translate in this way the rather emphatic formulation of the question at 219,20–1: *ti dê pote*.
- 23 The subject is clearly Aristotle.
- 24 Note that, although Alexander finds a way to explain the fact that some comparative *topoi* are included in *Top.* 2, this remark can be filed together with the evidence about the concerns about the (lack of a clear) structure of the *Topics*. Such concerns were apparently already voiced by some of Aristotle's pupils (Theophrastus, for example, made an attempt at a different division and arrangement of the *topoi*: see Alex., in *Top.* 55,24–7). For further evidence and some discussion, see Hasnawi (2007) and Castelli (2013).
- 25 *Top.* 2.10, 114b25–115a24.
- 26 *Top.* 2.11, 115a29–33.
- 27 *Top.* 2.11, 115b3–10.
- 28 On this point cf. n. 2 and Introduction, pp. 6–19. Alexander's remark is interesting because it introduces a distinction between two types of argument which cannot be found (at least not explicitly) in Aristotle and because it testifies to Alexander's attempt at making sense of the admittedly confusing text he is commenting upon.
- 29 Namely about what is more choiceworthy. The point here seems to be that one reason to use the choiceworthy to illustrate the *topoi* for comparative problems is that more *topoi* can be used in arguments about the choiceworthy than in arguments about other properties. One example for this might be the *topoi* (116b22–36) based on the relations between means and ends, which may not find any room for application if one is trying to establish e.g. that a given planet is closer to Earth than another one, or whether a given musical mode is more acute than another, etc. (for further examples of comparative problems that are not about the choiceworthy cf. 217,19–219,3).
- 30 This is a reference to the generalisation of the *topoi* in *Top.* 3.5.
- 31 'Set next to each other [as equivalent]' translates *ek parallêlou* at 220,14. The meaning becomes clear in what follows. About the conceptual distinction Alexander is drawing here between being more choiceworthy and being better (or, respectively, between being choiceworthy and being good) and its theoretical background see Introduction, pp. 27–31.

32 '[Is] in': forms of the verb 'to be' (*einai*) can be omitted in Greek and this is the case in this passage. The construction *en* + dative is here used by Alexander to indicate the relation between a predicate and the domain over which it ranges.

It is hard to tell whether Alexander has in mind the distinction between 'being said of a subject' and 'being in a subject' from *Cat.* 2 in this context, where the latter indicates accidental predication. Note in any case that Alexander has already said that comparisons can only be drawn with reference to accidental properties since these are the only ones which can belong to their subjects to a different degree.

33 Wallies' punctuation at 220,17 suggests that he takes *kai phusikois kai logikois* to spell out *theôrêtikois*. I think it is more likely, however, that Alexander associates 'contemplative' problems only with the class of 'natural' problems, i.e. those which (on Alexander's reading of Aristotle's distinction of problems into ethical, natural and logical in *Top.* 1.14, 105b19–29) aim at truth and knowledge: see Alex., in *Top.* 95,26 and Introduction, p. 25. I punctuate the translation accordingly.

34 *Top.* 3.1, 116a3.

35 Alexander is referring to the distinction he introduced at 219,3–17.

36 220,24: *hoion* before *hotan* is added by Wallies. *hotan* introduces an example and this is probably the reason Wallies feels the need to add *hoion*, i.e. to make clear that what follows is not a general explanation but rather an example illustrating that we can compare one thing to itself with respect to time. I *de facto* translate Wallies' text, since something to the effect of 'e.g.' must be understood in any case. I am not sure, however, whether the addition in the Greek is necessary.

37 I take the three-fold distinction to be about (1) the domains to which the compared objects belong (picking up 'in the things that are choiceworthy' as opposed to 'in other things' at 220,20); (2) the things 'of' or 'about' which the comparison is, i.e. the objects that are compared to each other (the terms of the relation); and (3) the things 'with respect to which' the comparison is drawn, i.e. the accidents which belong in different degrees to one or more subjects.

38 I take it that the infinitive (*khresthai*) at 211,2 depends on the interrogative *pôs dei* at 220,29.

39 *Top.* 3.1, 116a6–7.

40 Alexander's insistence on Aristotle's focus (even when this is not so explicit in Aristotle) on what is 'worth the enquiry' might carry a polemical connotation against the activity of other philosophical schools who engaged in idle and pointless discussions (see Introduction, pp. 30–1). On this point, see also Alexander's comments on Aristotle's remarks in *Top.* 1.11, 105a3–9 that one should only investigate the problems about which puzzlement requires arguments rather than appeal to perception or punishment (Alex., in *Top.* 83,4–84,9).

41 *Top.* 3.1, 116a6–7.

- 42 Literally: ‘even if one had the resources to show the excess of wealth compared to happiness in some respect.’
- 43 I take the point to be that such arguments would not be persuasive, no matter how skilled their proponent is; cf. n. 51. About the persuasiveness (or plausibility) and reputability of dialectical arguments, cf. n. 251.
- 44 Literally: ‘the superiority, either one or many’.
- 45 Alexander is here paraphrasing Aristotle’s text (116a10–12), but it seems at least possible to take his statement as an indirect reply to the sceptic stance (cf. Introduction, pp. 30–1): dialectic is indeed, among other things, a capacity to come up with arguments in support of opposite claims – i.e. dialectic overlaps (at least up to a certain point) with the ‘sceptical capacity’ (cf. Sextus’s account of the sceptical *dunamis* in *PH.* 1.8). However, Aristotle says clearly that one can resort to dialectical competence in comparative arguments to give an assent to one of two opposite sides.
- 46 *Top.* 1.16.
- 47 *Top.* 1.17.
- 48 The language of ‘selection’ (*eklogê*) and ‘selecting’ (*eklegein*) occurs in *Arist., Top.* 1 (see e.g. 1.14, 105a34; 105b4 and b12), but not directly with reference to the two tools consisting in detecting differences and similarities in 1.16 and 17. Alexander’s point, however, is spelled out in the parenthesis: differences and similarities should be an object of enquiry precisely when they are not obvious, i.e. when things look quite similar or rather different respectively.
- 49 cf. *Top.* 1.16, 108a3–6.
- 50 Wallies prints ‘in things that are very different’ in quotation marks, perhaps thinking of *Top.* 1.17, 108a12–13. The phrase in Greek, however, is a recurrent one in Aristotle’s text (cf. e.g. *Top.* 1.18, 108b23–4, also with reference to the detection of similarities) and, while it certainly is used by Aristotle, it need not be a quotation.
- 51 cf. by way of contrast the lack of credibility or persuasiveness of the one who argues that wealth is more choiceworthy than happiness at 221,9–10; cf. n. 43.
- 52 Alternatively: ‘that something belongs [to something else]’. Literally: ‘the obtaining (*huparxin*) of something’ (or, alternatively, ‘the belonging of something [to something else]’). The same point is expressed through the verb (*huparkhein*) instead of the noun (*huparxin*) at 221,30.
- 53 Both genitives (‘of what exceeds’ and ‘of what is exceeded’) seem to depend on ‘excess’; if so, the first genitive must be taken as a subjective genitive, the second as an objective one.
- 54 See n. 31.
- 55 ‘Handle’ translates *metakheirizesthai* at 222,13.
- 56 The consideration of posthumous rewards and punishment in assessing what is good or choiceworthy for us is a common theme in ancient discussions, starting (at least) with Socrates’ assessment of justice as something that should be chosen both for its

own sake and for the sake of its consequences, including rewards and punishments after death in Plato, *Resp.* 10, 614A5–621D3. As is well known, one main point of Epicurean philosophy was that of setting people free from their fears and expectations of what might come after death. There was, however, some debate about the pleasure (i.e. for the Epicureans: the good) which the living might get e.g. from recalling their dead friends (for some discussion on this point and mourning for the Epicureans, see Warren 2004: 34–41). In the same spirit, one might wonder whether the thought of being remembered fondly after one's death might be regarded as a good for the living also by those who rejected posthumous goods and bads for the dead.

- 57 At 222,25 Wallies prints *toiouton d' he euexia: oute gar khôris* [...], which yields the translation: 'and good physical condition is of this sort: for it does not occur [...]' The manuscripts have: *toiouton gar he euexia oute khôris* [...]. Wallies' departure from the manuscripts at 222,25 does not seem necessary and I translate the text of the manuscripts.
- 58 I take 'what comes later' (*to husteron*) to indicate the state resulting from the addition. Cf. 'what comes first' (*to prôton*) in the immediately following sentence.
- 59 'Alternatively' (*ê*) is Wallies' addition. The addition is needed to make sense of the text.
- 60 'What is correctly done without previous deliberation' translates *tou aprobouleutôs katorthôthentos* at 223,5. When used transitively, the verb *katorthô* means 'to set upright', from which the more metaphorical usages ('to set right', 'to accomplish successfully') derive. When used intransitively, it means 'to succeed'. It is used by Aristotle (*EN* 2.6, 1106b31) in the sense of 'doing something correctly' as opposed to making mistakes (*amartanein*: *ibid.* 1106b28) and it is certainly possible that Alexander had this usage in mind. The related noun (*katorthôma*) becomes a technical term in the Stoic tradition to indicate the perfect appropriate action, i.e. the right action, in accordance with virtue, of the sage. See e.g. SVF 3: 494.
- 61 The dative here could either refer to 'other things' (i.e. any external factor which is not up to us) or to 'other people'. I have opted for the more generic translation which does not exclude the more specific interpretation.
- 62 'In prominence' translates *en huperokhêi* at 223,10–11, and 'intermediate' a little earlier translates *mesos* at 223,10. Literally *en huperokhêi* means 'in excess' or 'in superiority'. The context suggests that the alternative here, however, is between the life of the ordinary person and the life of someone who plays a prominent role on the political scene.
- 63 The quote is ascribed to the poet Phocylides (sixth century BC) by Aristotle in *Pol.* 4.11, 1295b34.
- 64 Eurip., *Iphig. Aul.* 16–19.
- 65 Other texts by Alexander testify to a debate concerning the possibility of moral change in connection with the issue of the existence of intermediate states between vice and virtue: see e.g. *Eth. Probl.* 3 and 30. In *EN* 3.5, 1114a12–21, Aristotle

- famously seems to suggest that the person who has developed vice as a settled disposition of character can never become good. Whether this is indeed Aristotle's view is a debated issue (for some discussion see e.g. Di Muzio 2000). Although we do not have Alexander's work on the *Categories*, *Cat.* 10, 13a22–31, where Aristotle does indeed describe a process of change from moral baseness to excellence, may have well played a role in shaping Alexander's views on this point and, perhaps, in forcing him to find a coherent reading for these passages. Perhaps an echo of some such debate can still be heard in the later commentaries to the *Categories*: see e.g. Simpl., in *Cat.* 401,24–403,23; Olymp., in *Cat.* 184,3–25.
- 66 'The second *topos* for showing the more choiceworthy' translates *deuteron topon tês tou hairêtôterou deixêôs* at 223,30.
- 67 Wallies adds *hairêtôteron* at 224,1 before *hairêtôteron* at 224,2. Haplography seems possible here and the addition must be understood in any case. I therefore translate Wallies' text.
- 68 For the list of authorities one can rely on in establishing what is more choiceworthy cf. the groups of people with reference to which classes of *endoxa* ('reputable claims') are distinguished in *Top.* 1.1, 100b21–3 and 1.10, 103b8–104a37.
- 69 cf. *Top.* 1.10, 104a14–15 and 104a33–7: the opinions of all arts and crafts can be used as dialectical premises.
- 70 *Top.* 3.1, 116a14–15.
- 71 *hôs ek parallêlou* at 224,14; cf. n. 31.
- 72 'Co-extensive' translates *ep'isês* at 224,14.
- 73 'Rational' translates *logikên* at 224,19. The distinction Alexander has in mind is the one between intellectual virtues (i.e. excellences of the rational part of the soul) and moral virtues (i.e. excellent dispositions towards emotions, pleasure and pain). The distinction is drawn by Aristotle in *EN* 1.9, 1102a23–1103a10.
- 74 'About assessment' translates *kritikê* at 224,22.
- 75 'About action' translates *praktikai* at 224,23.
- 76 'To honour above' translates *protiman* at 224,25; cf. 224,23.
- 77 Plato, *Leg.* 9, 875A. I am not sure whether through this quote right after the assessment of prudence Alexander is alluding to different arguments in support of the superiority of justice over intellectual virtue. One example of the assessment of the superiority of justice and what derives from it over wisdom based precisely on the claim that justice is what preserves the common bond of the human community can be found in Cic., *Fin.* 1, 153–161.
- 78 Thuc., *Hist.* II 60, with slight divergences from Thucydides text.
- 79 For a famous defence of the claim that suffering injustice is more choiceworthy than doing injustice see Plato, *Gorg.* 469A–479E.
- 80 Lycurgus (ninth century BC) was the almost legendary and austere legislator of Sparta; Zaleucus (seventh century BC), a Pythagorean philosopher, was the legislator

- of Locri; Solon (630–560 BC) introduced important reforms in the legislation of Athens. Solon was counted among the “Seven Sages” of the sixth century BC.
- 81 Particularism of action is a well-known aspect of Aristotle’s ethics, but an argument to the effect that a good king would be better than good laws since a king could assess the individual cases can also be found in Plato, *Polit.* 294A–300C.
- 82 Both common messes and rule of the excellent people feature prominently in Plato’s *Republic*. These and similar topics were discussed by exponents of the Peripatetic school after Theophrastus with an interest in political philosophy and education: see Baltussen (2016: 91–8).
- 83 The general point is clear enough, but the Greek text is problematic: at 225,17 I translate *autos hou* (‘<himself> . . . <where>’), which is Wallies’ conjecture in the apparatus, instead of *autou*, of which I cannot make any sense.
- 84 ‘Motives’ translates *prophaseis* at 225,17.
- 85 *Il.* XII, 243.
- 86 *Il.* II, 204–5. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 12.10, 1075b4.
- 87 *Top.* 3.1, 116a15.
- 88 The prepositions *ek* or *apo*, ‘from’, are often used to make concise labels for *topoi*. In this way the label indicates ‘from where’ one can make an attack. For some context, see Castelli (2020: 24–30, 32–3, 43 n. 62).
- 89 In this section Alexander alludes to the arguments identifying the final end (i.e. the highest good, which is choiceworthy on its own right) by looking at what every human being (or even every living being) strives for. This way of thinking is mentioned by Aristotle himself in *EN* 1.1, 1094a2–3. In the Stoic account of *oikeiôsis* (‘appropriation’ or ‘familiarisation’) every living being has an inborn tendency and capacity to preserve itself (see e.g. Long and Sedley 1987, section 59). Simplifying, self-preservation for the Stoics consists in the promotion of one’s own growth and constitution and not simply in the preservation of one’s mere existence. In fact, for the Stoics the only good worth striving for is virtue, certainly not mere life (or, as Alexander puts it in this argument: mere being). An argument based on self-preservation is probably what Alexander has in mind here, when he says that in this way one could argue that being is more choiceworthy than learning. The argument that Alexander is targeting, however, seems to take being in the sense of simple existence. Apparently the Peripatetics (including Alexander himself) had tried to develop an Aristotelian account of *oikeiôsis* in line with Aristotle’s doctrines: see Alex., *Mant.* 150,20–153,27. The Peripatetic version of the argument for self-preservation is criticized by Alexander *ibid.* 151,3–18. See also *Eth. Probl.* 1, against those (i.e. the Stoics) who denied that life is a good. For some discussion of Alexander’s views on this point, see Inwood (2014: 109 ff).
- 90 Plato, *Phil.* 20D.

- 91 The neuter implies that this is not only about human beings, but at least about animals and, perhaps, living beings more generally.
- 92 cf. Arist., *EN* 10.2, 1172b9 ff.
- 93 See n. 112.
- 94 ‘According to’ translates *kata* + accusative. I take the point to be that things falling within the domain of interest of a “better” branch of knowledge are more valuable than those falling within the domain of interest of an “inferior” branch of knowledge, where the domain of interest of a branch of knowledge is presumably determined by what that branch of knowledge is about (with reference to the conceptual framework of Aristotle’s theory of scientific knowledge, e.g. *An. Post.* 1.10, 76b10–16: the domain of interest of a branch of knowledge is determined by its subject genus).
- 95 ‘Branches of knowledge’ translates the plural *epistêmas* at 226,30. Given the examples that follow (philosophy and carpentry) this seems to be the best translation (alternative translations for the singular *epistêmê* would be ‘knowledge’, ‘science’, ‘scientific knowledge’).
- 96 ‘What [is] precisely’ translates *hoper*, which is the neuter relative pronoun *ho* followed by the emphatic suffix *-per*. This expression is often used in Aristotle’s writings and, especially, in the *Topics* to indicate the predication of the genus, which expresses the nature of the subject (see e.g. the use of *hoper* in *Top.* 4.2, 122b19; 122b26; 122b38; 4.4, 124a18; cf. *Metaph.* 7.4, 1030a2–7; *Phys.* 1.3, 186a32–b14). The idea behind this use seems to be that the genus is more appropriate to express what the subject is, while the other part of the definition (i.e. the difference) rather indicates some quality of the genus or of the subject (*Top.* 4.2, 122b15–17; 4.6, 128a23–9). For some discussion of Aristotle’s use of this expression see e.g. Clarke (2019:116–124), which also includes further references.
- 97 ‘Indicative’ translates *dêlôtikon* at 227,7.
- 98 I take the dative *autôi* at 227,7 to refer to Aristotle. If I understand this correctly, Alexander is making a point about Aristotle’s use of the expression *hoper*.
- 99 At 227,14 *hoper to genos* is added by Wallies. The addition should be understood in any case and it is not impossible that *hoper to genos* after *hupo to genos* dropped out through haplography or *saut du même au même*.
- 100 As opposed to the white thing. About the two ways in which *leukon* (‘the white’) can be taken in Greek to indicate the abstract property (whiteness) or the concrete particular (the white thing) cf. e.g. Arist., *Phys.* 1.3, 186a26–31.
- 101 On the use of ‘being in’ to indicate predication cf. Alex., in *Top.* 159,27–160,27. In the present passage Alexander distinguishes different ways of ‘being in’: one has to consider whether the subject is in the predicate with respect to which it is compared to something else ‘as in a genus’ rather than as an accident. Aristotle famously uses ‘being in’ to spell out universal predication (‘being in a whole’) in *An. Pr* 1.1, 24b26–7.

- 102 As is well known, in *EN* 1.6, 1096a11–1097a14 Aristotle presents various arguments against the existence of a Form of the Good. Some of these arguments undermine not just the claim that there be a separate Idea of the Good, but also the more basic claim that ‘good’ is a univocal predicate. One such argument (1.6, 1096a23–b3) is based on the assumptions that there are good things belonging to the different categories and that good things in the different categories are good in different ways. One further point Aristotle makes (1.6, 1096b8–26) is that it is difficult to define a unified class of things that are good in their own right. In *Cat.* 11, 14a23–5, however, Aristotle does seem to suggest that good and bad can be genera of some things.
- 103 Presumably what Alexander means is that the genitive *tou dikaïou* in Aristotle’s text at 116a24 (‘the just’) refers not to the disposition, but rather to a subject that happens to be just, i.e. the just man. The genitive in Aristotle’s text can be a neuter or a masculine. Adjectives in the neuter can be used as nouns for the abstract property (e.g. justice) or for the concrete thing that has that property (e.g. the just thing). Cf. n. 100 and ‘the white’ at 227,15 *versus* ‘the white thing’ at 228,2 both corresponding to *leukon* in Greek.
- 104 *Top.* 3.1, 116a25–6.
- 105 *Top.* 3.1, 116a27–8.
- 106 On ‘being in’ cf. n. 101.
- 107 At 228,29 Wallies adds *ê* and deletes *eiê de kai ta* of the manuscripts. I translate the text of the manuscripts. The translation of Wallies’ text would be: ‘[. . .] but not as in a genus <or> not as in a species [. . .].’
- 108 Alexander comments on the fact that the species is not a separate type of predicate in the *Topics*. His idea is that the species (*eidos*) is not listed among the types of predicate because, in the problems considered in the *Topics*, the species are rather the subject whose definition is under investigation. However, Alexander suggests that, if there are any problems in which the species appears as a predicate, then the species is a genus-like predicate in that it is predicated of several things in their what-it-is. The species differs from the genus in that the things of which it is predicated are not different in species. See Alex., in *Top.* 39,2–10; 48,7–19; 295,16–17.
- 109 About the distinction between good and choiceworthy cf. 220,14–20 and Introduction, pp. 28–9.
- 110 The tripartition of goods into (a) those that are choiceworthy for their own sake, (b) those that are choiceworthy for the sake of something else following upon them, and (c) those that are choiceworthy both for their own sake and for the sake of what follows upon them is well known. It is introduced for example by Glaucon in Plato, *Resp.* 2, 357B4–D2. The example of virtue to illustrate (c) is interesting in that it emphasizes the Peripatetic view according to which virtue is good on its own but does not coincide with happiness: whether virtue is only a necessary condition for

- happiness or whether it is also sufficient and, if so, whether external goods can make virtuous people happier was a well-known issue for the Peripatetic stance (see e.g. Cicero, *Fin.* 5, 76–96; Alex., *Mant.* 159,16–168,20). By way of contrast, the Stoics did not embrace the distinction given by Alexander as a partition of goods: they claimed that there is only one good, i.e. virtue, which coincides with happiness; among things which are indifferent, i.e. neither good nor bad, however, some, depending on the circumstances, are choiceworthy whereas others are to be avoided. About indifference and the identification of what is to be preferred, see e.g. texts in Long and Sedley (1987, section 58); about what is good and what is bad for the Stoics, see *ibid.* section 60.
- 111 About *dunameis* ('capacities') as a class of goods, see Introduction, p. 29 and nn. 122, 124.
- 112 Apparently the Peripatetics were known for their assessment of health as a good on its own (rather than as something indifferent, which can be used well or badly, or as something choiceworthy because of something else): Sextus, *Adv. Eth.* 77, ascribes to Aristotle the distinctive view that health is good, while the claim that virtue is good is distinctive of Zeno and the claim that pleasure is good is distinctive of Epicurus. As a quick overview of the choice of examples shows (see Greek-English Index, s.v. *hugieia*), health figures prominently among the examples Alexander uses to illustrate the *topoi* of the choiceworthy; perhaps this is more than a mere matter of chance.
- 113 The application of the *topos* to the case of friends is not straightforward. We would expect here that a friend is chosen because of himself or herself; what we find instead is that the friend is chosen because of ourselves. Alexander justifies this twist with reference to Aristotle's theory of friendship in *EN* 9.3, 1166a29–33: since the friend is another self, if our friend is chosen because of himself or herself, they are actually chosen because of ourselves.
- 114 Sleep has an *anaphora* to wakefulness, i.e. sleep is for the sake of wakefulness: animals sleep in order to be able to be awake. About the relation between sleep and wakefulness cf. Arist., *PN* 453b24–455b28. About *anaphora* ('leading back'), see n. 7.
- 115 *Top.* 3.1, 116a31–5.
- 116 'Circumstance' here and elsewhere translates *peristasis*.
- 117 In this context, 'prefer' seems a better translation than 'choose', which I have otherwise used consistently as a translation for *hairein*.
- 118 *Top.* 3.1, 116a35–9.
- 119 *ton tropon tês ekphoras* at 230,15–16. Cf. Alex., in *Top.* 37,17; 40,18; 41,11–14; 62,28; 68,24; 69,9; 125,16.
- 120 This last section of the discussion of the two *topoi* reports exclusively Alexander's considerations about the possible distinctions between the two *topoi*. The distinctions that Alexander draws are certainly informed by debates about different classes of goods and the grounds on which things are or are not choiceworthy: cf. Introduction, pp. 27–31 and n. 110.

- 121 I translate Wallies' text, which adds *ê* at 230,19. The text of the manuscripts would yield the translation: 'it is possible to find in them more [difference] based on the mode of the formulation.' Alexander's point seems to be that in other cases the differences will not merely concern the mode of the formulation.
- 122 What is choiceworthy because of itself is also choiceworthy for someone in its own right, but not the other way round. Choiceworthy in their own right are all things falling under the division of the choiceworthy (Introduction, p. 29): what is fine, what is pleasant and what is useful or advantageous. What is choiceworthy as useful is not choiceworthy because of itself since it is useful as a means to an end. However, as Alexander will illustrate in the following lines, as long as what is useful is used as a means to the end for which it is designed (e.g. in the case of a tool) or with reference to which it is defined (e.g. in the case of a natural capacity), the connection between means and end is not incidental. Something *y* is choiceworthy incidentally for *x* if there is something *z* which is choiceworthy in its own right for *x* and *y* is incidentally the same as *z*. In the example given by Alexander: warm clothes are choiceworthy in their own right for the one who is freezing; warm clothes are e.g. red; so, red clothes are incidentally choiceworthy for the one who is freezing. About the possibility that 'good' and 'choiceworthy' be predicated in the essence of something rather than incidentally, cf. *Top.* 3.1, 116a23. See also n. 124 and Alexander's discussion of the next *topos* about incidental causes of good things.
- 123 Alexander does not think that 'good' and 'choiceworthy' are equivalent (see Introduction pp. 27–31 and n.31), but the illustrations of the *topoi* switch back and forth between the two.
- 124 In the division of goods that Alexander has in mind (see Introduction p. 29), useful things are good in their own right, presumably because their nature is determined with reference to their function which, in turn, is defined with reference to the end or outcome for the sake of which they can be used (cf. Introduction, p. 29, and n. 122, about capacities as a type of goods). The idea here is that it is no incidental feature of them that they can be used as tools for reaching a certain end: they are meant as tools for an end all along. For example, a hammer or a saw are built with an eye to the function they are supposed to perform as tools of a carpenter. They are, however, not choiceworthy because of themselves since, as tools, they are meant as means for a certain end (e.g. for building a table or a ship).
- 125 About incidental causes cf. Arist., *Phys.* 2.3, 195a32–b3.
- 126 On the label 'from the causes' cf. n. 88.
- 127 'Would lead on to' translates *proagoi* at 231,23.
- 128 'The things that are rightly done' translates *katorthômatôn* at 231,25. See Introduction, pp. 24–33 and n. 60, for the philosophical background of the examples discussed by Alexander.

- 129 Alexander presumably refers to Aristotle's account of luck in *Phys.* 2.5, 197a5 ff., cf. *Metaph.* 11.8, 1065a30–2. Apart from Aristotle himself, however, the nature and causality of luck were prominent topics of investigation in the Peripatetic tradition: we know that Theophrastus devoted quite a bit of work to the analysis of luck and, among the writings ascribed to Alexander himself, one essay of *Mantissa* (Bruns 176,2–179,23) is entirely devoted to it.
- 130 *prosgumnazesthai* at 232,1–2 is a conjecture by Wallies based on the text that follows. In addition to 'entering into a contest' with someone (where the person with whom one enters into a contest is indicated by the dative case: see LSJ, s.v. 2), the first meaning of the verb is 'to exercise at' some particular thing (where the particular exercise is picked by the dative: see LSJ, s.v.). Both interpretations could make sense. On the second reading, Alexander's point would be that, doing physical exercise is more choiceworthy than doing a specific exercise because the former is productive of health in its own right, while engaging in a specific type of physical activity is productive of health only incidentally.
- 131 For the example cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 5.2, 1013b12–16; *Phys.* 2.3, 195a12–14.
- 132 At 232,14–15 I translate the text of the manuscripts, since Wallies' additions (*ha* at 232,14 and *pasin* at 232,15) do not seem necessary.
- 133 Plato, *Resp.* 6, 496B6–C3.
- 134 *Top.* 3.1, 116a31–5. Cf. Arist., *Top.* 2.11, 115b29–35 about what is said without qualification. See also Alexander's discussion of the next *topos* about the relation between what is without qualification and what is by nature. On the construction of the label, which picks out the distinctive formulation of the *topos* through the nominal construction with 'from', cf. n. 88 and n. 126.
- 135 About Alexander's claims about *topoi* or propositions being potentially the same as some other *topoi* or propositions and, more generally, about relations of 'potential' inclusion and 'potential' sameness obtaining between propositions see Introduction, pp. 20–1.
- 136 'Acquired' translates *epiktêta* at 233,4.
- 137 'In conception' translates *epibolêi* at 233,5. Earlier (230,15–20) Alexander distinguishes two *topoi* with reference to the 'mode of their formulation'. I suggest that the distinction Alexander envisages here is different and does not refer to mere differences in the formulation, but rather to a conceptual difference (it is not clear to me how this might relate to the use of *epibolê* in Epicurus, *Hrdt.* 50, 5–6; D.L. X 31, 35). The conceptual difference is the following: in spelling out what is choiceworthy without qualification, Alexander did refer to nature by saying that what is choiceworthy without qualification is choiceworthy for all those who are in their natural condition – but this account does not identify the source of the choiceworthiness of *x* in *x*'s nature. The latter point is rather what is made in the present *topos*. Things that are choiceworthy 'not by nature' are here identified with

- those that are choiceworthy based on use and convention; as such, they will turn out to be choiceworthy only for someone – and, in the former *topos*, what is choiceworthy for someone is opposed to what is choiceworthy without qualification. About what is good (or bad) by nature, cf. Introduction, pp. 26–7.
- 138 ‘Established by use’ translates *nenomismenôn*. The contrast is between what is adopted conventionally and what is by nature.
- 139 *Top.* 3.1, 116b11: the genitive *tou dikaïou* could be neuter or – as Alexander suggests here – masculine. On this interpretation, the contrast would not be between justice and what is just for some people, but rather between justice and the just person, who is just not by nature but by having acquired a certain moral disposition through habit.
- 140 Both Ross and Brunschwig print a different text from the one printed in the lemma of Wallies’ edition: Wallies’ edition at 116b12 has *to tõi beltïoni kai timiôtêrõi hairêtôteron* (which is what I have translated), whereas Ross and Brunschwig have *to tõi beltïoni kai timiôtêrõi huparkhon hairêtôteron*, which yields the translation ‘what belongs to the one who is better and more honourable is more choiceworthy.’ According to Wallies’ apparatus, *huparkhon* is added after *beltïoni* in the lemma in manuscripts a and B. From Alexander’s commentary on the passage, it is hard to tell with certainty what text he was reading, but since no paraphrase or example in the course of the commentary is expressed in terms of *huparkhein* it seems at least possible that the text printed in the lemma of Wallies’ edition corresponds to the text that Alexander had.
- 141 I take it that Alexander’s point here is what he spells out in full later, at 234,25–235,2, i.e. the way in which the present *topos* differs from the one in *Top.* 3.1, 116a14–15.
- 142 ‘Being well affected’ translates *eu paskhein* at 234,18. The emphasis is on passivity and affectability, which do not belong to the gods.
- 143 At 234,21 Wallies inserts *ei ge* before *kai holôs*. Wallies’ text yields the translation: ‘[. . .] then being wise and the virtues are more choiceworthy, <if indeed> also, in general, the things [. . .].’ The text of *Mant.* 166,10, to which Wallies refers in the apparatus in support of the insertion, is indeed *ei ge kai holôs*, which shows that the phrase recurs elsewhere, but it is not clear to me why the same phrase should be added here.
- 144 *Top.* 3.1, 116a14–15.
- 145 ‘Sets up’ translates *sunhïstanta* at 235,4. Cf. 218,14; 219,19 and see n. 14.
- 146 *idion*, which I have translated here as ‘specific’, also indicates the type of predicate (the *proprium*) which does not express the what-it-is of the subject and can be ‘predicated instead’ of (i.e. is co-extensive with) the subject. See p. 3.
- 147 ‘From what is specific’ translates *apo tou idiou* at 235,7.
- 148 For the distinction between what is good (or better) and what is choiceworthy (or more choiceworthy) see Introduction, pp. 28–9.

- 149 At 235,11 I translate *dio* of the manuscripts and depart from Wallies, who prints *ei* at 235,11 and (possibly linked to this change) deletes *kai* at 235,13. The reading of the manuscripts, however, requires taking the remark at 235,10–11 about the alternative reading as parenthetical. I have inserted the parenthesis accordingly.
- 150 There is no explicit subject in Greek; I take the subject to be Aristotle as at 235,7 ff. and later at 235,29. Alternatively, one could take the subject here to be the *topos*.
- 151 ‘Of the same kind’ translates *homogenesi* at 235,28. I prefer to translate in this way because it is not clear to me that Alexander wants to make a point about things that are in the same genus rather than, more generally, about things that have some features in common. The more technical translation ‘of the same genus’ would be an alternative.
- 152 *Top.* 3.1, 116b15–16.
- 153 It is not completely clear whether Alexander is using ‘being in’ in any specific and coherent way here. Some of the ensuing examples may suggest that the relation of being-in is one obtaining between a property or an activity and its subject. The latter can be understood either as the material substrate in which the property inheres (health is in the body) or as the material condition underpinning a certain disposition (e.g. the commensurability of certain parts of the body) or as the subject of a certain activity (e.g. knowledge is in the soul). The last example, however, about contemplation’s being more choiceworthy than action ‘because it is an actuality about the more honourable things’ may suggest a broader understanding – something like the relation between a cognitive activity and the domain of its objects. For a similar use of ‘being in’ cf. n. 32 (about what is better in the domains of contemplative and logical investigations). See also n. 155.
- 154 Here I supply ‘is better’ instead of ‘is more choiceworthy’ (which would also be possible) because the immediately preceding formulation of the *topos* suggests that the predicate of the conclusion (i.e. what is shown) is *beltion*, i.e. ‘better’ (than something else).
- 155 I am grateful to an anonymous reader for comments on this difficult passage. The reader suggests taking *tôi einai* as locative dative, which, if I understand the comments correctly, would yield the translation: ‘it could be shown that contemplation arises in being through itself actuality related to more honourable things.’ I agree with the reader that some reference to the “location” of contemplation must be alluded to here, since the *topos* is based on the idea that one can compare things with reference to what they are ‘in’. However, I prefer to take *tôi einai* as introducing the infinitive clause indicating the claim which is instrumental to showing that contemplation is better or more choiceworthy than action and I take the locative aspect of the argument to be captured by the expressions *peri* + accusative (‘about more honourable things,’ ‘about things that can be done and are up to us,’ ‘about the divine things’), indicating the domain of an activity. See also n. 153.

- 156 'Is almost included' translates *skhedon emperiekhetai* at 237,2. On the terminology used to describe the relations obtaining among *topoi* cf. Introduction, pp. 20–1.
- 157 *Top.* 3.1, 116a29.
- 158 The activity of a disposition or a capacity is the end of the possession of that disposition. Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 9.8, 1050a4–b6.
- 159 About the *anaphora* to an end cf. n. 7 and n. 114.
- 160 The example suggests that cutting one's hair was regarded as a matter of personal hygiene and, in this sense, contributing to one's health and good physical condition. Apparently cutting the hair was a topic for debate among the Stoics: e.g. Musonius Rufus (first century CE) wrote a short treatise *On Cutting the Hair*. A recent English translation is available in Lutz and Reydams-Schils (2020, chapter 21).
- 161 Alexander's point is that, of two means to an end, the one which is closer to the end can be regarded as an intermediate end for the means which is further removed from the end.
- 162 The *anaphora* Alexander has in mind is the one of all other ends to happiness in *EN* 1.1 (cf. Introduction p. 28).
- 163 On the language used to describe the relations obtaining among *topoi* see Introduction, pp. 20–1.
- 164 For the distinction cf. 232,14–28.
- 165 cf. Aristotle's characterisation of the domain of deliberation and choice in *EN* 3.3, 1112b24–1113a7.
- 166 'In a similar way': this refers to the way in which the means relate to their respective ends. If one considers two productive things that are either equally proximate or equally remote from their ends, the *topos* is sound.
- 167 cf. n. 6.
- 168 The objection to the general validity of the *topos* is Alexander's. One might wonder whether such remarks only serve an exegetical purpose or might also be taken as hints that Alexander was sensitive to the possibility of applying the *topoi* for the sake of deliberation. On this point see Introduction, pp. 31–3.
- 169 The formulation is quite convoluted, but the basic idea is clear (cf. Brunschwig 1967: 156). The analogical nature of the *topos* is made evident by the introduction of two pairs of terms (an *analogia* in Aristotle is always a proportion:  $a:b = c:d$ ). Let us call E1 and E2 the two ends entering the comparison, and P1 and P2 the corresponding productive things (i.e. the two means that bring about E1 and E2 respectively). The basic tenet is that P1 and P2 stand to each other as E1 and E2 stand to each other:  $E1:E2 = P1:P2$ . The *topos* exploits this proportion to compare one productive thing with the end of another productive thing. Let us write  $a > b$  for 'a exceeds b'. In the *topos* different amounts of excess are compared; let us write  $(a > b) \gg (c > d)$  for 'a exceeds b more than c exceeds d'. The *topos* says that if  $(E1 > E2) \gg (E2 > P2)$ , then  $(P1 > P2) \gg (E2 > P2)$ . It follows then that  $P1 > E2$ .

- 170 ‘These things being laid down’ translates *keimenôn toutôn* at 241,7. It is not clear whether ‘these things’ refer to everything Alexander has said so far or only to some part of it (e.g. the *topos*), but cf. Introduction pp. 13–19 on ‘laying down’ general propositions and carrying out a deduction about specific terms. Cf. nn. 323, 363, 369.
- 171 Following the notation introduced in n. 169: happiness : health = practical wisdom : physical exercise. If (happiness > health) >> (health > physical exercise), then (practical wisdom > health). Similarly for the other cases.
- 172 ‘Rather common’ translates *koinoteron* at 242,3. As Alexander will spell out presently, he takes Aristotle to be using these words in a less technical way than he does elsewhere. More specifically, Alexander notices that in the illustration of this *topos* Aristotle makes room for the idea that capacities (elsewhere classified as a separate class of goods: see Introduction, p. 29) are good in the sense that they are fine or praiseworthy or honourable.
- 173 This text (Alex., in *Top.* 242,1–9) is included in the collections of fragments of Aristotle’s lost works: fr. 113 in Rose (1886); Ross (1963: 101), *Dihaireseis* 1.
- 174 ‘Those that have more the character of principles’ translates *ta arkhikôtera* at 242,5.
- 175 On this partition of goods, its relevance in the commentary on *Top.* 3 and its role in Alexander’s ethical writings see Introduction, pp. 27–31.
- 176 ‘Are chosen by being led back to something else’, literally: ‘the leading-back of their choice is to something else’ ( *eph’hereron hê anaphora tês haireseôs autôn*: 242,15–16).
- 177 *Top.* 3.1, 116a31.
- 178 *ibid.* 116a29.
- 179 This remark is quite interesting from the methodological point of view since it explicitly refers to a work of analysis and assessment (*krinein*: 242,23) of the *topoi* given by Aristotle. It is fairly clear from this and similar remarks through the commentary that at least part of this work consisted in establishing whether and to what extent the *topoi* given by Aristotle are different from each other or are ‘potentially’ the same as each other. On the relations between *topoi* cf. Introduction, pp. 12–21.
- 180 *Top.* 3.1, 116b10.
- 181 *ibid.* 117a1–2.
- 182 The discussion about wealth as a good in its own right addresses the Stoic views that wealth is neither good nor bad. For the view that things that are neither good nor bad are put to good or bad use by the agent who has or uses them see e.g. Seneca, *Ep.* 82.11–12 and 87.16–17. I am grateful to an anonymous reader for comments on this point.
- 183 As Alexander will spell out, the ‘consequents’ (*parëpomena*, or simply *hepomena*) of *x* include both the necessary conditions or, generally, preconditions for *x* and the

consequences of *x*. For example, both ignorance and knowledge are consequents of learning: ignorance is a consequent prior in time, knowledge a consequent posterior in time to learning.

- 184 *dusphôraton* ('hard to detect') at 243,15 is Wallies' conjecture. The manuscripts aABP have *dusphorôtaton* ('very hard to move' or 'very hard to bear'), whereas D has *dusphôrotaton* with *ôro in rasura*, presumably as a correction on the reading transmitted by the other manuscripts. Wallies' conjecture makes good sense and seems paleographically possible.
- 185 Literally: 'provided that other things are similar for them.'
- 186 Wallies signals a lacuna at 243,23. I translate the words supplied by Wallies in the apparatus.
- 187 Wallies signals a lacuna at 243,24. I translate the words supplied by Wallies in the apparatus.
- 188 'Direct observations' translates *historia* at 244,10. The word is used to indicate, among other things, inquiry, systematic observation, or the knowledge deriving therefrom: a body of recorded cases or a narrative of one's observation. Certainly, travelling was (also for Aristotle and his followers) a way to gather information and data about e.g. animal species, plants, constitutions of cities. But perhaps a more general meaning of direct observation of places (possibly for touristic purposes) should not be excluded here. About travelling and its cultural relevance in ancient Greece see Montiglio (2005).
- 189 See n. 183.
- 190 'Since the consequence (*akolouthia*) is in a hypothesis (*hupothesis*):' this presumably means that what counts as a 'consequent' is what appears as the consequent in a conditional proposition.
- 191 'What is submitted': i.e. the submitted claim at the beginning of the exchange.
- 192 'Fond of contemplation' translates *philothêôros* at 245,18 and 19.
- 193 I take it that *de* at 245,28 ('on the other hand') picks up *men* at 245,13: after the illustration of how one can resort to implications about what is posterior to the compared items (the consequences, in our ordinary sense of 'consequence'), Alexander now turns to illustrating how one can resort to implications about what is prior to the compared items.
- 194 As Alexander will spell out in the next line, the point is that the *topos* is true (with some qualification concerning the relation between means and end) with reference to classes of good such that one is included in the other, whereas the quantitative assessment in terms of amount of goods is not necessarily telling with respect to classes of goods that are disjoint.
- 195 I supply 'does not seem to be true' rather than 'is not true' in line with the immediately preceding remark about the truth of the *topos* ('this seems to be more true'). One further consideration in favour of the weaker translation is that here Alexander is voicing his own assessment of the *topos* given by Aristotle, for which

- he often resorts to a humble tone. The simpler ‘is not true,’ however, certainly remains an alternative.
- 196 EN 1.6, 1097b16–17.
- 197 Alexander’s idea seems to be that goods can be ‘counted’ with each other as long as they do not relate to each other in such a way that (a) one is a means to the other or (b) one is a part of the other.
- 198 Alexander discusses the objection at 246,28–247,12.
- 199 The vocabulary of indifferents (*adiaphora*) is Stoic (see e.g. the texts in Long and Sedley 1987, section 58). The list of examples in the parenthesis is supposed to pick out things such that it does not make any difference whether one has them or not. Note that for the Stoics the domain of indifferents does not simply include things (like those in these examples) which will not make much of a difference to most people: anything other than virtue (which is good) and vice (which is bad) is indifferent. The examples in the parenthesis may well pick things which were regarded as indifferent (i.e. neither good nor bad) also by the Peripatetics, who admitted different classes of goods (see Introduction, pp. 27–31).
- 200 This is an objection to the *topos* in *Top.* 3.2, 117a16–18.
- 201 Several of the *Ethica Problemata* ascribed to Alexander discuss the issue of whether and how pleasure is good: see e.g. *Eth. Probl.* 5, 7, 16, 17, 23, 26. The Greek formulation with the subjunctive here suggests that Alexander is noncommittal as to whether pleasure is a good. About pleasure in the Peripatetic tradition see also n. 300.
- 202 This was the *topos* in *Top.* 3.2, 117a16–21.
- 203 Alexander seems to take the commentary (also) as an opportunity to make a point about Aristotle’s claims (in the passage under investigation) on doctrinal points which are relevant to the more general controversies among the different philosophical schools. Cf. n. 201.
- 204 ‘Time’ (here and in the next *topos*) translates *kairos*, which indicates the critical time or season or period or opportunity for something (cf. LSJ s.v. III).
- 205 ‘Is more effective’ translates *pleion dunatai* at 248,11 (literally: ‘can [do] more’).
- 206 ‘Test’ translates *exetasis* at 248,24.
- 207 Wallies deletes *tês iskhuos* at 248,23–4, but cf. 248,19 and 248,27 about the greater strength of painlessness in old age and of temperance in young age; the point here seems to be that one can better appreciate the strength of practical wisdom in the circumstances and tasks that people have to face when they are more advanced in age.
- 208 ‘Appropriate’ translates *prosêkon* at 248,26.
- 209 Literally: ‘the usefulness of justice and temperance’. This *topos*, like the previous one and the next one, emphasizes the *khreia* (‘usefulness’) of different things. About being useful and being good cf. the class of useful things in the division of the choiceworthy and in the division of the good: Introduction, pp. 28–9.

- 210 Aristotle argues that moral virtues entail each other (and prudence) in *EN* 6.13, 1144b1–1145a6. In the same context he argues that one should distinguish between ‘natural’ virtues (i.e. the natural inclination to act e.g. courageously or justly), which do not require the rational capacity to deliberate, from moral virtues strictly speaking, which require a certain disposition of the rational capacity to deliberate. Unlike moral virtues strictly speaking, natural virtues can be present independently from each other: e.g. one can have a natural inclination to act bravely without having a natural sense of justice. Cf. also Alex., *Mant.* 153,29–156,27.
- 211 Alexander’s point seems to be that, even if moral virtues as settled dispositions of the soul cannot obtain the one without the other, it is still possible to distinguish e.g. an act of justice from an act of courage and it is still possible to draw a distinction based on the domain of competence, so to speak, of each virtue (e.g. justice is useful in distributions; courage is useful at war; temperance is useful in dealing with bodily pleasures etc.).
- 212 ‘Perfect’ virtues are opposed to natural virtues: cf. n. 210.
- 213 *Top.* 2.9, 114b16–24.
- 214 ‘Transfers’: Alexander often uses the verb *metapherein* (literally: ‘to carry across’ from one side to another, often with *epi* + accusative or with *pros* + accusative) to indicate the modification of a *topos* previously given to fit a different type of argument or to obtain a formulation of the *topos* of different generality. In the present case, the modification is from a *topos* for non-comparative problems to a *topos* for comparative problems. At 278,17 and 23 the modification is from a more specific to a more general formulation. At 280,6 and 281,14 the modification is from a *topos* for universal problems to a *topos* for particular problems. Cf. also 278,3 (*metatithêtai*, ‘modifies’, literally: ‘to transpose’).
- 215 For the expression *ek parallêlou* (‘next to each other’ [as equivalent]) at 250,15 cf. n.31.
- 216 About changes from the possession to the privation of a feature as irreversible (as opposed to reversible changes between contraries), cf. *Cat.* 10, 13a31–6.
- 217 Wallies deletes *kai* at 250,21, but I am not sure why this would be necessary. I translate the text with *kai*.
- 218 ‘Through corruption’: i.e. through the corruption of the substance in which they inhere.
- 219 The point of this qualification is spelled out by the immediately following examples: disease (which is the contrary of health) is to be avoided more than bad physical condition (which is the contrary of good physical condition). However, it is not the case that health is more choiceworthy than good physical condition, because good physical condition includes health.
- 220 *Top.* 3.1, 117b7–8.
- 221 At 251,26 I translate *opheilon* in the manuscripts (‘as an obliging [man]’); Wallies prints *kai opheilontôs* (‘and obligingly’). The intervention creates a symmetry in the

- construction of the two terms one of which ('living modestly and obligingly') is more choiceworthy than the other ('[living] arrogantly and shamelessly') but does not seem to be necessary.
- 222 At 251,29–30 Wallies adds 'than enjoying knowing less than its appearance'. The complement must be understood, but there do not seem to be compelling reasons for thinking that the whole phrase dropped out of the text.
- 223 At 252,2–3 I *de facto* translate Wallies' addition to the text, which must be understood in any case, although it is not clear to me that the intervention on the Greek text is justified.
- 224 This is presumably a remark on the fact that in *Top.* 3.1, 117b8–9 Aristotle only mentions how acquisitions and generations are supposed to be used in arguments about what is more choiceworthy and not about what is more to be avoided. This sounds as a claim of originality on Alexander's side, who is fully spelling out aspects in the application of the *topos* which Aristotle himself did not spell out. Throughout the commentary on *Top.* 3 Alexander goes out of his way to explain how the *topoi* should be used. One might wonder whether his interest here, in addition to being exegetical, concerns not only the possibility of using these arguments in debates, but also as tools for deliberation. Cf. Introduction, pp. 24–30.
- 225 *Top.* 3.1, 116b23.
- 226 *ibid.* 116a23.
- 227 This is Alexander's alternative explanation of Aristotle's text at 116a23.
- 228 At 252,27 I translate the text of the manuscripts (*duo*) instead of Wallies' *dokei*. The translation of the text printed by Wallies is: 'the examples for it seem to be that justice [. . .]'. Since Alexander keeps insisting on the possibility of distinguishing two interpretations of the genitive *dikaïou* at 117b12 (cf. n. 229), it seems likely that his point here is that there are indeed two examples that one could use to illustrate the *topos*.
- 229 Alexander has explicitly spelled out the two possible interpretations of Aristotle's text (*dikaïou* at 117b12), i.e. that justice is closer to the good than the just man or that justice is closer to the good than the just thing, at 252,16–23.
- 230 'If one divided up the *topos*', i.e. if one took Aristotle's text to give two *topoi*, as in 252,10–23.
- 231 *Top.* 3.2, 117b12–19.
- 232 *ibid.* 117b14.
- 233 *ibid.* 117b16–17.
- 234 Alexander's point is that Aristotle's example should be understood as a comparison of degrees of similarity despite the fact that Aristotle formulation at 117b16–17 is not in comparative form. In the immediately following remark, however, Alexander spells out an alternative interpretation of the same lines.

- 235 *Top.* 3.2, 117b21–5.
- 236 At 254,26 Wallies signals a lacuna. I translate the text he supplies in the apparatus.
- 237 Aristotle describes magnanimity (or: greatness of soul) as an ‘ornament’ (*kosmos*) of virtues, which makes other virtues greater and does not come about without the others (*EN* 4.3, 1124a1–5).
- 238 *Top.* 3.2, 117b28–30.
- 239 Hes., *Op.* 289.
- 240 Arist., *Top.* 3.2, 117b30.
- 241 *ibid.* 117b30–1.
- 242 *tois kakois* in Aristotle’s text at 117b30–1 could be neuter (‘bad things’) or masculine (‘bad people’). Brunschwig (1967) in his translation opts for the second reading (p. 68: ‘gens sans valeur’), whereas Alexander’s examples show quite clearly that he opts for the neuter and takes the *topos* to be, in general, about things (and not just about people) that are unmixed with something bad.
- 243 Presumably in *Top.* 3.2, 117b34.
- 244 *Top.* 3.2, 117b36–9.
- 245 Both this and the following example are not about individual men and women (or individual human beings and horses), but about universals. Alexander has specified earlier (256,12–13) the universals as a *genos* and, at 256,4–6, he has spoken of a *genos* or an *eidos*. Both the general context of the *Topics* and most examples suggest that Alexander is thinking of a technical or semi-technical distinction between genus and species, but, as is well known, *genos* and *eidos* need not indicate the technical distinction between genus and species but may indicate a universal of unspecified generality (in this more general acception, both *eidos* and *genos* can be translated with ‘kind’). In any case, Man and Woman are neither genera nor species (cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 10.9, 1058a29–b25, and Alex., *Mant.* 168,22–169,32 on the status of the distinction between male and female).
- 246 I translate Wallies’ text, which adds *to* before *proskeimenon* at 256,26.
- 247 *Top.* 3.2, 117a21–4.
- 248 The walk is intermediate in the sense that in itself it is neither good nor bad. Cf. n. 199.
- 249 cf. *Top.* 3.2, 118a2–5.
- 250 In this context ‘giving the impression’ seems what is meant by *dokein* at 257,12 and 14.
- 251 With this remark Alexander seems to be reminding his audience that the *Topics* is a treatise about dialectical arguments (‘attacks’ in Alexander’s standard vocabulary), whose main feature is that their premises are *endoxa* (cf. Arist., *Top.* 1.1, 100a29–b23). In his commentary (*in Top.* 3,25–5,16) Alexander also spells out the claim in Arist., *Rhet.* 1.1, 1354a1, that rhetoric is a ‘counterpart’ (*antistrophos*) of dialectic by specifying that they are both about ‘persuasive’ (or ‘plausible’) things (*pithana*), which are persuasive (or plausible) by being *endoxa* (3,26–7).

- 252 About showing off as opposed to engaging in genuine critical enquiry cf. Alex., *Mixt.* 215,29–32; *De fato*, 175,5–8.
- 253 cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 5.5, 1014b20–2.
- 254 *Top.* 3.2, 118a12–13.
- 255 cf. the *topos* in *Top.* 3.1, 116b26.
- 256 cf. Plato, *Resp.* 3, 407A.
- 257 ‘Roughly speaking’: *skhedon* in Arist., *Top.* 3.2, 118a13.
- 258 The comment in the parenthesis refers to Aristotle’s formulation at 118a13–15, where Aristotle says that ‘roughly speaking [...] what is necessary is more choiceworthy, whereas what is superfluous is better.’
- 259 I translate the *kai* at 259,4, which is deleted by Wallies for reasons that are not clear to me.
- 260 At 259,8 *kata spoudên* is difficult. The example should illustrate the point that what we can obtain through ourselves and out of our own efforts is better than what we can obtain through others. LSJ (*s.v.* II.2) mentions a use of the word in the sense of ‘support’ in political life. Connected to this use, the plural can indicate ‘party feelings’ or ‘party attachment’. I therefore suggest that the point here is that a deserved victory that one obtains through her own merit is better than a victory obtained because of the favours of the judges or of the public. I am grateful to Katerina Ierodiakonou for feedback on this point.
- 261 *Top.* 3.2, 118a17.
- 262 *ibid.* 118a16.
- 263 About capacities as goods, see Introduction p. 29 and nn. 122 and 124.
- 264 ‘So that [...]’ translates the construction *hyper* + genitive (literally: ‘for the purpose of making it seem that we have the other one’) at 260,10; similarly at 260,17.
- 265 In this context ‘to prefer’ seems a better translation for *hairein* than ‘to choose’, which I have adopted systematically in the rest of the translation.
- 266 *Top.* 3.2, 118a25–6.
- 267 cf. Arist., *Top.* 3.3, 118a28.
- 268 The masculine plural accusative *agathous* at 262,15 makes it clear that Alexander is talking about people.
- 269 At 262,19 Wallies signals a lacuna in the text. I translate the text suggested by Wallies in the apparatus, but the text remains intelligible even without the addition.
- 270 At 262,21 *thermoteron* is Wallies’ addition.
- 271 Snow is formed when the clouds, which contain much warmth, freeze due to a predominance of coldness in the air around the clouds (Arist., *Meteor.* 1.11, 347b12–28). In this sense, snow is both cold and warm. The way in which the simple qualities of the elements (warmth, coldness, moisture and dryness) are combined in material compounds was certainly a debated topic in the Peripatetic tradition. See, e.g., Alex., *Quaest.* 1.6.

- 272 It is difficult to find a single English translation for the Greek *ergon* that applies to all cases considered in the text. In its basic usage, *ergon* indicates the object of an action (a work or a task), but in Aristotle's philosophy the word is used to indicate more specifically the result or outcome of an activity which may or may not be different from the very exercise of the activity itself (see e.g. *Metaph.* 9.8, 1050a21–b1, where the *ergon* is described as the 'end', *telos*, of an 'activity', *energeia*). For example, in a productive activity such as housebuilding the *ergon* is the product of the activity, i.e. the house. In the case of an action, instead, the *ergon* is rather the deed. In the translation of this *topos* I have used 'outcome' or 'deed', depending on the context.
- 273 The *topoi* from inflections and coordinates to establish or demolish a non-comparative claim can be found in *Top.* 2.9, 114a26–b15. The *topoi* in book 2, however, are not presented specifically with reference to the property of being choiceworthy.
- 274 cf. Alex., in *Top.* 250,5–11. In *Top.* 3.5 Aristotle spells out how the *topoi* about the more choiceworthy can be generalized to be applied to arguments about other qualities and, in *Top.* 3.6, he explains that *topoi* from the inflections, coordinates, generations, and corruptions (among others) are universal also in the sense that they can be used to establish or refute both universal and particular claims (Arist., *Top.* 3.6, 119a36 ff. and Alex., in *Top.* 280,1 ff). Alexander is of course aware of these further developments, but in this passage, as in 250,5 ff., he seems only interested in pointing out that corresponding *topoi* from the inflections, generations, etc., can be used to establish (or demolish) both a positive non-comparative claim about what is choiceworthy and a comparative claim about what is more choiceworthy.
- 275 With the word 'inflection' (*ptôsis*) Aristotle indicates in the *Topics* adverbs in *-ôs* (*Top.* 2.9, 114a33–8). On this, see Primavesi (1994). Both in Aristotle and in Alexander's commentary it is often difficult to tell whether inflections are merely linguistic items or whether Aristotle or Alexander rather make points about what is signified by such expressions. More specifically, in his commentary Alexander says that inflections do not indicate 'underlying things', but rather a way or mode (*tropos*) 'of some activity or disposition' (in *Top.* 197,22–4). For this reason, I occasionally translate the adverb used in the function of an inflection periphrastically (e.g. 'the just way') or by supplying the generic verbs 'acting or being', which the adverb qualifies. For some discussion about the difficulties concerning the translation of inflections, see comments in Castelli (2020: 171 n. 410).
- 276 I take it that Alexander's point here is not about the linguistic items (the adverb 'justly' and the adverb 'courageously'), but rather about what they signify. Since Alexander thinks that inflections indicate ways of being in activity or having a disposition (see n. 275), I supply 'acting or being' in the translation, which allows to keep the adverbial form of the inflection in its adverbial function.

- 277 ‘Deed’ translates *ergon*. At 264,20–1 Alexander specifies that, while the action is an activity that aims at a certain end, the *ergon* is the end of the action. When the action is a productive one, the *ergon* is external to it and is, in fact, the corresponding ‘product’. But when the action is not a production, the *ergon* is not a separate ‘product’ but rather what is achieved through the action. I have used the term ‘outcome’ as a generic term to cover both cases.
- 278 cf. *Top.* 2.9, 114a36–8.
- 279 On the division of the goods see Introduction pp. 28–9 and nn. 31, 173; cf. n. 110.
- 280 The conversion here does not consist in swapping the subject and the predicate as in other contexts, but rather in starting from premises about the things that are used in order to establish a conclusion about the uses (rather than the other way round).
- 281 ‘Prior choice’ translates *prohairesis* at 264,4. It is common to translate this simply with ‘choice’; the reason why I have avoided this translation is that Alexander often uses *hairesis*, which I have translated with ‘choice’.
- 282 At 264,19 Wallies signals a lacuna. I translate the text supplied by Wallies in the apparatus.
- 283 At 265,1 Wallies adds *ti*, which must be understood and supplied in the translation, but does not seem to be necessary in Greek.
- 284 Alexander’s Greek is rather convoluted here, but the point is fairly simple: if *a* is more choiceworthy than *b*, then *a* is also more choiceworthy than any *c* such that *b* is more choiceworthy than *c*.
- 285 Wallies double-spaces the sentence ‘but also [...] lesser degree’, which reproduces Aristotle’s text in *Top.* 3.3, 118b3–4 almost *verbatim*. However, the few departures (*henos* at 265,7; *autou* at 265,8) clearly aim at making Aristotle’s text plainer to the reader. More than a direct quotation this seems to be a very close paraphrase. From the point of view of the contents, note in this *topos* the addition of one further level of comparison (one has to compare the comparisons).
- 286 *Top.* 3.2, 118a16.
- 287 The point of the remark seems to be the following: in the former *topos* the comparison was between things that can only be procured by ourselves and things that can also be procured by someone else. Here the comparison is rather between things for which we would rather be the cause ourselves and things for which we do not mind if someone or something else brings them about. This does not exclude that there can be things which can be brought about by someone or something else and are more choiceworthy than things that we can bring about.
- 288 About inflections, see nn. 275 and 276.
- 289 See n. 275.
- 290 ‘Cause’ translates *aition* at 267,10. The analysis of the distinction between the cases in which the *topos* is true and the cases in which it is not true takes in Alexander a rather systematic turn. Aristotle confines himself to saying that one must take some

- care in choosing additions that stand to the thing to which they are added in a similar way (either they are both used by the thing to which they are added, or neither is). Alexander goes out of his way to explain when the *topos* applies – or, in his phrasing, what is the ‘cause’ of the fact that the *topos* is not always true.
- 291 ‘Cooperates’ translates *sunergon* at 267,12. The terminology can be found in Aristotle (e.g. *Top.* 1.11, 104b3 and b9; 3.3, 118b13–14; *EN* 1.7, 1098a24; 1099b28). In Chrysippus’s theory of causation, auxiliary causes are a distinct class of causes, i.e. those that contribute to bring about a certain effect (e.g. SVF 2: 346, 351, 354).
- 292 *Top.* 3.3, 118b11–14.
- 293 About the use of the logic of comparisons with reference to numbers and magnitudes, cf. 275,28–9. For a generalised version of the *topoi* from addition and from subtraction, cf. 277,28–278,15. Alexander seems to think that comparative problems about what is greater, smaller, and equal are primarily about numbers and quantities. This may suggest that he thinks that at least some of the *topoi* provided in these chapters express general rules or general true propositions about relations between quantities. On the role of such general propositions in arguments based on relations about quantities, cf. Introduction, pp. 17–19.
- 294 The ‘discussion’ could be the whole of *Top.* 3.1–4 or, more specifically, the discussion of the present *topos*.
- 295 Wallies deletes the whole of 269,21–3. My sense is that the words at 269,22 ‘and, I believe, that what is such only because of itself, if it is understood in the same way’ very much look like a gloss which may have crept in, but I am not sure why the same should apply to the whole of 21–3. <. . .> in the translation indicate the place where the translation of the words at 269,22 would fit.
- 296 Being obedient and fast are the properties that make a horse choiceworthy in its own right: cf. 262,11. As such in this context they are taken together as opposed to the property (beauty) which makes the horse choiceworthy only with respect to opinion.
- 297 For the distinction between being just and appearing just, cf. Plato, *Resp.* 2, 359C7–361D3; 10, 612C7–614A3.
- 298 The fragment is ascribed to Callimachus: see Pfeiffer (1949) 620.
- 299 The example is presumably not about any action, but rather about virtuous actions. About virtuous action as ‘setting something right’ (*epanorthôsai ti*), especially with reference to just actions, cf. Arist., *EN* 5.4, 1132a18; 5.7, 1135a13; 5.10, 1137b12, b22, b26.
- 300 About pleasure and virtue cf. Alex., *Eth. Probl.* 23 and 26. On a certain tendency in the Peripatetic tradition to flirt with hedonism, see Inwood (2014, chapter 2).
- 301 cf. *Top.* 3.2, 117a16 ff. and Alexander’s comments at 246,16–247,12.
- 302 *EN* 8.3, 1156b7–17.
- 303 About the description of the relations between *topoi*, see Introduction, pp. 20–1.

- 304 The immediately following remark suggests that Alexander has *Top.* 3.1, 116b23–36 in mind.
- 305 The reference is to the distinction introduced by Aristotle in *Top.* 3.3, 118b20, between what is choiceworthy because of itself and what is choiceworthy because of opinion.
- 306 At the beginning of the commentary on *Top.* 3 (219,20 ff; cf. 217,4) Alexander has argued that the *topoi* in the third book, as opposed to the comparative *topoi* mentioned in the second book, are about comparative problems, i.e. arguments in which the desired conclusion expresses a comparison (i.e. is in comparative form), whereas those in the second book were comparative *topoi* used to establish that an accident belongs or does not belong to a subject without qualification (i.e. not in comparison to something else). In 3.4, however, Aristotle claims that the *topoi* given in 3.1–4 are useful also to establish that something is choiceworthy (or to be avoided) without qualification, i.e. not in a comparative way. Aristotle's point, however, does not seem to undermine Alexander's suggestion in the prologue: what Aristotle is saying is that the *topoi* about what is more choiceworthy can be turned into *topoi* about what is choiceworthy without qualification by removing the comparative formulation. See Introduction, pp. 10–11 and nn. 310 and 315 for some discussion of how these *topoi* work.
- 307 About what is honourable as what is a principle or principle-like, cf. 242,4–5.
- 308 'Admittedly' translates *homologoumenôs* at 273,21.
- 309 *Top.* 3.4, 119a7.
- 310 Alexander is considering those cases in which (1) the property of being more choiceworthy, which subject S1 has to a higher degree than subject S2, follows upon some property P of S1, and (2) it might be controversial that being choiceworthy without qualification follows upon P taken without qualification. Alexander's point here seems to be that when P = being good, it is clear that being choiceworthy follows upon being good.
- 311 *Top.* 3.4, 119a6–7.
- 312 *Top.* 3.1, 116a13.
- 313 *ibid.* See also Alexander's comments at 222,3–223,26.
- 314 'Taking this,' i.e. obtaining from the interlocutor that both terms of comparison are good.
- 315 In this passage, Alexander raises a question about the relation between the comparative and the non-comparative ascription of a predication to a subject. Alexander is raising the issue whether it is necessarily the case that, if S1 is more P than S2, this implies that S1 is P without qualification. His point here seems to be that this is not necessarily the case, since it is possible to compare two subjects S1 and S2 with respect to a property P even if neither S1 nor S2 are P 'strictly speaking'. Since most comparative predications are with respect to incidental

properties of the compared items (as Alexander himself stresses at the beginning of his commentary on *Top.* 3), it is unlikely that Alexander's point here is simply that P is an incidental property of S1 and / or S2. The point rather seems to be that, in the cases under consideration, P is not a property of S1 and / or S2 and the comparative predication reflects an improper use of language.

316 It seems to me that Wallies is right in deleting 275,17–20, possibly a gloss to 274,26.

317 'Perfectly complying with the right method' translates *panu emmethodôs* at 275,21. More praise for Aristotle's methodological choices can be found at 55,2–57,14.

318 'Sets down' translates *hupotithetai* 276,6. I am not sure whether Alexander attaches any special value to the use of this verb to describe what Aristotle is doing here. My impression is that the verb here simply means 'to instruct', 'to give a preliminary illustration' (cf. LSJ, s.v. *hupotithêmi*, II.3).

319 'If we make a small modification' translates *an mikron parallassômen* 276,6. The modification consists in choosing more general (or even generic) terms to indicate the compared objects ('this', 'that') and the property ('such and such') with respect to which the comparison is drawn. For some comments about the relation between the more specific and the more general formulations of *topoi*, see Introduction, pp. 13–16.

320 cf. *Top.* 3.1, 116b10 ff.

321 Wallies supplies the text of the whole *topos* at 276,15–16, but this does not seem to be necessary.

322 'Have been admitted' translates *sunkekhôrêtai* at 276,18–19; the verb can indicate that something is conceded in a dialectical exchange, but in this context it rather seems to indicate that the general formulation 'makes room' for any specific application of the *topos*. See also n. 330.

323 cf. *Top.* 3.3, 118a29–33. About what is 'laid down' cf. nn. 170, 363, 369.

324 *Top.* 3.5, 119a17–19.

325 Wallies signals a lacuna at 276,27. I translate the text he supplies in the apparatus.

326 While the procedure that Alexander is describing is clear enough, it is not clear whether he thinks that through these modifications of the specific *topos* what we get is a more general version of the same *topos* or something else. More generally, the nature of the relations obtaining between general and specific formulation of *topoi* and, possibly, of premises in the arguments based on *topoi* is an issue emerging at different points in Alexander's writings: cf. Introduction, pp. 12–21.

327 *Top.* 3.3, 118b1–2.

328 'Through [the way of] setting [it] out and [the use of] general terms' translate *têi ekthesêi te kai prosêgoriai* at 277,10–11. *prosêgoria* is used in grammatical theory to indicate a common noun (LSJ, s.v. II.2), as opposed to proper name (*kurios*: LSJ, s.v. II.5). It seems at least possible that Alexander has the distinction in mind. What Alexander means is that the specific (categorematic) terms in the more specific

- formulation of the *topos* must be replaced with more universal terms ('such and such'). What Alexander will say a little later, that "such and such" can be adapted to all these' can mean either (possibly: both) of two things: (1) the universal formulation accommodates, i.e. makes room, for all specific instantiations (cf. n. 322); (2) the universal formulation of the *topos* can be adjusted to the desired conclusion by replacing the universal indeterminate terms with the specific terms which are appropriate to establish the conclusion. About the relation between universal formulations of *topoi* and specific premises for specific conclusions, see Introduction, pp. 12–21.
- 329 See cf. 322 and n. 328. Alexander resorts to the language of 'adapting' (*epharmozein*) a general *topos* to the more specific contents of the conclusion that one wants to establish. Cf. the way in which Alexander describes the relation between *topoi* and the 'appropriate' premises in his discussion of Theophrastus' account of *topos*: Introduction, pp. 15–21.
- 330 I depart from Wallies' text at 277,17 in that Wallies follows AD and prints *mê toiouton*, whereas I read *mê toioutou* with P. Either way the phrase is elliptic, but the reading with the genitive makes more sense in that it captures the difference between the two cases that are compared, as the immediately following example makes clear. Brunschwig prints *mê toiouton* in Aristotle's text (*Top.* 3.5, 119a21–2), but understands the second clause of the *topos* differently: 'si l'une est plus telle qu'un terme lui-même tel, l'autre plus telle qu'un terme lui-même non-tel [...]'. On the Greek text of Aristotle see also Brunschwig (1967: 161, n. 1). The translation I provide of the text with the genitive corresponds to the example Alexander gives in the following lines.
- 331 The alternative reading requires taking *mallon* with the genitive rather than with the nominative and the nominative *toiouton* as standing for a superlative form: 'if one thing is [more] such and such than what is more such and such'. In this case the *topos* would be: if something is more so-and-so than what is very so-and-so, whereas something else is so-and-so but nor more than what is very so-and-so, then the former thing is even more so-and-so than the latter. I am not sure Aristotle's formulation makes room for this interpretation.
- 332 At 277,25–6 Wallies supplies the missing words to complete the specific formulation of the *topos* about what is sweeter; this does not seem to be necessary since Alexander may just introduce the next example with a shorter elliptic formulation whose completion is made obvious by the context.
- 333 *Top.* 3.3, 118b10–11.
- 334 *ibid.* 118b16.
- 335 *ibid.* 118b17–19.
- 336 *Top.* 3.2, 117b30–2.
- 337 Ancient authors distinguish two criteria for identifying what is P (e.g. what is pleasure) most of all: intensity and purity. In the *Philebus*, for example, Plato

distinguishes between the most intense pleasures, i.e. bodily pleasures, which are mixed with pain (*Phil.* 44D7–47C2); the unmixed and pure pleasures, however, are the ‘true’ pleasures (50E5–53C3). Similar distinctions can be found in the discussion of issues in natural philosophy, also in Alexander: pure fire is what is hot to the highest degree in the sense that it is only hot; there is, however, some type of impure flame which is, in terms of temperature, hotter than fire (*Alex., Quaest.* 2.17).

338 *Top.* 3.4, 118b37–9.

339 This is the sense in which it is *para*, i.e. ‘next to’ the comparative *topoi* already mentioned. See, however, *Arist., Top.* 3.1, 116a23–8, which seems close enough to the *topos* Alexander is discussing here.

340 About the different ways in which the good and the choiceworthy are said, see Introduction, pp. 28–9 and nn. 31, 110, 173. See also n. 102, about the possibility that the choiceworthy and the good be genera of something.

341 In the prologue to his commentary on *Top.* 2 (*in Top.* 128,15–129,13; see also 129,16–32) Alexander makes explicit that, while the distinction between universal and particular problems is a general one, the distinction is truly relevant only with respect to the problems about the accident. What he means by this is that particular propositions can be true in their own right, i.e. without the corresponding universal’s being true, only in the case of accidental predication. The examples Alexander gives a few lines later are of this kind: ‘some human being is musical’ can be true while ‘all human beings are musical’ is false. In the case of *proprium*, genus, and definition, instead, the predicate is always predicated universally of its subject. This clause can be directly derived from the accounts of the corresponding types of predicate in *Top.* 1.5: *proprium* and definition can be ‘predicated instead’, i.e. are co-extensive with their subject; a genus has a greater extension than its subject. This implies that, even if one can formulate a true particular proposition expressing one of these kinds of predicate (e.g. ‘Socrates is a biped rational animal’ or ‘some human beings are animals’), the corresponding universal (e.g. ‘All human beings are biped rational animals’; ‘All human beings are animals’) will be true. cf. pp. 22–3.

342 *Top.* 2.1, 108b34–109a10.

343 Alexander distinguishes between what is universally destructive or constructive (i.e. demolishes or establishes both the universal and the particular) and what is destructive or constructive of the universal: *in Top.* 130,23–131,1.

344 *Top.* 2.1, 109a1–3.

345 About ‘transferring’ or ‘modifying’ the *topoi*, see n. 214; about the corresponding operation of ‘adapting’ general *topoi* to specific contents, see nn. 328 and 329.

346 I take the neuter at 280,5 to refer to the problems (*problēmata*) as at 280,1–2; alternatively, a more generic noun (‘things’) could be supplied in the translation.

347 About *topoi* from the opposites cf. *Top.* 2.8.

- 348 About *topoi* from the coordinates cf. *Top.* 2.9, 114a26–32, a36–b5.
- 349 About *topoi* from the inflections cf. *Top.* 2.9, 114a26–7, a33–b5.
- 350 See n. 341.
- 351 *Top.* 3.6, 119a38–b4, where Aristotle gives examples about the contraries (pleasure and pain), the opposites according to possession and privation (perception and lack of perception), and the relatives (conceivable and conception).
- 352 Alexander is paraphrasing *Top.* 3.6, 119a38–b1.
- 353 I supply ‘sections of the books about the accident’ to keep track of the plural (*en tois prôtois*) at 280,29–30. The reference is presumably to *Top.* 2.8.
- 354 What follows is not a quotation, but a paraphrase of *Top.* 3.6, 119b1–3.
- 355 ‘Conception’ translates *hupolêpsis* at 281,14 ff.
- 356 About the distinction between particulars that are true in their own right and particulars that are true by falling under the corresponding universal cf. n. 341.
- 357 The text at 282,4 is puzzling. The literal translation is: ‘For inflection is justly, the just [thing].’ From the commentary on *Top.* 2.9 (see nn. 275 and 276) we know that Alexander has a fairly precise understanding of what inflections are, i.e. linguistic expressions in adverbial form derived from an adjective or a noun, indicating ways of being or of being active. Based on these considerations and on the following example, *to adikón* (‘the unjust [thing]’) should indicate that of which ‘unjustly’ or the unjust way is an inflection. The translation is based on these considerations. Note, however, that A has the plural *ptôseis* instead of the singular *ptôsis*. The text in A would yield the translation: ‘For inflections are the unjust way, the unjust [thing], or ‘for inflections are “unjustly”, “the just [thing]”’. This reading would not be compatible with Alexander’s claims about inflections elsewhere. A’s reading may reflect some puzzlement in dealing with this sentence.
- 358 See nn. 275 and 276.
- 359 Arist., *Top.* 2.9, 114a26–b5.
- 360 I *de facto* translate the text supplied by Wallies at 282,15, but I am not sure whether the addition to the Greek text is necessary.
- 361 On the division of the goods, see also Introduction, pp. 28–9 and nn. 31, 173; cf. also n. 110.
- 362 cf. Arist., *Top.* 2.9, 114b16–24 and Alex., *in Top.* 200,12 ff. Particularly notable in the commentary on the *topos* in *Top.* 2.9 is Alexander’s attempt at spelling out the distinction between the corruptive thing (i.e. the factor or process which causes something’s corruption) and corruption as the state resulting from a corruptive process.
- 363 About the general formulation which is ‘laid down’, see Introduction, pp. 13–19 and cf. nn. 170, 323, 369.
- 364 cf. the similar remark at 280,29–30.
- 365 ‘Of both *topoi*’: i.e. of both *topoi* from corruptions and from generations.

- 366 This is presumably a comment on Aristotle's use of *epistêmê* and *epistasthai* in *Top.* 3.6, 119b11–15.
- 367 Arist., *Top.* 3.6, 119b15.
- 368 'Consequents' translates *parëpomena* at 283,30–1.
- 369 cf. nn. 170, 323, 363, about things that are 'laid down'.
- 370 Wallies adds *oun* at 284,3. The translation of Wallies' text is: 'He says, <then,> that [...]'.  
 371 At 284,11 Wallies adds *ti*. This seems correct in light of the similar structure of the sentence at 284,7, 9, and 12.
- 372 cf. 219,3–17.
- 373 cf. n. 251.
- 374 I translate Wallies' text here, which probably correctly supplies the full classification of *topoi* to which Alexander refers, cf. *Top.* 2.10, 114b37–115a14.
- 375 cf. *Top.* 2.10, 114b38–115a6.
- 376 I translate Wallies' text, which omits *en* before *autois* at 284,27. The translation of the text with *en* would be: '[...] he shows the similarity of the particular ones in them.' This seems hard (even if certainly not impossible), given that *autois* ('them') presumably has the same antecedent as *autôn* at 284,26, i.e. the universal *topoi* corresponding to the particular ones considered in this section.
- 377 Arist., *Top.* 3.6, 119b17–19.
- 378 *ibid.* 119b19–21.
- 379 Presumably *ibid.* 119b18: 'some of the things from another genus'.
- 380 *ibid.* 119b20: 'some knowledge'.
- 381 *ibid.* 119b20.
- 382 cf. *ibid.* 120a6.
- 383 'Moves forward' translates *proiôn* at 285,18. I take this to mean that the *topos* can be used to produce an argument also in the case considered now, i.e. the case of things belonging in the same genus.
- 384 'The best thing' translates *to ariston* at 285,23–4. Since *ariston* is a superlative form of *agathon* (good), an alternative translation would be 'the highest good'.
- 385 As Alexander has noted himself a little earlier (283,21), *epistêmê* can be used in a looser or in a more specific sense. In the looser sense, it can be taken as equivalent to 'cognition'; in the most specific (Aristotelian) sense, it indicates scientific knowledge (i.e. universal knowledge of what obtains necessarily or for the most part). Between the extremes, the term can also be used to indicate something more specific than cognition and less specific than scientific knowledge, i.e. the knowledge characteristic of arts and crafts. It seems that both examples require the most specific understanding of *epistêmê* and I translate accordingly. About the first example: for sure, there is some cognition of what is contingent (e.g. through perception or experience); the problem seems to be whether one can have scientific

knowledge of at least some contingent phenomena. As for the second example, perception is certainly a form of cognition.

386 *Top.* 3.6, 119b31.

387 ‘About each particular thing’ here translates *kath’hekasta* at 286,2–3. Alexander usually uses *epi merous* for particular propositions. The variation does not seem to introduce any important conceptual distinction.

388 Alex., in *Top.* 284,9–13.

389 cf. 284,7–9.

390 About capacities as goods, see Introduction, p. 29, and nn. 122 and 124.

391 Alex., in *Top.* 285,17–286,1.

392 Arist., *Top.* 2.1, 109a1–8; 3.6, 119a32–6.

393 On Alexander’s account: *Top.* 3.6, 119a36–b34.

394 ‘Against both [targets]’, i.e. both against universal and against particular problems.

395 The clear identification of three different strategies to deal with particular problems is Alexander’s. Aristotle’s text does not draw any explicit distinctions.

396 At 287,11–12 Alexander’s commentary has the plural accusative *axiôsantas*, in modern editions of Aristotle’s text (and in the lemma of Wallies’ edition) we have the singular accusative *axiôsanta*. With this exception, the text quoted by Alexander corresponds to Arist., *Top.* 3.6, 119b35–6.

397 The example of the argument for the immortality of the soul to illustrate how arguments from a hypothesis work is Aristotle’s standard example (*Top.* 2.3, 110a37–b4; 3.6, 119b35–7).

398 Wallies signals a lacuna at 287,25. The text within < > is the translation of the text supplied by Wallies in the apparatus.

399 The arguments from a hypothesis that Alexander (following Aristotle) has in mind are quite complex. The situation is the following. Imagine that one wants to establish the particular claim that the human soul is not immortal. This is a particular claim in Alexander’s view, because it is about one particular (kind of) soul, i.e. the human soul. Imagine, however, that who wants to establish this claim does not have a direct deduction about the human soul, but has an argument to show that some other particular soul (e.g. the soul of plants) is not immortal. In this situation, one can proceed in the following way:

- (1) Ask the interlocutor to concede that, if it is shown that any particular soul is not immortal, no soul is immortal.
- (2) Show, through an independent argument, that some particular soul (e.g. the soul of plants) is not immortal.
- (3) Obtain, through the concession in step (1) and the argument in step (2), the claim that no soul is immortal.
- (4) Deduce from the universal (‘no soul is immortal’) obtained in step (3) the particular (‘the human soul is not immortal’), which is the desired conclusion.

The procedure is similar if one wants to establish an affirmative particular. Arguments from a hypothesis have been studied extensively, both with reference to Plato and Aristotle and with reference to the development of a theory in later authors. See e.g. Bobzien (1997; 2000; 2002a; 2002b); Fortenbaugh (2003); the papers collected in Longo (2011); Shorey (1889); Slomkowski (1997); Striker (1979); Strobach (2001).

- 400 'Asking' translates *aitèsamenous* at 288,4. This request corresponds to step (1) in the reconstruction in n. 399.
- 401 cf. Arist., *Top.* 3.6, 120a2–3 (the order of words in Aristotle's text is slightly different).
- 402 The classification of propositions which Alexander will give in his comments on this text and, especially, the distinction between fully indeterminate propositions and indeterminate particular propositions cannot be found in Aristotle. See also nn. 407, 408 and Introduction, pp. 21–4.
- 403 Alexander is presumably alluding to the distinction about increasing determinations he comments upon at 290,2–29.
- 404 'Most properly' translates *malista* at 288,20. The point is spelled out more explicitly in Alexander's commentary on *Top.* 2 (128,15–129,13; 129,16–32).
- 405 Wallies' addition of *tis* at 288,21 is certainly correct and I translate his text.
- 406 In the translation I have turned the Greek construction into a passive one in order to make the sentence less involuted.
- 407 'To have equal force' (*ison dunasthai*) is often used by Alexander with reference to two different sentences or expressions to indicate that (broadly speaking) they mean the same: cf. 35,27–9. This use does not seem to be backed up by any specific theory of meaning.
- 408 I depart from Wallies in that I omit *hai* at 288,27 since it does not seem necessary to make sense of the text. The translation of Wallies' text would be: 'For it is for this reason that also <those that are> in this way are indeterminate particulars', which seems redundant and suggests that there are other types of indeterminate particulars, while Alexander has only introduced one type ('some pleasure is good', which is taken as equivalent to the fully indeterminate proposition: 'pleasure is good').
- 409 It is not completely clear to me whether Alexander here is quoting or offering a close paraphrase of Aristotle's text. The formulation he uses has the nominative *tis* ('someone') as the subject of the verb *ephêsen* (289,1), whereas in modern editions of Aristotle's text at 120a7 we either do not have anything (Ross) or we have an accusative *tina* which goes with *hêdonên* (Brunschwig). See Introduction, pp. 22–3 on why this is important.
- 410 *Top.* 3.6, 120a7–8, but see n. 324.
- 411 Alexander is commenting on *Top.* 3.6, 120a8–11.
- 412 *ibid.* 120a10–11.

- 413 In the immediately preceding section, Alexander said that (1) the propositions he is considering are indeterminate particulars because they have ‘equal force’ to indeterminate propositions strictly speaking (cf. n. 407). Now he is saying that (2) they are indeterminate because it is not determinate whether they are true in their own right or in that the corresponding universal is true (for the distinction see Introduction, pp. 22–23 and n. 341; cf. 290,2–9). It is not clear to me whether Alexander thinks that (1), which has something to do with the meaning of the propositions (whatever that turns out to be), should be understood in terms of conditions of truth as in (2). This is certainly a possibility, but I do not think this is obvious. For this reason, I prefer to keep the *kai* of the manuscripts at 289,5 and depart from Wallies (who deletes *kai*).
- 414 The latter examples are examples of particular determinate propositions that can be true ‘in their own right’: if they are true, they are true without the corresponding universal’s being true (in fact, if ‘only contemplative pleasure is good’ is true, the universal ‘every pleasure is good’ is false, provided that not every pleasure is contemplative).
- 415 *Top.* 3.6, 120a8–20.
- 416 Particular propositions of opposite quality (one affirmative and one negative) can be true at the same time.
- 417 If Alexander is quoting (as it seems), it is worth noting that the text in modern editions has *ê agathon* after *ouk agathon* at 120a13. In Wallies’ edition, Alexander quotes the text only with *ouk agathon*. The immediately preceding remark, about how to proceed if what is submitted is a negative particular, and the immediately following comment, saying that Aristotle’s remark is about the case in which what is submitted is an affirmative particular, do indeed require *ouk agathon*. Notice, however, that *ouk* is Wallies’ conjecture, while the manuscripts have *kai*, which gives the translation: ‘if we show that some pleasure is also good’ (which, however, would not fit Alexander’s immediately following remark). The text of modern editions *ouk agathon ê agathon* is about how to demolish affirmative or negative indeterminate particulars: ‘if we show that some pleasure is not good or [that some pleasure is] good [...]’.
- 418 *Top.* 3.6, 120a12–13, but see previous note.
- 419 About problem and thesis cf. Arist., *Top.* 1.11, 104b19–105a2.
- 420 In this section of the commentary Alexander goes through the different types of *diorismos* (‘determination’) which can qualify the particular proposition. On determination see Introduction, pp. 23–4.
- 421 ‘Proposition’ translates *protasis* at 290,5. All feminine articles in this and the following lines (e.g. 290,5: *tên epi merous*, ‘the particular’; 290,6 *tên katholou*, ‘the universal’) must be understood accordingly. The alternative translation is ‘premise’, which would also work well in this passage. Since all premises are propositions but not the other way round, I opt for the more general translation.

- 422 cf. by way of contrast indeterminate particular propositions: 289,4–8.
- 423 This passage makes clear what Alexander's point is: in the proposition 'some pleasure is good and some pleasure is not good,' and some pleasure is not good' can, in principle, be omitted as long as it is clear that the proposition 'some pleasure is good' is a particular proposition which is true as a particular in its own right, i.e. not because the corresponding universal ('every pleasure is good') is true. In fact, the particular is true in its own right only if the corresponding universal is not true. The addition 'and some pleasure is not good' should therefore not be taken as an independent, second proposition: there is only one proposition (i.e., the particular 'some pleasure is good'), not two propositions (i.e. one affirmative particular and one negative particular).
- 424 On this reference to Theophrastus' *On affirmation*, see Huby (2007: 52, comments on text 89). The note of hesitation in Alexander's comments ('seems') may suggest that he did not have this work at his disposal.
- 425 *Top.* 2.2, 109b13–29.
- 426 Both individuals and all species resulting by the progressive division of the genus fall under the genus.
- 427 *Top.* 2.2, 109b28. If the answerer has conceded that the predicate belongs to several subjects all falling under the subject of the desired conclusion and, when asked to concede the universal claim ascribing the predicate to the subject of the desired conclusion, does not concede it, he has to make an objection and specify a counterexample which justifies his denial of the universal claim. If he neither concedes the universal nor brings a counterexample, he will appear to behave in an 'extravagant' or 'absurd' (*atopos*) way (and will therefore be discredited within the framework of the dialectical exchange): see Arist., *Top.* 2.2, 109b28–9; *Top.* 8.8, 160a35–b13.
- 428 *Top.* 3.6, 120a32–3.
- 429 'Survey' translates *epiblepsis* at 291,11. Alexander's use of this word is certainly linked to Aristotle's use of *epiblepein* ('to look carefully at') in the introduction of this *topos* both here (3.6, 120a32) and in the corresponding *topos* at 2.2, 109b13. In the context of these *topoi*, the verb (otherwise fairly generic) is used to indicate the survey of cases distinguished through division (*diairesis*): cf. the immediately following *topos* at 120a34.
- 430 The *topos* Alexander has in mind is presumably still the same as in the previous section: 2.2, 109b13–29. See in particular the methodological indication about the procedure through the division of the species before the division into the potentially infinite particulars at 109b14–16.
- 431 'Genus-like' translates *genikon* in this section of the commentary but see n. 437.
- 432 Presumably this means: when one of the terms of the problem is general enough that it is possible to proceed through division as prescribed in this *topos*.

Alexander's discussion of the next *topos* (292,16–21) makes it clear that Alexander thinks that the two *topoi* at 120a32 and 120a34 are about dividing and surveying what falls under the subject term, whereas the *topos* at 120a38 is about dividing and surveying what falls under the predicate term.

433 'It', i.e. what was posited in the problem.

434 I think Alexander has *Top.* 2.4, 111a33–b11 in mind.

435 'Divide [...] and define' translates *diairein kai horizein* at 292,22, which seems to be Alexander's way of paraphrasing Aristotle's *dihorisai* at 120a38. Aristotle is still talking about a process of division which leads one to consider progressively more determinate predicates.

436 The two types of division, in species and in number, are parallel to the two stages of division (into species and into particular individuals) in the immediately preceding sections. The labels in Aristotle (*eidei* and *arithmōi* at 120a38) are often used to distinguish the level of species and the level of individuals (for example in the locution 'one in species' and 'one in number': see e.g. Arist., *Metaph.* 5.6, 1016b31–1017a3). Alexander gives an example of how the division into individuals might look at the end of the section (293,10 ff.).

437 'Genus-related' translates *genikon* at 293,3. Alexander is referring to the partition of problems based on the type of predicate in *Top.* 1.5. The remark is about the different formulations of the problem: 'time changes' and 'time is change'. In the first formulation, the predication is expressed through a paronym of change (the verbal form: 'changes'); paronymous predication indicates that the predicate is ascribed to the subject as an accident, since the genus is never predicated paronymously (cf. *Top.* 2.2, 109a34–b12 and Alexander's comments at 137,6–29; see also *Top.* 2.1, 109a11–26 and Alexander's comments at 131,22–133,20). Alexander's remark suggests that 'time is change' would fall under the rubric of problems concerning the genus, i.e. those problems in which the predicate is supposed to be the genus of the subject.

438 'Each of these', i.e. odd and even.

439 Alexander's point seems to be that in the final section of the chapter (from 120a35) Aristotle is not saying anything specifically about particular problems. It might be worth noting that it is hard to tell whether Aristotle considers the claims he mentions in the last part of the chapter ('time does not change', 'the soul is not [a] number') as universal or particular (or indeterminate). Alexander's neat reading of 3.6, about particular problems, is much more explicit than Aristotle's text.

# Select Bibliography

## Primary sources (critical editions only)

### Alexander of Aphrodisias

- Bruns, I. (ed.), (1887), *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis Praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora. De Anima Liber cum Mantissa*, Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1, Berlin: G. Reimer.
- Bruns, I. (ed.), (1892), *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis Praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora. Quaestiones, De fato, De mixtione*, Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.2, Berlin: G. Reimer.
- Wallies, M. (ed.), (1883), *Alexandri in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I commentarium*, CAG 2.1, Berlin: G. Reimer.
- Wallies, M. (ed.), (1891), *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo commentaria*, CAG 2.2, Berlin: G. Reimer.
- Wallies, M. (ed.), (1898), *Alexandri quod fertur in Aristotelis sophisticos elenchos commentarium*, CAG 2.3, Berlin: G. Reimer.

### Ammonius

- Busse, A. (ed.), (1897), *Ammonius. In Aristotelis de interpretatione commentarius*, CAG 4.5, Berlin: G. Reimer.
- Wallies, M. (ed.), (1899), *Ammonius. In Aristotelis analyticorum priorum librum I commentarium*, CAG 4.6, Berlin: G. Reimer.

### Aristotle

- Bodéüs, R. (ed.), (2002), *Aristote. Catégories*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Brunschwig, J. (ed.), (1967–2007), *Aristote. Topiques*, Tome I & II, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
- Bywater, T. (ed.), (1894), *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.
- Rose, V. (ed.), (1886), *Aristotelis qui ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta*, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner.
- Ross, D. (ed.), (1949), *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.
- Ross, D. (ed.), (1958), *Aristotelis Topica et Sophistici Elenchi*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

- Ross, D. (ed.), (1959), *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.  
 Ross, D. (ed.), (1963), *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

## Aspasius

- Heylbut, G. (ed.), (1889), *Aspasii in Ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt commentaria*, CAG 19.2, Berlin: G. Reimer.

## Callimachus

- Pfeiffer, R. (ed.), (1949), *Callimachus. Fragmenta vol. I*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

## Cicero

- Moreschini, C. (ed.), (2005), *M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt omnia*, Fasc. 43: *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, München / Leipzig: K.G. Saur.  
 Winterbottom, M. (ed.), (1994), *Cicero. De officiis*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

## Diogenes Laertius

- Dorandi, T. (ed.), (2013), *Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 Long, H.S. (ed.), (1964), *Diogenes Laertii Vitae Philosophorum*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.  
 Marcovich, M. (ed.), (1999), *Diogenes Laertius. Vitae philosophorum*, Stuttgart and Leipzig: B.G. Teubner (3 Bände).

## Dionysius Thrax

- Uhlig, G. (ed.), (1883), *Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica*, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner.

## Galen

- Kalbfleisch, K. (ed.), (1896), *Galen, Institutio Logica*, Leipzig.

## Philoponus

- Wallies, M. (ed.), (1905), *Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Analytica Priora Commentaria*, CAG 13.2, Berlin: G. Reimer.

## Plato

Burnet, J. (ed.), (1900–1907), *Platonis Opera*, 5 volumes, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

Duke, E.A.; Hicken, W.F.; Nicoli, W.S.M.; Robinson, D.B.; Strachan, J. (eds.), (1995), *Platonis Opera. Tomus I*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

Slings, S.R. (ed.), (2003), *Platonis Respublica*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

## Seneca

Reynolds, L.D. (ed.), (1965), *Seneca: Ad Lucilium Epistulae morales*, 2 volumes, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

## Sextus Empiricus

Bury, R.G. (ed.), (1939–49), *Sextus Empiricus* (Loeb Classical Library), 4 volumes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mutschmann, H. and Mau, J. (eds.), (1912–1962), *Sexti Empirici Opera*, Leipzig: Teubner (4 Bände).

## Stoics

v. Arnim, H.F.A. (ed.), (1964), *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, Leipzig: Teubner.

## Theophrastus and other Peripatetics

Fortenbaugh, W.W.; Huby, P.; Sharples, R.W.; Gutas, D. (eds.), (1993), *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, Leiden/New York/Köln: Brill.

Wehrli, F. (ed.), (1944–1959; 2. Auflage 1967–1969), *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentare*, Basel: B. Schwabe & Co.

## Secondary literature (including modern commentaries and translations)

Abbamonte, G. (1995), 'Metodi esegetici nel commento *In Aristotelis Topica* di Alessandro di Afrodisia', in I. Giallo (ed.), *Seconda miscellanea filologica* (Università degli Studi di Salerno. Quaderni del Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Antichità 17), Napoli: Arte Tipografica, 249–266.

- Abbamonte, G. (1996), *Alessandro di Afrodisia. Il primo libro del commentario di Alessandro di Afrodisia in Aristotelis Topica*. Saggio introduttivo, testo, traduzione e note, PhD thesis, Salerno.
- Abbamonte, G. (2013), 'Cicerone, Alessandro di Afrodisia, Boezio: tre modi di leggere i Topici di Aristotele tra I sec. a.C. e VI d.C.', in Y. Lehmann (ed.), *Aristoteles Romanus. La réception de la science aristotélicienne dans l'Empire gréco-romain* (Recherches sur les rhétoriques religieuses 17), Turnhout: Brepols, 341–370.
- Ackrill, J. (1963), *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.
- Adamson, P. (2018), 'Dialectical Method in Alexander of Aphrodisias' Treatises on Fate and Providence', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 54, 279–308.
- Annas, J., and Barnes, J. (2002), *Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Annas, J., and Barnes, J. (2005), *Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Annas, J., and Barnes, J. (2012), *Sextus Empiricus: Against the Physicists*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Annas, J. and Wolf, R. (2001), *Cicero. On Moral Ends*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baltussen, H. (2016), *The Peripatetics. Aristotle's Heirs 322 BCE – 200 CE*, London/New York: Routledge.
- Barker, A. (1990), *Greek Musical Writings. Volume II. Harmonic and Acoustic Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barnes, J. (1983), 'Terms and Sentences: Theophrastus on Hypothetical Syllogism', *Proceedings of the British Academy* 69, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barnes, J. (1985), 'Theophrastus and Hypothetical Syllogistic', in J. Wiesner (ed.), *Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung I*, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 557–76. (repr. in J. Barnes 2012: 413–432)
- Barnes, J. (2012), *Logical Matters. Essays in Ancient Philosophy II*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barnes, J.; Bobzien, S.; Flannery, K.; Ierodiakonou, K. (1991), *Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.1–7*, London: Duckworth.
- Battezzato, L. (2009), 'Metre and music', in F. Budelmann (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Lyric* (Cambridge Companions to Literature), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 130–146.
- Berrettoni, P. (2000a), 'Per un'archeologia del discorso grammaticale sul comparativo', *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* 22.1, *Horizons de la grammaire alexandrine* (1), 35–49.
- Berrettoni, P. (2000b), 'On the Geometrical Background of Dionysius Thrax' Definition of Comparatives', *Rivista di Linguistica* 12.2, 195–223.
- Bett, R. (1997), *Sextus Empiricus. Against the Ethicists*, translated with an introduction and commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Blumenthal, H. and Robinson, H. (eds.), (1991), *Aristotle and the Later Traditions*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.
- Blumenthal, H. (1996), *Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity*, London: Duckworth.
- Bobzien, S. (1997), 'The Stoics on Hypothesis and Hypothetical Arguments', *Phronesis* 42, 299–312.
- Bobzien, S. (2000), 'Wholly Hypothetical Syllogisms', *Phronesis* 45, 87–137.
- Bobzien, S. (2002a), 'Pre-Stoic Hypothetical Syllogistic in Galen', in V. Nutton (ed.), *The Unknown Galen, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, supplement volume, 57–72.
- Bobzien, S. (2002b), 'The Development of Modus Ponens in Antiquity: From Aristotle to the 2nd Century AD', *Phronesis* 47, 359–394.
- Bobzien, S. (2014), 'Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Theory of the Stoic Indemonstrables', in M. Lee (ed.), *Strategies of Argument: Essays in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology and Logic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199–227.
- Bochenski, I.M. (1947), *La Logique de Théophraste*, Fribourg: Librairie de l'Université.
- Bochenski, I.M. (1951), *Ancient Formal Logic*, Amsterdam: North Holland.
- Bodnár, I. and Fortenbaugh, W. (eds.), (2002), *Eudemus of Rhodes*, Rutgers University Studies in classical humanities 11, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Bonelli, M. (ed.), (2014), *Le questioni etiche di Alessandro d'Afrodisia*, Napoli: Bibliopolis.
- Brandis, C.A. (1835), 'Über die Reihenfolge der Bücher des Aristotelischen Organons und ihre Griechischen Ausleger'. *Abhandlungen der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (aus dem Jahre 1833), 249–299.
- Brunschwig, J. (1968), 'Observations sur les manuscrits parisiens des *Topiques*', in G.E.L. Owen, G.E.L. (ed.), *Aristotle on Dialectic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–21.
- Buhl, G. (1978), 'Zur Funktion der Topoi in der aristotelischen Topik', in K. Lorenz (ed.), *Konstruktion vs Positionen. Beiträge zur Diskussion um die konstruktive Wissenschaft*, Bd. 1, Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 169–175.
- Casari, E. (1987), 'Comparative Logics', *Synthese* 73 (3), 421–49.
- Casari, E. (1989), 'Comparative Logics and Abelian L-Groups', *Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics* 127, 161–90.
- Castelli, L.M. (2013), 'Collections of Topoi and the Structure of Aristotle's Topics: Notes on an Ancient Debate (Aristotle, Theophrastus, Alexander and Themistius)', *Philosophia Antiquorum* 7, 65–92.
- Castelli, L.M. (2014), 'Alexander of Aphrodisias: Methodological Issues and Argumentative Strategies between *Ethical Problems* and *Commentary on the Topics*', in M. Bonelli (ed.), *Le questioni etiche di Alessandro d'Afrodisia*, Bibliopolis, 19–42.
- Castelli, L.M. (2015), 'Alexander on Aristotle, *APr I 31*, Division and Syllogistic', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* XXVI, 33–54.
- Castelli, L.M. (2020), *Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics 2*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Clarke, T. (2019), *Aristotle and the Eleatic One*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Cosci, M. (2014), *Verità e comparazione in Aristotele*, Venezia: Istituto veneto di scienze ed arti.
- De Pater, W.A. (1965), *Les Topiques d'Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne: la methodologie de la definition*, Fribourg: Editions St. Paul.
- Di Muzio, G. (2000), 'Aristotle on Improving One's Character', *Phronesis* 45, 205–19.
- Donini, P.L. (1995), 'Alessandro di Afrodisia e i metodi dell'esegesi filosofica', in C. Moreschini, C. (ed.), (1995), *Esegesi, parafrasi e compilazione in età tardoantica. Atti del terzo congresso dell'Associazione di studi tardoantichi*, Napoli: M. D'Auria Editore, 107–129.
- Duncombe, M. (2015), 'Aristotle's Two Accounts of Relatives in *Categories* 7', *Phronesis* 60, 436–61.
- Falcon, A. (ed.), (2016), *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity*, Leiden: Brill.
- Falcon, A. (2017), *Aristotelismo*, Torino: Einaudi.
- Fazzo, S. and Zonta, M. (1999), *Alessandro di Afrodisia. La provvidenza. Questioni sulla provvidenza*, Milano: Rizzoli.
- Fink, J.L. (ed.), (2012), *The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Flannery, K. (1995), *Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias*, Leiden: Brill.
- Fortenbaugh, W.W. (2003), 'Theophrastus of Eresus: Rhetorical Argument and Hypothetical Syllogistic', in Id., *Theophrastean Studies*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 35–50.
- Fortenbaugh, W.W. (ed.), (2017), *Arius Didymus on Peripatetic Ethics, Household Management, and Politics*. Text, Translation and Discussion, London: Routledge.
- Gambra Gutiérrez, J.M. (2012), 'The *Topoi* from the Greater, the Lesser and the Same Degree: An Essay on the σύγκρισις in Aristotle's *Topics*', *Argumentation* 26, 413–37.
- Gili, L. (2011a), *La sillogistica di Alessandro di Afrodisia*, Hildesheim/Zurich/New York: Olms.
- Gili, L. (2011b), 'Boeto di Sidone e Alessandro di Afrodisia intorno alla sillogistica aristotelica', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 154, 375–397.
- Gili, L. and Pezzini, G. (2015), 'Aristotle's comparative logic: A modest proposal', *Classical Quarterly* 65 (2), 559–71.
- Gohlke, P. (1928), 'Untersuchungen zur Topik des Aristoteles', *Hermes* 63, 457–479.
- Gohlke, P. (1936), *Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik*, Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt.
- González Calderón, J.F. (2014), *Historia de la tradición textual del comentario de Alejandro de Afrodisias a los Tópicos de Aristóteles*, PhD Thesis, Getafe.
- González Calderón, J.F. (2018), 'Formas de hacer filosofía en época imperial: Alejandro de Afrodisias y su Comentario a los *Tópicos*', *ΠΗΓΗ/FONS* 3, 31–49.
- Gottschalk, H.B. (1987), 'Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century AD', in W. Haase (ed.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt* II.36.2, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1079–1174.

- Graver, M. and Long, A.A. (2015), *Seneca. Letters on Ethics to Lucilius*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Griffin, M.T. and Atkins, E.M. (1991), *Cicero. On Duties*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Guyomarc'h, G. (2017), 'Métaphysique et Organon selon Alexandre d'Aphrodise. L'utilité de la logique pour la philosophie première', in A. Balansard, A. Jaulin (ed.), *Alexandre d'Aphrodise et la métaphysique aristotélicienne*, Louvain: Peeters, 83–111.
- Hadot, P. (1990), 'La logique, partie ou instrument de la philosophie?' in *Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories*, dir. I. Hadot., fasc. 1, Introduction, Leiden, 183–188.
- Hambruch, E. (1904), *Logische Regeln und der Platonischen Schule in der Aristotelischen Topik*, Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Jahresbericht des Askanischen Gymnasiums zu Berlin, Berlin: Weidemann.
- Harari, O. (2011), 'The Unity of Aristotle's Category of Relatives', *The Classical Quarterly New Series* 61.2, 521–37.
- Hasnawi, A. (2007), 'Boèce, Averroès, et Abū Al-Barakāt Al-Baġdādī, témoins des écrits de Thémistius sur les *Topiques* d'Aristote', *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 17, 203–265.
- Huby, P. (2002), 'Did Aristotle Reply to Eudemus and Theophrastus on Some Logical Issues?', in I. Bodnár and W. Fortenbaugh (eds.), (2002), 85–106.
- Huby, P. (2007), *Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence: Commentary*, Volume 2: *Logic*, Leiden/New York/Köln: Brill.
- Hutchinson, D.S. and Johnson, M.R. (2017), *Aristotle. Protrepticus or Exhortation to Philosophy (citations, fragments, paraphrases, and other evidence)* (version 20 Sept. 2017), <http://www.protrepticus.info/protr2017x20.pdf>
- Ierodiakonou, K. (1998), 'Aristotle's Logic: an Instrument, Not a Part of Philosophy', in N. Avgelis and F. Peonidis (eds.), *Aristotle on Logic, Language and Science*, Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publications, 33–53.
- Inwood, B. (2007), *Seneca: Selected Philosophical Letters*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Inwood, B. (2014), *Ethics after Aristotle*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kapp, E. (1931), 'Syllogistik', in *Pauly-Wissowa's Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 2nd ser., IV A, cols. 1046–1067; repr. in Id., *Ausgewählte Schriften*, Berlin 1968, 254–77.
- Karabatzaki-Perdiki, H. (1992), 'Η σχέση της Σωκρατικής και Αριστοτελικής διαλεκτικής κάτω από το φως των σχολίων του Αλεξάνδρου Αφροδισιεύως', *Dodoni* 21, 73–82.
- Karamanolis, G. (2011), 'The Place of Ethics in Aristotle's Philosophy', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 40, 133–56.
- Koch, I. (2019), *La Causalité humaine. Sur le De fato d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise*, Paris: Classiques Garnier.
- Konstan, D. (2001), *Aspasius, Anonymous, Michael of Ephesus: On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics* 8–9, London: Bloomsbury.
- Konstan, D. (2006), *Aspasius: On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics* 1–4, 7–8, London: Bloomsbury.

- La Croce, E. (1978–1979), 'Alexandri Aphrodisiensis, Comentario al tratado de los Tópicos de Aristotóteles. Proemio al libro I, traducción & notas', *ethos* 6–7, 227–244.
- Lee, T.S. (1984), *Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike, Hypomnemata* 79, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
- Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (1987), *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Longo, A. (2011), *Argument from Hypothesis in Ancient Philosophy, Elenchos* LIX, Napoli: Bibliopolis.
- Lutz, C.E. and Reydams-Schils, G. (2020), *Musonius Rufus. That one Should Disdain Hardships*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
- Lynch, J.P. (1972), *Aristotle's School. A Study of a Greek Educational Institution*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mansfeld, J. (1988), 'Diaphonia: the Argument of Alexander *De Fato* Chs. 1–2', *Phronesis* 33.2, 181–207.
- Menn, S. (1995), 'Metaphysics, Dialectic, and the Categories', *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 100e Année, No. 3, (Juillet-Septembre 1995), 311–37.
- Militello, C. (2017), *Dialettica, genere e anima nel commento di Alessandro di Afrodisia al IV libro dei 'Topici' di Aristotele*, Introduzione, saggi di commento, traduzione e note (Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico 145), prefazione di M. Bonelli, presentazione di L. Cardullo, Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
- Mignucci, M. (1986), 'Aristotle's Definitions of Relatives in *Cat. 7*', *Phronesis* 31, 101–27.
- Montiglio, S. (2005), *Wandering in Ancient Greek Culture*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Morau, P. (1973), *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, Volume 1 (Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im 1. Jh. v. Chr.), Berlin: W. de Gruyter.
- Morau, P. (1984), *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, Volume 2 (Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jahrhundert n. Chr.), Berlin: W. de Gruyter.
- Morau, P. and Wiesner, J. (ed.) (2001), *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, Volume 3 (Alexander von Aphrodisias), Berlin: W. de Gruyter.
- Müller, I. (1969), 'Stoic and Peripatetic Logic', *Journal of Philosophy* 51, 173–87.
- Müller, I. with Gould, J. (trans.), (1999), *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Prior Analytics I.8–13 and I.14–22*, 2 vols, London: Duckworth.
- Müller, I. (2006), *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Prior Analytics I. 23–31 and I. 32–46*, 2 volumes, London: Duckworth.
- Natali, C. and Tetamo, E. (2009), *Alessandro d'Afrodisia (Tito Aurelio Alessandro), Il Destino. Trattato sul destino e su ciò che dipende da noi. Dedicato agli Imperatori*, International Aristotle Studies 5. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
- Owen, G.E.L. (ed.), (1968), *Aristotle on Dialectic. The Topics*, Proceedings of the third Symposium Aristotelicum, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paoli, F. (1999), 'Comparative Logic as an Approach to Comparison in Natural Language', *Journal of Semantics* 16 (1), 67–96.

- Pickard-Cambridge, W.A. (1984), *Topics* (trans.), in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Prantl, C. (1853), *Über die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik aus der Platonischen Philosophie*, Munich: Verlag der königlichen Akademie.
- Primavesi, O. (1994), 'Casus – Ptōsis: zum aristotelischen Ursprung eines umstrittenen grammatischen Terminus', *Antike und Abendland* 40, 86–97.
- Primavesi, O. (1996), *Die aristotelische Topik*, Munich: C. H. Beck.
- Rapp, Ch. (2000), 'Topos und Syllogismos bei Aristoteles' in Th. Schirren and G. Üding (eds.), *Topik und Rhetorik: Ein interdisziplinäres Symposium*, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 15–35.
- Rapp, Ch. (2002), *Aristoteles Rhetorik. Übersetzt und erläutert*, 2 Halbbände, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
- Rapp, Ch. and Wagner, T. (2013), 'On Some Aristotelian Sources of Modern Argumentation Theory', *Argumentation* 27, 7–30.
- Reinhardt, T. (2000), *Das Buch E der Aristotelischen Topik*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Repici, L. (1977), *La logica di Teofrasto*, Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Roselli, A. (2002), 'Solone in Alex. Aphr. Comm. in Arist. Top. II 2 (CAG 2.2, p. 139,26 – 140,3 Wallies)', *Cuadernos de filología clásica* 12, 137–144.
- Rubinelli, S. (2009), *Ars Topica. The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero*, Dordrecht: Springer.
- Sainati, V. (1968), *Storia dell'Organon aristotelico*, vol. 1, Firenze: Le Monnier.
- Sainati, V. (1993), 'Aristotele, dalla Topica all' Analitica', *Theoria* XIII, 1–117.
- Schirren, Th. et al. (ed.) (2000), *Topik und Rhetorik: Ein interdisziplinäres Symposium*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
- Schramm, M. (2004), *Die Prinzipien der Aristotelischen Topik*, Munich and Leipzig: K.G. Saur Verlag.
- Sedley, D. (2002), 'Aristotelian Relativities', in M. Canto-Sperber and P. Pellegrin (eds.), *Le style de la pensée*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 324–52.
- Sharples, R.W. (1983), *Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Fate*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Sharples, R.W. (1987), 'Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation', in W. Haase (ed.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1176–1243.
- Sharples, R.W. (1990), *Alexander of Aphrodisias: Ethical Problems*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Sharples, R.W. (2004), *Alexander of Aphrodisias: Supplement to on the Soul*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Sharples, R.W. (2008), *Alexander Aphrodisiensis, De anima libri mantissa. A new edition of the Greek text with introduction and commentary*, Peripatoi 21, Berlin: W. de Gruyter.
- Sharples, R.W. (2010), *Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC to 200 AD. An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sharples, R. and Alberti, A. (1999), *Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics*, Peripatoi 17, Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

- Shiel, J. (1974), 'Boethius and Eudemos', *Vivarium* XII, 14–16.
- Shorey, P. (1889), 'Syllogismoi ex Hypotheseos', *The American Journal of Philology* 10, 460–2.
- Slomkowski, P. (1997), *Aristotle's Topics*, Leiden/New York/Köln: Brill.
- Smith, R. (1997), *Aristotle: Topics Books I and VIII with Excerpts from Related Texts*, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.
- Solmsen, F. (1929), *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik*, Weidmann: Berlin.
- Sorabji, R. (ed.), (1990), *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, London: Duckworth.
- Sorbi, L. (1999), *Aristotele. La logica comparativa*, Firenze: Olschki.
- Sorbi, L. (2002), *Aristotele. La logica comparativa II. La distribuzione del bene negli enti*, Firenze: Olschki.
- Spranzi, M. (2011), *The Art of Dialectic between Dialogue and Rhetoric. The Aristotelian Tradition*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Bejamins Publishing Company.
- Striker, G. (1979), 'Aristoteles über Syllogismen "Aufgrund einer Hypothese"', *Hermes* 107, 33–50.
- Strobach, N. (2001), 'Schlüsse aus Annahmen bei Aristoteles. Eine argumentationstheoretische Deutung des syllogismos ex hypotheseos', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 55, 246–257.
- Stump, E. (1982), 'Topics: Their Development and Absorption into the Consequences', in N. Kretzmann et al., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 273–299.
- Stump, E. (1989), *Dialectic and its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Tsouni, G. (2016), 'Peripatetic Ethics in the First Century BC: The Summary of Didymus', in A. Falcon (ed.) *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity*, Leiden: Brill, 120–37.
- Tsouni, G. (2019), *Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Ophuijsen, J.M. (2001), *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Topics I*, translated with notes, London: Duckworth.
- Von Fritz, K. (1978), *Schriften zur griechische Logik, I & II*, Stuttgart: Verlag Frommann-Holzboog.
- Wagner, T. and Rapp, Ch. (2004), *Aristoteles Topik*. Übersetzt und kommentiert, Stuttgart: Reclam.
- Wallies, M. (1891), *Die griechischen Ausleger der aristotelischen Topik*, Berlin: Gaertner.
- Warren, J. (2004), *Facing Death: Epicurus and his Critics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zadro, A. (1974), *Aristotele. I Topici, traduzione, introduzione e commento*, Napoli: Loffredo.
- Zhmud, L. (2002), 'Eudemos' History of Mathematics', in I. Bodnár and W. Fortenbaugh (eds.), (2002), 263–306.

# English–Greek Glossary

absence: <i>apousia</i>	bad: <i>kakos</i>
accident: <i>sumbebêkos</i> ; to belong as an accident: <i>sumbebêkenai</i>	base: <i>aiskhros</i> ; <i>phaulos</i>
account: <i>logos</i>	beautiful: <i>kalos</i>
accurate: <i>akribês</i>	because of itself: <i>di' hauto</i>
to act: <i>poiein</i>	belong: <i>huparkhein</i>
to be acted upon: <i>paskhein</i>	best: <i>beltistos</i>
action: <i>praxis</i> ; about action: <i>praktikos</i>	better: <i>ameinon</i> ; <i>beltiôn</i>
active, to be: <i>energein</i>	to blame: <i>epitimein</i>
activity: <i>energeia</i>	
actuality: <i>energeia</i>	categorical: <i>katêgorikos</i>
to acquire: <i>ptaomai</i> ; <i>epiktêsthai</i>	category: <i>katêgoria</i>
acquired: <i>epiktêtos</i>	cause: <i>aitia</i> ; <i>aition</i>
acquisition: <i>lêpsis</i> ; <i>ktêsis</i>	choice: <i>hairesis</i> ; prior choice: <i>prohairesis</i>
to adapt: <i>epharmonozein</i>	choiceworthy: <i>hairetos</i> ; more choiceworthy: <i>hairetôteros</i>
to add: <i>prostithenai</i>	circumstance: <i>peristasis</i>
addition: <i>prosthesis</i> ; <i>prothêkê</i>	close: <i>engus</i> ; <i>sunengus</i> ; <i>paraplêSION</i>
advantageous: <i>sumpheron</i>	cognition: <i>gnôsis</i>
to be affected: <i>paskhein</i>	co-extensive: <i>ep'isês</i>
affirmation: <i>kataphasis</i>	common: <i>koinos</i>
affirmative: <i>kataphatikos</i>	commonality: <i>koinônia</i>
antecedent: <i>hêgoumenon</i>	comparative: <i>sunkritikos</i>
to be antecedent: <i>hêgeisthai</i>	comparatively: <i>sunkritikôs</i>
apparent: <i>epiphanês</i>	comparison: <i>sunkrisis</i>
appropriate: <i>prosekhês</i>	complying with the right method: <i>emmethodôs</i>
apt (to sth): <i>epitêdeios</i>	consequence: <i>akolouthia</i>
argument: <i>deixis</i>	consequent: <i>hepomenon</i> ; <i>parêpomenon</i>
art: <i>tekhnê</i>	constructive argument: <i>kataskeuê</i> ; for constructive purposes: <i>pros kataskeuên</i>
arrogance: <i>thrasutês</i>	contemplation: <i>theôria</i>
assessment: <i>epikrisis</i> ; <i>krisis</i>	contemplative: <i>theôretikos</i>
attached: <i>proskeimenos</i>	contingent: <i>endekhomenon</i>
attack: <i>epikheirêma</i> ; <i>epikheirêsis</i> ; to attack: <i>epikheirein</i>	contradiction: <i>antiphasis</i>
to be avoided: <i>pheuktos</i>	

- contrary: *enantios*  
 to contribute (to the achievement of an end): *suntelein*  
 controversy: *amphisbêtesis*  
 to convert: *antistrephein*  
 conversion: *antistrophê*  
 to cooperate with: *sunergos einai*  
 to coordinate: *sustoikhon*; column of coordination: *sustoikhia*  
 correctly done: *katorthôthen*  
 corruption: *phthora*  
 courage: *andreia*  
 craft: *tekhne*  
  
 deduction: *sullogismos*  
 deed: *ergon*  
 defect: *elleipsis*  
 definition: *horismos*  
 to deliberate: *bouleuesthai*; result of previous deliberation: *probebouleumenon*; without previous deliberation: *aprobouleutôs*  
 to demolish: *anaskeuazein*  
 to deny: *arnousthai*  
 destructive: *anaskeuastikos*; for destructive purposes: *pros anaskeuên*  
 determination: *diorismos*  
 determinate: *aphôrismenos*; *hôrismenos*; *diôrismenos*  
 to determine: *diorizein*  
 determined: *diôrismenos*  
 devoted to enjoyment: *apolaustikos*  
 to diverge: *diaphônein*  
 to divide: *diäirein*  
 division: *diäiresis*  
 discernment: *epikrisis*  
  
 end: *telos*  
 to establish: *kataskeuazein*; to establish at the same time: *sunkataskeuazein*  
 excellence: *akrotês*  
  
 excess: *hyperokhê*  
 exposition: *paradosis*  
 to express: *hêrmeneuein*  
 extreme: *akrotês*  
  
 far (from the end): *porrô*  
 to find hard to endure: *dusphorein*  
 fine: *kalos*  
 to follow/follow upon: *akolouthein*; *hepesthai*  
 formulated: *ekpheromenon*  
 formulation: *ekphora*  
 for the most part: *epi to polu*  
 friend: *philos*  
 friendship: *philia*  
  
 generation: *genesis*  
 genus: *genos*  
 genus-like: *genikos*  
 genus-related: *genikos*  
 to a greater extent: *mallon*  
 with greater extension: *epi pleon*  
 good: *agathos*  
 good physical condition: *euexia*  
 greater amount: *hyperbolê*  
  
 happiness: *eudaimonia*  
 having: *ekhein*  
 health: *hugieia*  
 to a higher degree: *mallon*  
 to a lower degree: *hêtton*  
 to hold in esteem: *spoudazein*  
 honourable: *timios*  
 hypothesis: *hupothesis*  
 hypothetical: *hupothetikos*  
  
 impulse: *hormê*  
 in its own right: *kath'hauto*  
 incapacity: *adunamia*  
 incidentally: *kata sumbebêkos*  
 to include: *emperiekhein*; *periekhein*

included among, be: *enhuparkhein*

increase: *epidosis*

indeterminate: *adioristos*

indicative, that indicates: *dêlôtikos*

indifferent: *adiaphoros*

indivisible: *atomos*

induction: *epagôgê*

inflection: *ptosis*

instrument: *organon*

instrumental: *organikos*

intermediate: *mesos*

justice: *dikaïosunê*

lack of emotions: *apatheia*

lack of pain: *alupia*

lack of reputation: *adoxia*

leading back: *anaphora*

less: *hêttôn*

to a lesser extent: *hêttôn*

(linguistic) formulation: *lexis*

loss: *apobolê*

to a lower degree: *hêttôn*

logic: *logikê*

logical: *logikos*

long-lasting: *polukhronios*

luck: *tukhê*; bad luck: *dustukhia*; good luck: *eutukhia*

magnitude: *megethos*

matter: *hulê*

means to an end: *to pros to telos*

moderation in emotions: *metriopatheia*

to modify: *metapherein*; *metatithenai*

moral: *êthikos*

more: *mallon*

natural: *phusikos*; natural inaptitude: *aphuia*

nature: *phusis*; by nature: *phusei*

necessary: *anankaion*

negation: *apophasis*

negative: *apophatikos*

need: *endeia*; in need: *deomenos*; *endeês*; in

want of naught: *anendeês*

next to each other [as equivalent]: *ek parallêlou*

number: *arithmos*; in number: *arithmôî*; *kat' arithmon*

objection: *enstasis*

opinion: *doxa*

opposites: *antikeimena*

opposition: *antithesis*

outcome: *ergon*

(something's) own: *idios*

painlessness: *alupia*

particular: *epi merous*

perfection: *teleiotês*

persuasive: *pithanos*; *peistikos*

plausible: *pithanos*

pleasure: *hêdonê*

position: *keisthai*

potentially: *dunamei*

poverty: *penia*

power: *dunamis*

practical: *praktikos*

to predicate: *katêgorein*

predicate: *katêgoroumenon*

praiseworthy: *epainetos*

presence: *parousia*

to be present: *pareinai*

to present: *paradidonai*

privation: *sterês*

problem: *problêma*

to procure: *porizein*; to procure in addition: *proskataskeuazein*

product: *ergon*

productive: *poiêtikos*

proper: *oikeios*

proportion: *analogia*; *analogon*; *logos*

proprium: *idion*

to prove at the same time:

*sunapodeiknunai*

proximate: *prosekhês*

quality: *poiôtês*

quantity: *poson; posotês*

rational: *logikos*

reasoning: *logos*

recovery: *analêpsis*

relative: *pros ti*

removal: *anhairesis*

to remove: *anhairein*

to remove at the same time: *sunanhairein*

reputable: *endoxos*

reputation: *doxa*; good reputation: *eukleia*;

bad reputation: *adoxia*

(the thing) rightly done: *katorthôma*

to require: *axioun*

requirement: *axiôsis*

result: *ergon*

self-control: *enkrateia*

service: *khreia; diakonia*

to be set next to each other [as equivalent]:

*ek parallêlou keimena*

to set out: *ektithenai*

to set up (a problem): *sunhistasthai*

setting out: *ekthesis*

shift: *metathesis*

to show: *deiknunai*

to signify: *sêmainein*

similar: *homoios*

species: *eidos*; in species: *eidei*

specific (to sth): *idios*

specifically: *eidikôs; idiôs*

stable: *bebaios*

starting point: *aphormê*

strength: *iskhus*

strictly speaking: *kuriôs*

subject: *hupokeimenon*

substance: *ousia*

to subtract: *aphairein*

subtraction: *aphairesis*

such and such: *toiouton*

suitable: *epikairos*

to be suitable: *harmonozein*

superiority: *hyperokhê; hyperbolê*

to be superior: *huperekhein*

superfluous: *ek parousias*

survey: *epiblepsis*

to survey: *epiblepein*

to take away: *aphairein*

to teach: *didaskein*

teaching: *didaskalia*

temperance: *sôphrosunê*

thesis: *thesis*

time: *kairos; khronos*

tool: *organon*

toughness: *karteria*

to transfer: *metapherein*

true: *alêthês*

trustworthy: *axiopistos; pistos*

universal/universally: *katholou*

unmixed: *amigês*

use: *khreia; khrêsis*

useful: *ôphelimos; khrêsimos*

usefulness: *khreia*

virtue: *aretê*

way back: *epanodos*

wealth: *ploutos*

what [is] precisely: *hoper*

when: *pote*

where: *pou*

whole: *holon*

wish: *boulêsis*

wisdom: *sophia*

without qualification: *haplôs*

# Greek–English Index

References are to the page and line numbers of the Greek text (indicated in the margins of the translation).

- adiaphoros**, indifferent 247,19.26.  
**adioristos**, indeterminate 288,15 ff.  
**adioristôs**, indeterminately 288,14; 290, 5–6.  
**adoxia**, lack of reputation; bad reputation  
 223,20; 232,23–4; 247,21; 261,3;  
 266,25; 271,21.  
**adunamia**, incapacity 281,1 ff.  
**agathos**, good 221,31 *passim*  
**aiskhros**, base 251,32; 252,1.  
**aitia**, cause 222,21; 233,10; 259,1.  
**aition**, cause; responsible 222,28; 131,17 ff.;  
 232,7 ff.; 237,16 ff.; 266,2 ff.; 267,10.  
**akolouthēin**, to follow, to follow upon  
 230,30 *passim*  
**akolouthia**, consequence 245,1.  
**akribês**, accurate 248,23; 262,12.  
**akribôs**, accurately 262,2.  
**akrotês**, excellence; extreme 261,19; 265,16  
 ff.  
**alêthês**, true 226,5–6; 234,4; 246,21–2;  
 262,3–4; 267,2.10.25; 280,9.11;  
 281,24.26; 283,28; 289,14; 290,5.16.  
**alupia**, lack of pain; painlessness  
 248,5.8.16.18; 266.25; 278,18.  
**ameinon**, better 237,16 ff.  
**amigês**, unmixed 255,26; 265,20; 278,17 ff.  
**amphibêtesis**, controversy 221,11; cf.  
 225,5.  
**analêpsis**, recovery 250,18.  
**analogia/analogon**, proportion 240,1 ff. (cf.  
 logos 237,19).  
**anankaïos**, necessary 223,6; 245,20.21;  
 257,21 ff.; 260,31; 261,1.  
**anaphora**, leading back 217,22; 229,16;  
 237,15; 238,5 ff.; 242,15.  
**anaskeuastikos**, destructive 219,30 *passim*  
**pros anaskeuên**, for destructive  
 purposes 284,10–11 *passim*  
**anaskeuazein**, to demolish 217,4–5 *passim*  
**andreia**, courage 247,27 *passim*  
**anendeês**, in want of naught 243,24.26;  
 254,29.  
**anhairein**, to remove 236,20–1;  
 249,17.22.25; 286,4; 288,5.6.11;  
 289,17 ff.; 290,8 ff.  
**anhairesis**, removal 290,14.20.  
**anhairetikos**, that removes 243,3;  
 272,19.23.  
**antikeimena**, opposites 280,6–7 ff.;  
 291,24 ff.  
**antiphasis**, contradiction 280,13; 281,21.  
**antistrephein**, to convert 230,30–1; 263,20;  
 264,1.19.  
**antistrophê**, conversion 256,13.16;  
**antithesis**, opposition 280,13; 281,22.  
**apatheia**, lack of emotions 239,6–7.,  
**aphairein**, to subtract; to take away 268,16  
 ff.; 273,17.25; 278,9 ff.  
**aphairesis**, subtraction 268,16 ff.;  
 277,28 ff.  
**aphôrismenos**, determinate 249,11–12  
**aphormê**, starting point 223,19; 271,3.  
**aphuia**, , natural inaptitude 272,22.,  
**apobolê**, loss 250,15 ff.; 260,27 ff.; 272,22–3.  
**apolaustikos**, devoted to enjoyment  
 265,5–6.  
**apophasis**, negation 281,21 ff.  
**apophatikos**, negative 281,28 *passim*  
**apousia**, absence 232,8 ff.; 260,19 ff.  
**aretê**, virtue 222,18 ff. *passim*  
**arithmos**, number 268,24; 275,28; 293,8 ff.  
**arithmôi**, in number 292,15.  
**kat'arithmon**, in number 246,22; 292,22.  
**arnousthai**, to deny 260,8 ff.  
**atomos**, indivisible 291,19.23; 292,14.19;  
 293,10.

- axiopistos**, trustworthy 224,4 and 18.  
**axiôsis**, requirement 281,7.  
**axioun**, to require 225,14; 280,17 *passim*
- bebaios**, stable 222,1 ff.  
**beltiôn**, better 218,2; 220,14 ff. *passim*  
**beltistos**, best 256,1 ff. *passim*  
**boulêsis**, wish 229,26.29.  
**bouleuesthai**, to deliberate 245,30; 246,1  
    **aprobouleutôs** without previous  
    deliberation 223,5  
    **probebouleumenos** result of previous  
    deliberation 223,5
- deiknunai**, to show 217,5 *passim*  
**deixis**, argument 220,9; 287,29.  
**dêlôtikos**, indicative, that indicates  
    227,7.24–5; 228,25.  
**deomenos** (also: *endeês*) in need 243,23.26–  
    7; 254,29.  
**diakonia**, service 262,2.  
**diaphônein**, to diverge 222,8.  
**didaskalia**, teaching 220,3.  
**didaskein**, to teach 220,11; 257,17–18.  
**diäirein**, to divide 253,7; 271,1.4;  
    291,18.30–1; 292,6.16 ff.  
**diäiresis**, division 242,4; 271,3; 291,21;  
    292,10–11.23; 293,10.  
**dikaio sunê**, justice 228,8 ff. *passim*  
**diorizein**, to determine 289,5; 292,15.  
**diôrismenos**, determined; determinate  
    225,6; 288,16.24; 289,6; 290,1.2.10.  
**diorismos**, determination 288,14; 290,2–  
    3.14.18.  
**di' hauto**, because of itself 229,1 ff.; 237,3;  
    243,3; 269,9 ff.; 269,19 ff.; 270,12 ff.;  
    271,11 ff.  
**doxa**, opinion; reputation 223,3.7–8; 226,18  
    ff.; 232,22 ff.; 244,15–16; 247,23;  
    261,1 ff.; 265,11; 266,25; 269,9 ff.;  
    269,19 ff.; 270,14 ff.; 272,29.  
**dunamis**, capacity; power 229, 6–7;  
    236,12.16.25; 242,6.9; 248,12–13;  
    259,25 ff.; 281,1 ff.; 286,12 ff.  
    **dunamai**, potentially; in potentiality  
    233,3; 238,7; 247,17; 254,30; 272,16.  
**dusphorein**, to find hard to endure 260,  
    19 ff.  
**dustukhia**, bad luck 223.26.
- eidikôs**, specifically 276,21.  
**eidos**, species 220,11; 228,29–30; 256,3 ff.;  
    261.17 ff.; 291,19 ff.; 292,19 ff.  
**eidei**, in species 292,15.  
**ekhein**, having (the category of) 218,27.  
**ekpheromenos**, formulated 263,6.  
**ekphora**, formulation 230,16.  
**ekthesis**, setting out 276,7; 277,10–11.  
**ektithesthai**, to set out 217,3.6; 277,21.29;  
    284,16; 287,3.5.,  
**ek parallêlou**, next to each other [as  
    equivalent] 220,14; 222,7; 224,14;  
    250,15–16.  
**ek parousias**, superfluous 257,21 ff.  
**elleipsis**, defect 221,31.  
**emmethodôs**, complying with the right  
    method 275,21.  
**emperiekhein** (or: *periekhein*), to include  
    222,23; 237,2; 246,21 ff.; 271,25;  
    273,28; 274,4.  
**enantios**, contrary 232,5; 250,4 ff.; 278,16  
    ff.; 280,16.18–19.23.  
**endeia**, need 223,21; 248,14; 258,8.  
**endekhomenon**, contingent 223,6; 285,24 ff.  
**endoxos**, reputable 224,7; 226,6.15; 232,25;  
    257,15; 266,24; 280,16–17.23.26;  
    282,25–6; 283,2–3.  
**energeia**, activity; actuality 236,23.25;  
    237,20; 238,22.24; 253,8; 254,29–30;  
    263,19 ff.; 266,4; 270,20.  
**energein**, to be active 237,12.  
**engus**, close 237,13 ff.; 252,8 ff.  
**enhuparkhein**, to be included among  
    246,15.  
**enkrateia**, self-control 221,22; 244,1;  
    255,24; 272,6; cf. 260,16.18.  
**enstasis**, objection 246,28; 247,17; 253,15;  
    254,14; 291,8.  
**epagôgê**, induction 218,4; 220,20.  
**epainetos**, praiseworthy 242,1 ff.  
**epanodos**, way back 250,18.  
**epharmozein**, to adapt 277,16.22; 282,10.  
**epiblepein**, to survey 291,1 ff.; 292,14.  
**epiblepsis**, survey 291,13.  
**epibolê**, conception 233, 5.  
**epidosis**, increase 223,25.  
**epikairos**, suitable 280,3; 282,23.  
**epikheirein**, to attack 217,7; 268,15; 281,15;  
    282,5; 287,8.

- epikheirêma/epikheirêsis*, attack 220,8;  
221,30; 226,8; 234,27; 257,15; 271,5;  
280,23; 282,14.
- epikrisis*, discernment; assessment 220,7;  
227,5; 231,20; 234,4.15; 243,16;  
244,3.8.
- epiktêsthai*, to acquire 259,3.
- epiktêtos*, acquired 233,4.7.21
- epiphanês*, apparent 255,1 ff.
- epitêdeios*, apt (to sth) 261,26.28.
- epitimein*, to blame 260,19 ff.
- ep'isês*, co-extensive; equally 224,14;  
269, 4–6.
- epi merous*, particular 279,11 ff.
- epi pleon*, with greater extension 224,15; cf.  
220,15.
- epi to polu*, for the most part 244,29; 285,27.
- ergon*, outcome; product; result; deed 263,2  
ff. *passim*
- êthikos*, moral, 217,21–23; 224,20; 292,6–7.
- eudaimonia*, happiness 221,7–10;  
222,16.18; 229,3.6; 237,10.21; 238,4  
ff.; 240,25 ff.; 242,5; 247,4–5.26;  
252,15.28; 253,5.9–10.
- euexia*, good physical condition 221,12;  
222,21.25; 223,2; 237,27; 247,7;  
251,17; 258,16; 265,19–20; 268,3 ff.;  
277,8–9.
- eukleia*, good reputation 222,14 ff.;  
245,24.26; 253,5.
- eutukhia*, good luck 223,4; 253,4; 262,18.
- genesis*, generation 250,3 ff.; 251,20 ff.;  
263,5; 282,20 ff.
- genikos*, genus-like; genus-related 291,21;  
293,3.10.
- genos*, genus 217,15 ff.
- gnôsis*, cognition 220,7; 221,18; 283,20–21.
- hairesis*, choice 224,1.18; 226,1.7.18; 258,14.
- hairetos*, choiceworthy 217,22 *passim*
- hairetôtêros*, more choiceworthy 217,21  
*passim*
- haplôs*, without qualification 217,4 *passim*
- harmozein*, to be suitable; to fit 225,10;  
273,9; 278,5; 279,14; 286,25; 287,9;  
cf. 226,24.
- hêdesthai*, to feel pleasure 248,14–16.27;  
257,6–7
- hêdonê*, pleasure 226,16 ff.; 246,9–13;  
247,28 ff.; 253,5; 257,6–7; 260,1 ff.;  
262,16–17; 265,3–4.19–20; 266,23;  
272,4.16.20–1; 279,8; 280,17 ff.;  
282,14 ff.; 285,3–12.23–4; 288,21 ff.
- hêgeisthai*, to be an antecedent 245,30;  
246,3.
- hêgoumenon*, antecedent 241,4; 246,3.
- hepesthai*, to follow; to follow upon 243,  
17 ff.; 255,29.
- hepomenos*, consequent; that follows 241,5;  
243,18 ff.
- hêrneuein*, to express 241,28.
- hêtton*, less; to a lesser extent; to a lower  
degree 217,8 *passim*
- hexis*, disposition 228,6; 237,12.21;  
250,29.
- holon*, whole 266,14 ff.; 267,26 ff.;  
278,2 ff.
- homoios*, similar 219,24 *passim*
- hoper*, what [is] precisely 227,7 ff.
- hôrismenos*, determinate 220,5; 225,9;  
275,15.17.
- horismos*, definition 217,16; 279,1–2.
- hormê*, impulse 235,26.
- hugieia*, health 219,5 ff.; 221,12; 222,21 ff.;  
226,22; 229,6 ff.; 231,28–9; 232,14 ff.;  
236,8 ff.; 237,10 ff.; 238,20; 239,17 ff.;  
240,26 ff.; 244,9–10; 245,8 ff.; 246, 17  
ff.; 250,13 ff.; 255,10 ff.; 257,4;  
258,16; 260,2 ff.; 262,27; 265,4 ff.;  
266,19–20; 268,3 ff.; 270,24; 272,4;  
273,2; 274,24 ff.; 277,9; 282,31.
- hulê*, matter 217,19; 218,9.11–12; 219,18.
- huparkhein*, to belong 217,14 *passim*
- hyperbolê*, superiority; greater amount  
221,9; 265,14.16.
- huperokhê*, excess; superiority 221,9.12.14–  
15.26.28.; 222,6–7.18; 235,19; 240,8;  
243,15–16; 265,10; 273,12.25–6;  
274,14.
- huperekhein*, to exceed; to be superior  
221,28–9; 235,16.18; 236,7; 240,24;  
265,4.8–9; 271,13.
- hupokeimenon*, subject 227,11; 292,  
16.23–4; cf. 218,11.
- hupothesis*, hypothesis 245,1; 287,1 ff.;  
288,2 ff.
- hupothetikos*, hypothetical 218,5.

- idion*, proprium 217,16.  
*idios*, (something's) own; specific (to sth) 234,24; 240,17 ff.; 235,3 ff.; *passim*  
*idiôs*, specifically 224,20; 259,27; 263,28; 264,3.  
*iskhus*, strength 236,10 ff.; 242,13–16.28; 246,18.25; 247,21; 248,19.27.30; 255,18; 257,8–9; 262,28; 263,30 ff.; 267,3 ff.; 269,3–6; 270,25; 271,11–12; 272,1.13; 273,2.  
*kairos*, time 248,9 ff.; 249,1 ff.  
*kakos*, bad 232,7.20; 243,18 ff.; 247,20.22; 248,7; 255,21.23; 256,27; 275,27; 278,6.17; 280,17 ff.; 282,26 ff.  
*kalos*, beautiful; fine 218,9; 224,3; 231,7; 242,1 ff.; 253,6–7; 257,25; 262,7; 266,1; 271,6 ff.; 280,21.  
*karteria*, toughness 244,1–2; 249,28; cf. 260,16.18.  
*kataphasis*, affirmation 281,20 ff.; 290,29.  
*kataphatikos*, affirmative 281,28; 285,15–16; 288,2.7.22; 289,19 ff.; 290,8–9; 292,5.  
*kataskeuê*, constructive argument; establishing 274,5; 279,16.  
*kataskeuazein*, to establish 217,4 *passim*  
*katêgoria*, category 218,13; 219,18–19.  
*katêgorikos*, categorical 218,5.  
*katêgorein*, to predicate 227,10 ff.  
*katêgoroumenon*, predicate 227,10 ff.; 292,20.  
*katholou*, universal; universally 231,26; 276,3 *passim*.  
*kath'hauto*, in its own right 229,19 ff.; 231,15 ff.; 232,6.28; 242,1 ff.; 259,24; 270,23; 281,28; 290,6.  
*katorthôma*, (the action) rightly done 231,25.  
*katorthôthen*, correctly done 223,5.  
*keisthai*, position (category of) 218,28.  
*khreia*, service; use; usefulness 248,12 ff.; 249,14.17.24; 261,24 *passim*  
*khêsis*, use 263,1 ff.  
*khêsimos*, useful 220,6–7 *passim*  
*khronos*, time 220,24–7; 244,28; 292,26 ff.,  
*koinônia*, commonality 235,28.  
*koinos*, common 219,6; 224,25–6; 235,15.21; 242,3; 255,15 ff.; 258,23; 259,5; 261,10–11; 263,5; 267,11.18.24; 276,7; 277,3; 278,14; 279,28; 280,3; 282,23; 291,17; 292,13.  
*krisis*, assessment 224,1.25; 225,13; 226,7; 234,10.  
*ктаομαι*, to acquire 255,9; 258,25; 259,19; 265,23–4.  
*ktêsis*, acquisition 258,27; 259,1.  
*kuriôs*, strictly speaking 227,7 ff.; 246,5; 263,26; 275,5.12; 288,25.  
*lêpsis*, acquisition 250,4; 251,20–21; 283,32; 284,1.  
*lexis*, (linguistic) formulation 253,23; 263,9.  
*logikos*, logical; rational 220,17.19; 224,19.21; 264,3; 292,6–7.  
*logikê*, logic 218,3.  
*logos*, account; proportion; reasoning 228,22; 232,6.11; 236,16; 237,19; 248,28; 259,29; 260,29; 261,30; 272,17; 273,20; 275,6–7; 276,14; 278,25 ff.; 283,1–2; 293,6.  
*mallon*, more; to a greater extent; to a higher degree 217,7 *passim*  
*megethos*, magnitude 264,24; 268,23.27; 274,14; 275,28; 292,31.  
*mesos*, intermediate 223,10; 256,31.  
*metapherein*, to transfer; to modify 250,10; 278,17.23; 280,6.15; 281,14.  
*metathesis*, shift 277,3.  
*metatithenai*, to modify 278,3.  
*metriopatheia*, moderation in emotions 239,6.  
*oikeios*, proper 229,29; 234,24 *passim*  
*ôphelimos*, useful 229,3; 242,7.  
*organikos*, instrumental 231,5; 263,29.  
*organon*, instrument; tool 231,7; 243,4 ff.; 267,21.  
*ousia*, substance 217,17; 218,14–15; 219,1–2; 220,18.  
*paradidonai*, to present; to give 221,2; 222,3; 223,30; 227,20; 231,20; 235,4.7; 273,8; 277,7; 279,8.  
*paradosis*, exposition 220,4.9.29; 275,17; 284,15.

- parepomenon**, consequent 243,13 ff.; 283,30–1.
- pareinai**, to be present 262,13.17.
- parousia**, presence 229,21; 251,3; 256,24; 257,23.26; 262,16.23; 276,19.
- paskhein**, to be affected; to be acted upon 218,26; see *poiein*.
- peistikos**, persuasive 218,4.
- penia**, poverty 223,20; 231,12; 232,23; 243,9–10; 245,5; 248,29; 251,11; 261,3; 272,21.
- periekhein**, to include (see: *emperiekhein*)
- peristasis**, circumstance 225,10; 229,23; cf. 255,26.
- phaulos**, base 255,25.
- pheuktos**, to be avoided 223,19 ff.; 228,30–1; 232,6; 243,19; 244,19 ff.; 245,7; 248,29; 250,6 ff.; 266,25 ff.; 270,9–11; 272,17 ff.; 275,27; 276,4 ff.; 278,23; 282,13 ff.; 283,29.
- philia**, friendship 242,13.17.28; 250,2; 265,17–18; 271,26.
- philos**, friend 223,18; 229,12 ff.; 249,27; 250,1; 253,6; 257,1 ff.; 261,3–4; 264,12 ff.; 265,24.26.
- phthora**, corruption 250,3 ff.; 263,6; 282,20 ff.
- phusikos**, natural 217,23; 218,1; 220,17–19; 262,25.
- phusis**, nature 229,21; 231,10; 233,10 ff.; 234,3; 242,12 ff.; 258,14.
- phusei**, by nature 233,1 ff.; 242,27 ff.; 274,18 ff.; 276,9 ff.
- pithanos**, persuasive; plausible 257,15; 284,14.
- pistos**, trustworthy 221,27; cf. *axiopistos* and *pithanos*
- ploutos**, wealth 219,5–9; 221,7.10; 222,14; 225,13; 226,20–1; 229,6; 231,5–6; 232,22; 234,9; 237,10; 238,20 ff.; 239,19 ff.; 242,13–16; 243,3 ff.; 244,16; 246,18 ff.; 246,21 ff.; 250,14 ff.; 255,10 ff.; 257,4; 259,1; 261,2 ff.; 262,16; 263,29 ff.; 265,9.17–18; 266,18–19; 267,3 ff.; 268,5–6; 269,1 ff.; 270,24; 272,1.29; 273,19; 277,9–10.
- poiein**, acting (the category of) 218,25;  
**eu poiein**, acting well 224,29; 234,18–19; 243,25–7; 253,9–10; 264,16 ff.
- poiêtikos**, productive 238,16 ff.; 239,13 ff.; 240,1 ff.; 242,7; 250,6–9; 251,28.31; 283,31–2.
- poiôtês**, quality 218,16–19; 228,3; 250,29–9; 292,28 ff.
- polukhronios**, long-lasting 222,1 ff.; 274,7 ff.
- porizein**, to procure 258,21 ff.; 256,25–6 ff.
- porrô**, far (from to the end) 237,16; 238,12;
- poson**, quantity 228,1–4; 292,28 ff.
- posotês**, quantity 218,20–1.
- pote**, when (the category of) 218,24.
- pou**, where (the category of) 218,23.
- praktikos**, practical; about action 219,11 ff.; 221,13; 223,9; 224,23; 244,12 ff.; 255,7.26; 265,6.
- praxis**, action 217,22; 236,22 ff.; 254,6; 255,6 ff.; 263,2 ff.; 266,1; 268,12–3; 270,17.
- problêma**, problem 217,7 ff.
- prohairesis**, prior choice 264,4.
- prosekhôs**, appropriately; proximately 217,16; 238,16; 239,22.
- proskataskeuazein**, to procure in addition 257,24–5.
- proskeimenon**, attached cf. 217,11; 256,26–7; 268,2–3; 274,2–3.
- prosthêkê**, addition 220,26; 222,25.27; 234,13.
- prosthesis**, addition 219,24; 220,27; 266,13 ff.; 268,1 ff.
- prostithenai**, to add 227,7.10; 249,3; 266,15 ff.; 267,26 ff. *passim*
- pros ti**, relative 218,16.21; 281,13.
- (to) pros to telos**, means to an end 237,1 ff.; 238,1–2.
- ptôsis**, inflection 263,1 ff.; 280,7; 282,3 ff.
- sêmeinein**, to signify 227,8.11; 253,2.
- sophia**, wisdom 219,10 ff.; 221,23; 234,8; 262,29.
- sôphrosunê**, temperance 219,8; 221,23; 247,19.22; 248,26 ff.; 249,6 ff.; 255,5 ff.; 262,29; 267,9 ff.; 268,10; 271,17 ff.; 284,22.
- spoudazein**, to hold in esteem 255,10; 259,4.
- sterêsis**, privation 250,18 ff.; 280,27 ff.
- sullogismos**, deduction 218,4; 220,20.
- sumbebêkeinai**, to belong as an accident 217,5 ff. *passim*

- sumbebēkos**, accident 217,3 ff. *passim*  
**kata sumbebēkos**, incidentally 228,2  
*passim*  
**sumpheron**, advantageous 225,26; 271,6.13;  
 272,3 ff.; 284,20–1.  
**sunanhairein**, to remove at the same time  
 236,20–1.  
**sunapodeiknunai**, to prove at the same  
 time 280,2.5.  
**sunergos einai**, to cooperate with  
 267,12 ff.  
**sunhistasthai**, to set up (a problem) 218,14;  
 219,19; 235,4.  
**sunkataskeuazein**, to establish at the same  
 time 279,20.  
**sunkrisis**, comparison 217,12 *passim*  
**sunkritikos**, comparative 217,6 *passim*  
**sunkritikōs**, comparatively 218,3.7;  
 220,12.  
**suntelein**, to contribute (to the  
 achievement of an end) 237,14 ff.;  
 238,3 ff.; 241,24; 242,8; 258,16.
- sustoikhon**, coordinate 263,4 ff.; 280,7;  
 282,10 ff.  
**tekhnhē**, art; craft 218,7.13; 223,4; 224,5 ff.;  
 225,27; 226,4 ff.; 233,7–8; 255,22.  
**teleiotēs**, perfection 261,19.  
**telos**, end 237,1 ff. *passim*  
**theōretikos**, contemplative 219,11 ff.;  
 220,18; 221,13; 223,9; 244,12–13;  
 255,7.26; 265,5; 266,3; 289,8.  
**theōria**, contemplation 236,22–26; 254,6;  
 255,6.12; 266,3; 268,12; 270,7–8.  
**thesis**, thesis 290,1.2.  
**thrasutēs**, arrogance 245,21; 254,27.,  
**timios**, honourable 229,3; 233,24 ff.; 236,3  
 ff.; 242,1 ff.; 270,12 ff.; 273,14–18.22;  
 274,28–30.  
**toiouton**, such and such 273,13; 274,1;  
 276,16 ff.  
**tropos**, mode; way 219,19; 230,15.18.19;  
 290,26.  
**tukhē**, luck 223,4; 231,24 ff.

# Index of Passages

## Works referred to in the introduction

Alexander of Aphrodisias

*de Fato* 175,5–8, p. 32

*Eth. Probl.* (= *Ethica Problemata*)

118,23–120,2, n.65

*in An. Pr.* (= *in Aristotelis Analytica*

*Priora*) 2,33–4,29, n.74; 8,3–9,2,

n.74; 265,17, n.30; 265,20 n.30;

265,30–266,5, p. 14; 324,19–22, p. 16;

324,19–33, p. 13; 324,19–325,24,

p. 13; 325,14–15, p. 15

*in Metaph.* (= *in Aristotelis Metaphysica*)

14,3–15,19, n.60

*in Top.* (= *in Aristotelis Topica*) 5,21–7,

p. 15; 14,20–7, p. 18; 19,22–7, n.37;

21,31–22,6, n.37; 45,11–13, n.4; 52,2

ff; 52,19–27, p.26; 52,21–7, p. 8;

52,27–53,9, p. 8; 55,24–7, n.4;

74,2–11, p. 30; 74,11–75,3, p. 25;

75,28, p.30; 77,24, p. 24; 77,27–78,4,

p.30; 93,22–95,16, p. 25; 126,11–31,

p. 16; 129,16–131,19, n.45; 217,13–

19, p. 7; 217,16, n.20; 217,19–218,13,

n.49; 218,13–219,1, p. 7; 218,13–

219,3, p. 17; 218,16, p. 9; 219,1–3,

p. 7; 219,3–17, p. 17, n. 17; 219,20–

220,2, p. 17; 220,14–20, p. 28;

221,5–10, p. 30; 221,13–17, p. 30;

221,17–27, p. 30; 221,27–33, p. 9;

226,5–6, n.36; 233,26–235,2, p. 28;

234,3–4, p. 29; 234,4, n.36; 234,4–8,

p. 29; 234,10–11, p. 29; 236,21–6,

p. 29; 237,1–241,28, n.60; 237,2, p.

20; 238,7–8, p. 21; 242,3–243,11, p.

29; 242,4–8, p. 29; 246,21–2, n.36;

247,19–27, p. 27; 256,30–1, p. 27;

257,10–19, p. 32; 257,15–19, p. 32;

262,3–4, n.36; 267,2, n.36; 267,10–

25, n.36; 271,3–272,24, p. 29; 272,

16–17, p. 21; 273,8–274,8, p. 29;

275,14–276,8, n.50; 275,15–23, n.39;

275,28, p. 11; 276,7, n.40; 277,3, n.41;

280,1–286,31, n.42; 280,16–20, n.43;

288,24, p. 23; 288,25, p. 25; 289,1,

n.48; 289,2–3, p. 23; 289,7–8, p. 24;

290,28–9, p. 24

*Mixt.* (= *de Mixtione*) 215,29–32,

p. 32

*Quaest.* (= *Quaestiones*) 1.14, p. 29; 4.1,

p. 29; 4.17, 137,22–3, p. 29; 4.20,

p. 29

Aristotle

*An. Pr.* (= *Analytica Priora*) 1.1, p. 23;

1.1, 24a17–22, pp. 5, 21; 1.28, 45b15,

n.28; 1.28, 45b17, p. 12; 2.22,

68a25–b7, p. 11; 2.22, 68a39–68b7,

p. 12

*Cat.* (= *Categoriae*) 7, p. 9; 8, 10b26 ff,

p. 17; 8, 11a15–19, p. 17

*EN* (= *Ethica Nicomachea*) 1.1, p. 28,

n.60; 1.1, 1094a1–22, n.60; 10.2,

1172b9 ff, n.73

*Metaph.* (= *Metaphysica*) 9.2,

1046a36–b28, n.65

*Top.* (= *Topica*) 1.1, 100a18–24, n.3; 1.1,

100a20; n.37 1.1, 100a29–30, n.37;

1.4–5, p. 3; 1.4, 101b18–19, n.5; 1.5,

102a5–17, n.5; 1.5, 102a14–20, p. 3;

1.5, 102a24–30, n.5; 1.5, 102a36–b3,

n.5; 1.5, 102b6–8, n.9; 1.5, 102b14,

p. 25; 1.5, 102b20–6, n.5; 1.6,

102b27–103a5, n.11; 1.6, 102b31–5,

n.12; 1.6, 103a1–5, n.5; 1.8, p. 3; 1.10,

104a8–37, n.37; 1.11, pp. 25, 31; 1.11,

104b1–12, p. 25; 1.11, 104b3–5,

p. 30; 1.11, 104b12–17, p. 30; 1.14,

pp. 25, 31; 1.14, 105b19–29, p. 25;

1.14, 105b21–3, p. 25; 2.1, 108b34–5,

p. 21; 2.1, 108b34–109a10, p. 5; 2.1,

109a1–6, p. 21; 2.2, 109a34–b12,

p. 13; 2.10, pp. 17, 19; 2.10, 114b6–14,

- p. 6; 3.1, 116a3, p. 27; 3.1, 116a10–12, p. 30; 3.1, 116a23–8, p. 7; 3.1, 116a29, p. 27; 3.1, 116a31, p. 27; 3.1, 116a31–5, p. 7; 3.1, 116a35–9, n.38; 3.1, 116b10, p. 27; 3.1–3, pp. 5, 6, 11, 16, 31; 3.1–4, pp. 24, 29, 31, 32; 3.3, 118b27 ff, p. 29; 3.4, pp. 5, 6, 11, 35; 3.4, 119a3–4, p. 9; 3.5, pp. 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 20; 3.6, pp. 1, 2, 5, 20, 22, 23; 3.6, 119b6 ff, p. 5; 3.6, 119b7, p. 27; 3.6, 120a6, p. 23; 4.2, 122b16–17, n.32
- Aspasius  
*in EN (=in Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea)* 1,3–2,7, n.75; 19, 14–23,29, n.77; 20,3–8, n.77
- Cicero  
*Fin. (= De finibus bonorum et malorum)* 4.23, n.76  
*Off. (= de Officiis)* 1.8 n.76; 3.13–19, n.76
- Euclid  
*El. (= Elements)* 5, def. 3, n.24
- Galen  
*Inst. Log. (= Institutio Logica)* XVI 1, p. 19
- Ps.-Aristotle  
*Div. Arist. (= Divisiones Aristoteleae)* 23, n.62
- Seneca  
*Ep. (= Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium)* 94, p. 32, n.76; 95, p. 32, n.76; 95.9–12, p. 32; 95.57, n.70; 116.5–6, n.76
- Sextus Empiricus  
*Adv. Eth. (= Adversus Ethicos)* 2, n.67; 3–41, n.59; 30, n.62; 42–109, n.57; 110–3, n.68; 133–4, n.68, n.69; 139–40, n.69  
*PH (= Pyrrhonei Hypotyposes)* 1.25–8, n.71; 2.112, p. 21; 3.172, n.62; 3.179–187, n.57
- Works referred to in the notes to the translation
- Alexander of Aphrodisias  
*de Fato* 175,5–8, n.252  
*in Top. (= in Aristotelis Topica)* 3,25–5,16, n.251; 3,26–7, n.251; 35,27–9, n.407; 37,17, n.119; 39,2–10, n.108; 40,18, n.119; 41,11–14, n.119; 48,7–19, n.108; 55,2–57,14, n.317; 55,24–7, n.24; 62,28, n.119; 65,6–68,3, n.13; 65,14–17, n.13; 68,24, n.119; 69,9, n.119; 83,4–84,9, n.40; 95,26, n.33; 125,1–2, n.1; 125,16, n.119; 126,22–6, n.6; 128,15–129,13, nn.341, 404; 129,16–32, nn. 341, 404; 130,23–131,1, n.343; 131,22–133,20, n.437; 137,6–29, n.437; 138,13, n.6; 159,27–160,27, n.101; 197,22–4, n.275; 200,12 ff, n.362; 211,2, n.38; 217,1–2, n.1; 217,4, nn.2, 306; 217,19–219,3, n.29; 218,11, n.12; 218,14, nn.14, 145; 218,27, n.17; 218,28, n.18; 219,1–3, n.6; 219,3–17, nn.35, 372; 219,19, nn.14, 145; 219,20 ff, nn.2, 306; 219,20–1, n.22; 220,14, n.31; 220,14–20, n.109; 220,17, n.33; 220,20, n.37; 220,24, n.36; 220,29, n.38; 221,9–10, n.50; 221,30, n.52; 222,3–223,26, n.313; 222,13, n.55; 222,25, n.57; 223,5, n.60; 223,10, n.62; 223,10–11, n.62; 223,30, n.66; 224,1, n.67; 224,2, n.67; 224,14, nn.71, 72; 224,19, n.73; 224,22, n.74; 224,23, nn.75, 76; 224,25, n.76; 225,17, nn.83, 84; 226,30, n.95; 227,7, nn.97, 98; 227,14, n.99; 227,15, n.103; 228,2, n.103; 228,29, n.107; 229,16, n.7; 230,15–16, n.119; 230,15–20, n.137; 230,19, n.121; 231,23, n.127; 231,25, n.128; 232,1–2, n.130; 232,14, n.132; 232,14–15, n.132; 232,14–28, n.164; 232,15, n.132; 233,4, n.136; 234,25–235,2, n.141; 234,18, n.142; 234,21, n.143; 235,4, nn.14, 145; 235,7, n.147; 235,7 ff, n.150; 235,10–11, n.149; 235,11, n.149; 235,13, n.149; 235,28, n.151; 235,29, n.150; 237,2, n.156; 237,15, n.7; 239,22, n.6; 241,7, n.170; 242,1–9, n.173; 242,3, n.172; 242,4–5, n.307; 242,5, n.174; 242,15–16, n.176; 242,23, n.179; 243,15, n.184; 243,23, n.186; 243,24, n.187; 244,10, n.188;

245,13, n.193; 245,18, n.192; 245,19, n.192; 245,28, n.193; 246,16–247,12, n.301; 246,28–247,12, n.198; 248,11, n.205; 248,19, n.207; 248,23–4, n.207; 248,24, n.206; 248,26, n.208; 248,27, n.207; 250,5 ff, n.274; 250,5–11, n.274; 250,15, n.215; 250,21, n.217; 251,26, n.221; 251,29–30, n.222; 252,2–3, n.223; 252,10–23, n.230; 252,16–23, n.229; 252,27, n.228; 254,26, n.236; 256,4–6, n.245; 256,12–13, n.245; 256,26, n.246; 257,12, n.250; 257,14, n.250; 259,4, n.259; 259,8, n.260; 260,10, n.264; 260,17, n.264; 262,11, n.296; 262,15, n.268; 262,19, n.269; 264,19, n.282; 264,20–1, n.277; 265,1, n.283; 265,7, n.285; 265,8, n.285; 269,21–3, n.295; 269,22, n.295; 273,21, n.308; 274,26, n.316; 275,17–20, n.316; 275,21, n.317; 275,23–276,5, n.13; 275,28–9, n.293; 276,6, n.318; 276,15–16, n.321; 276,18–19, n.322; 276,27, n.325; 277,10–11, n.328; 277,17, n.330; 277,25–6, n.332; 277,28–278,15, n.293; 278,3, n.214; 278,17, n.214; 278,23, n.214; 280,1 ff; 280,6, n.214; 280,29–30; 281,14, n.214; 281,14 ff, n.274; 282,15, n.360; 283,21, n.385; 283,30–1, n.368; 284,3, n.370; 284,7, n.371; 284,9, n.371; 284,11, n.371; 284,12, n.371; 284,26, n.376; 284,27, n.376; 273,8–10, n.2; 282,4, n.357; 284,7–9, n.389; 284,9–13, n.388; 285,17–286,1, n.391; 285,18, n.383; 285,23–4, n.384; 286,2–3, n.387; 287,11–12, n.396; 287,25, n.398; 288,4, n.400; 288,20, n.404; 288,21, n.405; 288,27, n.408; 289,1, n.409; 289,4–8, n.422; 289,5, n.413; 290,2–9, n.413; 290,2–29, n.403; 290,5, n.421; 290,6, n.421; 291,11, n.429; 292,16–21, n.432; 292,22, n.435; 293,3, n.437; 293,10 ff, n.436; 294,1–2, n.1; 295,16–17, n.108; 368,1–2, n.1; 420,1–2, n.1; 425,15, n.6; 496,1–2, n.1; 518,1–2, n.1

*Eth. Probl.* (= *Ethica Problemata*) 1, n.89; 3, n.65; 5, n.201; 7, n.201; 16, n.201; 17, n.201; 23, nn.201, 300; 26, nn.201, 300; 30, n.65

*Mant.* (= *de Anima Libri Mantissa*) 150,20–153,27, n.89; 151,3–18, n.89; 153,29–156,27, n.210; 159,16–168,20, n.110; 166,10, n.143; 168,22–169,32, n.245; 215,29–32, n.252

*Mixt.* (= *de Mixtione*) 215,29–32, n.252  
*Quaest.* (= *Quaestiones*) 1.6, n.271; 2.17, n.337

#### Aristotle

*An. Post.* (= *Analytica Posteriora*) 1.10, 76b10–16, n.94

*An. Pr.* (= *Analytica Priora*) 1.1, 24b26–7, n.101

*Cat.* (= *Categoriae*) 2, n.32; 5, 2a9–19, n.19; 5, 2b7–28, n.19; 5, 2b22–8, n.14; 5, 2b29–3a6, n.19; 5, 3b33–4a9, nn.13, 14; 6, 6a19–25, n.13; 7, 6b20–7, n.13; 8, 10b26–11a14, n.13; 9, 11b1–7, n.13; 10, 13a22–31, n.65; 10, 13a31–6, n.216; 11, 14a23–5, n.102

*EN* (= *Ethica Nicomachea*) 1.1, n.162; 1.1, 1094a2–3, n.89; 1.6, 1096a11–1097a14, n.102; 1.6, 1096a23–b3, n.102; 1.6, 1096b8–26, n.102; 1.6, 1097b16–17, n.196; 1.7, 1098a24, n.291; 1.7, 1099b28, n.291; 1.9, 1102a23–1103a10, n.73; 2.6, 1106b28, n.60; 2.6, 1106b31, n.60; 3.3, 1112b24–1113a7, n.165; 3.5, 1114a12–21, n.65; 4.3, 1124a1–5, n.237; 5.4, 1132a18, n.299; 5.7, 1135a13, n.299; 5.10, 1137b12, n.299; 5.10, 1137b22, n.299; 5.10, 1137b26, n.299; 6.13, 1144b1–1145a6, n.210; 8.3, 1156b7–17, n.302; 9.3, 1166a29–33, n.113; 10.2, 1172b9 ff, n.92

*Metaph.* (= *Metaphysica*) 5.2, 1013b12–16, n.131; 5.5, 1014b20–2, n.253; 5.6, 1016b31–1017a3, n.436; 7.4, 1030a2–7, n.96; 9.8, 1050a4–b6, n.158; 9.8, 1050a21–b1, n.272; 10.9, 1058a29–b25, n.245; 11.8, 1065a30–2, n.129; 12.10, 1075b4, n.86

- Meteor.* (= *Meteorologica*) 1.11, 347b12–28, n.271
- Phys.* (= *Physica*) 1.3, 186a26–31, n.100; 1.3, 186a32–b14, n.96; 2.3, 195a12–14, n.131; 2.3, 195a32–b3, n.125; 2.5, 197a5 ff, n. 129
- PN* (= *Parva Naturalia*) 453b24–455b28, n.114
- Pol.* (= *Politica*) 4.11, 1295b34, n.63
- Top.* (= *Topica*) 1.1, 100a29–b23, n.251; 1.1, 100b21–3, n.68; 1.5, nn.341, 437; 1.5, 102a14–16, n.5; 1.9, n.13; 1.10, 103b8–104a37, n.68; 1.10, 104a14–15, n.69; 1.10, 104a33–7, n.69; 1.11, 104b3, n.291; 1.11, 104b9, n.291; 1.11, 104b19–105a2, n.419; 1.11, 105a3–9, n.40; 1.14, 105a34, n.48; 1.14, 105b4, n.48; 1.14, 105b12, n.48; 1.14, 105b19–29, nn.8, 33; 1.16, 108a3–6, n.49; 1.17, 108a12–13, n.50; 1.18, 108b23–4, n.50; 2.1, 108b34–109a10, n.342; 2.1, 109a1–3, n.344; 2.1, 109a1–8, n.392; 2.1, 109a11–26, n.437; 2.2, 109a34–b12, n.437; 2.2, 109b13, n.429; 2.2, 109b13–29, nn.425, 430; 2.2, 109b14–16, n.430; 2.2, 109b28, n.427; 2.2, 109b28–9, n.427; 2.4, 111a33–b11, n.434; 2.8, nn.347, 353; 2.9, n.357; 2.9, 114a26–b5, n.359; 2.9, 114a26–32, n.348; 2.9, 114a26–7, n.349; 2.9, 114a33–b5, n.349; 2.9, 114a36–b5, n.348; 2.9, 114a33–8, n.275; 2.9, 114a26–b15, n.273; 2.9, 114a36–8, n.278; 2.9, 114b16–24, nn.213, 362; 2.10, 114b25–115a24, n.25; 2.10, 114b37–115a14, nn.21, 374; 2.10, 114b38–115a6, n.375; 2.11, 115a29–33, n.26; 2.11, 115b3–10, n.27; 2.11, 115b29–35, n.134; 1.16, n.46; 1.17, n.47; 3.1–4, nn.294, 306; 3.1, 116a3, n.34; 3.1, 116a6–7, nn.39, 41; 3.1, 116a10–12, n.45; 3.1, 116a14–15, nn.70, 141, 144; 3.1, 116a15, n.87; 3.1, 116a23, nn.122, 226, 227; 3.1, 116a23–8, n.6; 3.1, 116a24, n.103; 3.1, 116a25–6, n.104; 3.1, 116a27–8, n.105; 3.1, 116a29, nn.157, 178; 3.1, 116a31, n.177; 3.1, 116a31–5, nn.115, 134; 3.1, 116a35–9, n.118; 3.1, 116b10, n.180; 3.1, 116b10 ff, n.320; 3.1, 116b11, n.139; 3.1, 116b12, n.140; 3.1, 116b15–16, n.152; 3.1, 116b22–36, n.29; 3.1, 116b23, n.225; 3.1, 116b23–36, n.304; 3.1, 116b26, n.255; 3.1, 117a1–2, n.181; 3.2, 117a16, n.21; 3.2, 117a16 ff, n.301; 3.2, 117a16–18, n.200; 3.2, 117a16–21, n.202; 3.2, 117a21, n.21; 3.2, 117a21–4, n.247; 3.2, 117a23, n.21; 3.1, 117b7–8, n.220; 3.1, 117b8–9, n.224; 3.2, 117b12, nn.228, 229; 3.2, 117b12–19, n.231; 3.2, 117b14, n.232; 3.2, 117b16–17, nn.233, 234; 3.2, 117b21–5, n.235; 3.2, 117b28–30, n. 238; 3.2, 117b30, n.240; 3.2, 117b30–1, nn.241, 242; 3.2, 117b30–2, n.336; 3.2, 117b34, n.243; 3.2, 117b36–9, n.244; 3.2, 118a2–5, n.249; 3.2, 118a12–13, n.254; 3.2, 118a13, n.257; 3.2, 118a13–15, n.258; 3.2, 118a16, n.262; 3.2, 118a17, n.261; 3.2, 118a25–6, n.266; 3.3, 118a28, n.267; 3.3, 118a29–33, n.323; 3.3, 118b1–2, n.327; 3.3, 118b3–4, n.285; 3.3, 118b10, n.21; 3.3, 118b10–11, n.333; 3.3, 118b11–14, n.292; 3.3, 118b13–14, n.291; 3.3, 118b16, nn.21, 334; 3.3, 118b17–19, n.335; 3.3, 118b20, n.305; 3.4, 118b37–9, n.338; 3.4, 119a6–7, n.311; 3.4, 119a7, n. 309; 3.5, nn.30, 274; 3.5, 119a17–19, n.324; 3.5, 119a21–2, n.330; 3.6, n.274; 3.6, 119a32–6, n.392; 3.6, 119a36 ff, n.274; 3.6, 119a36–b34, n.393; 3.6, 119a38–b1, n.352; 3.6, 119a38–b4, n.351; 3.6, 119b1–3, n.354; 3.6, 119b11–15, n.366; 3.6, 119b15, n.367; 3.6, 119b17–19, n.377; 3.6, 119b18, n.379; 3.6, 119b19–21, n.378; 3.6, 119b20, nn. 380, 381; 3.6, 119b31, n.386; 3.6, 119b35–6, n.396; 3.6, 119b35–7, n.397; 3.6, 120a2–3, n.401; 3.6, 120a6, n.382; 3.6, 120a7, n.409; 3.6, 120a7–8, n.410; 3.6, 120a8–11, n.411; 3.6, 120a8–20,

- n.415; 3.6, 120a10–11, n.412; 3.6, 120a12–13, n.418; 3.6, 120a13, n.417; 3.6, 120a32, nn.429, 432; 3.6, 120a32–3, n.428; 3.6, 120a34, nn.429, 432; 3.6, 120a35, n.439; 3.6, 120a38, nn.432, 435, 436; 4.2, 122b15–17, n.96; 4.2, 122b19, n.96; 4.2, 122b26, n.96; 4.2, 122b38, n.96; 4.4, 124a18, n.96; 4.6, 128a23–9, n.96; 8.8, 160a35–b13, n.427  
*Rhet.* (= *Rhetorica*) 1.1, 135a41, n.251
- Callimachus  
 Fragm. Pfeiffer 620, n. 298
- Cicero  
*Fin.* (= *de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*) 1, 153–161, n.77; 5, 76–96, n.110
- Diogenes Laertius  
*Vitae Philosophorum* X 31, 35, n.137
- Epicurus  
*Hrdt.* (= *Epistula ad Herodotum*) 50, 5–6, n.137
- Euripides  
*Iphig. Aul.* (= *Iphigenia in Aulis*) 16–19, n.64
- Hesiod  
*Op.* (= *Opera et Dies*) 289, n.239
- Homer  
*Il.* (= *Iliades*) II, 204–5, n.86; XII, 243, n.85
- Olympiodorus  
*in Cat.* (= *in Aristotelis Categoriae*) 184,3–25, n.65
- Plato  
*Gorg.* (= *Gorgias*) 469A–479E, n.79  
*Leg.* (= *Leges*) 9, 875A, n.77  
*Phil.* (= *Philebus*) 20D, n.90; 44D7–47C2, n.337; 50E5–53C3, n.337  
*Polit.* (= *Politicus*) 294A–300C, n.81  
*Resp.* (= *Res Publica*) 2, 357B4–D2, n.110; 2, 359C7–361D33, n.297; 3, 407A, n.256; 6, 496B6–C3, n.133; 10, 612C7–614A3, n.297; 10, 614A5–621D3, n.56
- Ps.-Aristotle  
*Probl.* (= *Problemata*) XI, n.10; XIX, n.10
- Seneca  
*Ep.* (= *Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium*) 82.11–12, n.182; 87.16–17, n.182
- Sextus Empiricus  
*Adv. Eth.* (= *Adversus Ethicos*) 77, n.112  
*PH* (= *Pyrrhonei Hypotyposes*) 1.8, n.45
- Simplicius  
*in Cat.* (= *in Aristotelis Categoriae*) 401,24–403,23, n.65
- Thucydides  
*Hist.* (= *Historiae*) II 60, n.78



# Subject Index

Numbers refer to the pages of this volume.

accident (*topoi* and problems about)  
    3–5, 51  
acquisition 84–6, 92–3, 118, 150 n.224  
actions 97–9  
addition 17, 53–4, 36, 81, 101–2, 112–13  
appropriate, *see* proximate  
  
Callimachus 155 n.298  
capacities 29, 43 n.65, 63, 71, 76, 93,  
    140 n.111, 141 n.124, 146 n.172  
categories  
    and comparison 6–11, 52  
cause (of what is good) 65–6, 92–3, 96–7,  
    100  
choiceworthy (division of) 29, 105–7  
    by nature *vs* not by nature 67  
    because of itself *vs* because of opinion  
        103–5  
    choiceworthy *vs* good 54–5, 81–2  
    in its own right *vs* incidentally 65–6  
    possible *vs* impossible 73  
    superfluous *vs* necessary 91–2  
    and time 82–3  
    without qualification *vs* for someone  
        (or something) 66–7, 68–9  
Cicero 32, 44 n.76, 240 n.110  
combination (of goods) 80–1, 93,  
    101–2  
comparative  
    comparative predication 6–19  
    comparative problems 6–19; 53  
    comparative *topoi* 6–19  
    comparatives and relatives 9–10  
    grammatical category 40 n.24  
comparison (types of) 52–3  
consequents 77–80  
contraries 66, 84–6  
coordinates 153 nn.273–4, 160 n.348  
corruptions 84–6, 117–18  
corruptive things 117–18

deduction  
    categorical 12–19  
    from a hypothesis 12–19, 121–2  
degrees  
    intensity *vs* purity 158 n.337  
deliberation 25–33  
division 125–7  
  
ends and means 71–3, 73–6  
Epicurus 140 n.112, 142 n.137  
ethical  
    principles 31–3  
    problems 25–7  
Euclides 40 n.24  
Eudemus 12, 41 n.27  
Eudoxus 44 n.73, 60  
  
friends 91  
  
Galen 19, 40 n.24  
generalisation (of *topoi*) 5, 20–1, 110–14  
generations 84–6, 117–18  
genus  
    predication of 130 n.6, 60–2  
good  
    better without qualification 90–1  
    and choiceworthy, *see* choiceworthy  
    close or similar to the good 86–9  
    division of goods 28–9, 76  
    as a genus 139 n.102  
  
Hesiod 89  
honourable 29, 68–9  
  
indifferent 27, 29, 33, 81–2, 132 n.21,  
    140 nn.110 and 112, 148 n.199  
inflections 97–9, 153 nn.275–6, 160 nn.349  
    and 357  
intermediate, *see* indifferent  
Lycurgus 58, 136 n.80

- mathematics 19, 40 n.24  
 matter (of comparative problems) 51–2  
 means, *see* ends  
  
 opinion 103–5, 136 n.69  
     *see also* plausible; persuasive; reputable  
 outcomes 97–9, 153 n.272  
  
 Panaetius 44 n.76  
 particular  
     determination of 21–4, 124–5  
     indeterminate 21–4, 122–4  
     problems vs universal problems 21–4,  
         114–27  
 Phocylides 92, 135 n.63  
 Plato 58, 60, 66, 131 n.14, 135 n.56,  
     136 nn.77 and 79, 137 nn.81–2 and  
     90, 139 n.110, 142 n.133, 152 n.256,  
     155 n.297, 158 n.337  
 plausible; persuasive 151 n.251  
 pleasure 82–3; 155 n.300  
 precepts 31–3  
 productive things 73–6  
 proportion 72, 74–6  
 proximate  
     to the end 129 n.6  
     premise 16–19, 129 n.6  
     species (of genus) 129 n.6  
  
 quantities 11, 17–19, 99, 103, 155 n.293  
  
 relatives 4, 9–10, 19  
 reputable 15, 57, 59, 60, 91, 151 n.251  
     *see also* opinion; plausible;  
         persuasive  
  
 Seneca 32, 44 nn.70 and 76, 146 n.182  
 Sextus 21, 27–8, 30; 43 nn.57, 59, 62;  
     44 nn.67–9 and 71, 134 n.45,  
     140 n.112  
 Solon 58, 137 n.80  
 Stoics 18, 27, 32, 44 n.76, 137 n.89,  
     140 n.110, 145 n.160, 148 n.199  
 subtraction 103  
  
 Theophrastus 5, 6, 12, 15–16, 19, 20, 24,  
     39 n.4, 45 n.77, 125, 132 n.24,  
     137 n.82, 142 n.129, 158 n.329,  
     165 n.424  
*topos*  
     definition of 15–16  
     relations between 20–1  
  
 use 97–9  
 useful 29, 83  
  
 Zaleucus 58, 136 n.80











